[Dehai-WN] Africanarguments.org: Somalia: Government Must Downsize Its Vision Over Democracy Project and Vision2016

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 20:02:33 +0200

Somalia: Government Must Downsize Its Vision Over Democracy Project and
Vision2016


By Abdihakim Ainte,

17 September 2013

Analysis

This week the Somali government and its international donors are coming
together in Brussels under the rubric of 'The New Deal' vision. This will
set in motion a massive amount of money and machinery required for
reconstructing and rebuilding the country.

In case you are unfamiliar with The New Deal, it is a new global framework
that allows fragile countries (a list which Somalia tops) to decide 'own'
their fate, build confidence and prepare for a responsible transition to
democracy.

Last week, the Somali Federal Government, for its part, organized a
preliminarily conference in Mogadishu in which it gathered legislators,
civil society organizations, diaspora representatives, academics, and
regional authorities.

The goal of the conference was to debate the future of the country beyond
2016 under the title of the Transition to Democracy Vision. In the absence
of a framework on transition to democracy, delegates offered sketchy and
rather casual recommendations to 'transform' Somalia.

At the end of the conference, delegates agreed on a national vision, dubbed
'Vision 2016: Transitioning towards Democracy.'

At the heart of this is a vision is to transform Somalia into a functional
democracy based on an independent one man-one-vote election - a sort of
Jeffersonian representative democracy - to take place in 2016.

But as with every 'vision', the question is how you can turn it into a
realistic plan?

The short answer lies in understanding the gap between the vision being
outlined by the delegates and the means available to achieve its goals.
Looking ahead, the means available are substantially less than what the
delegates had hoped to achieve at the conference.

But that does not mean the vision is inevitably doomed. Going forward, there
are some signs of optimism such as the 1-million-children-going-2-school
initiative, the modicum of stability, the return of investment and the
renewed interest from the international community.

But there are equally, if not more, graver signs that could potentially
threaten and undermine such optimism.

State of the Government - and the Country

For starters, the government's own survival depends on 17,000 fully armed
African-led peacekeeping troops - operationally known as AMISOM - comprised
by a battalion from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Sierra Leone.

Additionally, its own national troops - roughly 18,000 - are grossly
underpaid, poorly trained, lack organizational coherence and function
largely as ethnic and private militiamen, rather than a national, unified,
disciplined army.

It's no secret that some elements of its national troops frequently engage
in rape and other forms of sexual harassment, extortion, kidnapping and are
often complicit in insider attacks.

In addition, its logistical infrastructure - things like airpower, medevac,
aerial surveillance, equipment and even things as basic as troop sustenance
- are almost all nonexistent.

To top it off, the bulk of Somalia's citizens have either little faith in
the legitimacy of government institutions, or are deeply dissatisfied with
government's inability to provide basic services, questioning its legitimacy
beyond Mogadishu.

Moreover, it has only a few donor-imposed and donor-financed institutions,
chiefly the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the National
Intelligence Agency.

As one scholar recently put it at the national de-radicalization conference
in Mogadishu: "Still Al-Shabaab has the monopoly of fear" - able to kill
people almost at will, even assassinating government officials. As a result
it has become the only truly feared institution in the country.

The government doesn't have the legitimate means to control the violence in
its own backyard - Mogadishu - let alone in the rest of the country.

Secondly, insecurity remains a massive problem and still the biggest
challenge hampering future planning - whether this is 'Vison2016' or the
President's six pillar nation-building strategy.

In the days leading up to the conference, al-Shabaab carried out a deadly
suicide attack at a local restaurant just a block away from the presidential
place, leaving a death toll of more than 20 people and injuring two
journalists. Even more worryingly, two major humanitarian organizations -
including MSF - have completely withdrawn from the country.

While significant progress has been made on the security front over the
course of the year, the campaign against al-Shabaab has become somewhat
muted, allowing it to regroup and strike back with a more lethal form of
asymmetrical warfare.

Furthermore, the government's strategy against al-Shabaab appears to be as
follows: Whenever the group stages an attack they respond with roadblocks,
sweeping home-searches and detain dozen of youths, boxing themselves into a
defensive position.

The absence of a national strategy on the part of the government and the
lack of coherent coordination among its international partners has provided
al-Shabaab an opportunity to re-emerge and infiltrate government
institutions.

Thirdly, key government branches - legislative, judiciary and ministries -
are institutionally weak and unable to carry out reforms or support
'Vision2016.'

These institutions are often advanced patronage networks, fueling corruption
and cronyism at the national and local level. Worst yet, there is no
electoral infrastructure in place and political parties are utterly absent.

Fourthly, trust between government and regional administrations has eroded
due to the constitutional crisis, lack of confidence and clan enmity.

Although the government has attempted to reach regional authorities, it has
not defined an inclusive strategy that accommodates regional
administrations, prompting some regions to cut ties with government
unilaterally and others are threatening to follow.

Moreover, this highly centralized authority, governing vertically from
Mogadishu, complicates efforts to reconcile and reach out to the competing
regional administrations and, as result, fuels the hostile atmosphere.

Fifth, and perhaps most critically, the government faces huge economic
challenges. For more than three decades the country has been almost
exclusively dependent on outside assistance and diaspora remittances.

Furthermore, the government has been unable to generate local revenue to
cover its budgetary sheets and the private sector operates in an unregulated
and un-taxed market.

A recent UN commission study finds massive corruption and misappropriation
of public funds at the government level and accused government officials of
theft and public embezzlement.

Maintaining Fragile Gains

While it would be foolish to paint a picture of an existing democracy
project in Somalia, it would be equally foolish not to envision one. And the
government deserves huge credit for taking the initiative and setting the
wheels in motion.

But rather than standing behind the vision and cajoling donors in Brussels,
the administration needs to downsize its ambition and start debating a
realistic course of action.

That should start with a debate on how to sustain and strengthen the fragile
gains that government and its international partners have achieved over the
last years - creating an environment in which those gains can take root and
hold firmly.

Dropping a liberal democracy into a country that lacks experience of rule of
law, constitutional constraints and a system of governance, and expecting it
to take it root, is unrealistic. Keeping that in mind, Somalia's donors need
to abandon their zealous attempts to create a democracy out of the Somali
political system.

Rapid projects that attempt to make a transition towards democracy in
fragile situations like Somalia are perilous and very expensive. More
modest, fully developed, short-term projects like stabilization or building
a coherent framework for this are what is needed.

Maybe the next conference's title should be: "How to strengthen and sustain
the gains achieved?"

 




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