Kenya needs a comprehensive exit plan in Somalia
– By Abdullahi Boru Halakhe
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2013/09/11/kenya-needs-a-comprehensive-exit-pla
n-in-somalia-by-abdullahi-boru-halakhe/> September 11, 2013
Kenya’s intervention in Somalia in October 2011 came as a surprise to many
Horn of Africa observers. According to the Kenyan government, the raison
d’être for intervening was to pursue Al Shabaab members who allegedly
abducted aid workers in Northern Kenya and kidnapped tourist along the
coast.
Initially this sounded plausible (and even reasonable) given the genuine
security threats posed to Kenya by Al Shabaab. But shifting dynamics in the
port city of Kismayo raise questions regarding the changing goal of the
occupation. Recent events reveal Kenya is keen in establishing a “sphere of
influence” through Jubaland, putting the Al Shabaab theory to a stern test.
Since the intervention, the blowback has been evident – there is a
deteriorating security situation along the border with Somalia, and in
Nairobi there have been a series of grenade attacks. Whilst some of these
have been the work of opportunistic criminal and business groups, others
like the attack on the church in Garissa, bear the hallmark of Al Shabaab
(and have been claimed as such through their twitter handle.)
Liberators or occupiers
Striking a somewhat righteous if not opportunistic posture, many Kenyans
supported the intervention uncritically. And the initially triumphalist note
prevented many from asking questions about the entire enterprise.
But the “altruism” explanation seems to be wearing thin against naked
realpolitik displayed by the Kenya Defense Forces in Kismayo and its single
minded determination to establish a sphere of influence in Jubaland.
There is an obvious rationale for wanting to control Kismayo – the strategic
port is the nerve center of sea trade, and when it was controlled by Al
Shabaab it provided the group with ready income. But taking full control of
Kismayo has not been a straight forward affair due to several interlocking
and competing interests. This is where Kenya needs to be cognizant of
Somalia’s history and the radioactive nature of internal Somali clan
dynamics (especially for an external actor like Kenya with questionable
finesse.)
Kenya now seems to be walking straight into the local clan politics with its
eyes wide open, particularly as a result of their support for Sheikh Ahmed
Madobe, and by extension his clan, at the exclusion of the government in
Mogadishu, which until recently was at loggerheads with Madobe.
Recently, a rather misguided and naïve display saw Somali Ministers from the
Central Government mistreated when they visited Kismayo – a move intended to
undermine the authority of the new president. All the talk of federalism has
become a self-fulfilling prophesy and masks the nefarious interests of Kenya
which has aligned itself with Madobe and his clans. If the people in Kismayo
want a devolved authority that is nominally answerable to Mogadishu, but
autonomous at the same time, then that discussion should be left to the
Somalis themselves. Trying to influence such an outcome is counterproductive
and dangerous in the long run. If devolution is nothing but Kenya’s attempt
at establishing a satellite state remote-controlled from Nairobi, then this
reeks of sheer opportunism.
A recent rapprochement in Addis Ababa between Madobe and Mogadishu over the
key outstanding issues is, however, commendable as tensions between the two
sides were threatening to escalate. To make the deal, both sides made some
concessions – the federal government recognized Madobe as the interim
leader, and in return, the port will be handed to the federal government
after six months. However, there is a caveat regarding the revenues
generated by the port – priority will be given to the security and
institutional building of the Jubas. Regarding security, the Ras Kamboni
militias will be absorbed into the Somali National Army, although the local
administration will be responsible for police and law and order issues.
Remarkably, no timeline was set for this integration.
Wither Al Shabaab?
The only real beneficiary from the above mess is Al Shabaab, whose stock in
trade for recruitment is the weak central government. Al Shabaab also bills
itself as the vanguard of Somalia against external forces – the mere
presence of Kenya inside Somalia is a perfect storm for the group; it will
provide them with a raison d’etre to ‘liberate’ the country from the
infidels. This will potentially undo any gains made since intervention and
demonstrate Al Shabaab’s ability to transcend clan divisions.
Acute internal contradictions within the group are of greater existential
danger than any external interventions – the pan-Somali nationalism espoused
by Aweys and the transnational jihadist wing of Godane (nom de guerre of
‘Abu Zubeir’) was difficult to reconcile. The recent departure of Sheikh
Aweys (regarded as the father of the jihadi movement in Somalia), the
alleged killing of Ibrahim al-Afghani and fleeing of the group’s spokesman
Mukhtar Robbow, reveals a serious power struggle within the group. But what
is going on in Kismayo gives the group a second chance, similar to the 2006
Ethiopian invasion.
On the humanitarian front, as a demonstration of how tenuous the security
situation is, recently, after decades of working in Somalia, Medicin Sans
Frontiers (MSF) announced it was leaving. In a statement, the MSF said, “We
are ending our programmes in Somalia because the situation in the country
has created an untenable imbalance between the risks and compromises our
staff must make, and our ability to provide assistance to the Somali
people.”
Their departure raises serious questions about the regional interventions
(Kenya, Ethiopia etc) and the attendant wave of good news coming from
Somalia since they took place. This has seen Somalia once again on the
international radar; two international conferences in London, countless
visits by foreign dignitaries saying this is Somalia’s moment and many
triumphalism stories in the news media – opening of beech restaurants, ice
cream parlors and theaters. But all this gives a false impression that the
country has finally left its chaotic past behind and underplays the one
significant weakness that all previous Somalia governments had to contend
with – the lack of the monopoly over the use of force. Without an army and a
police of its own, peace and security will always be tenuous in Somalia.
In an effort to rebrand and remain relevant, on Eid, which marks the end of
month of Ramadhan, Al Shabaab released through its media wing, Al Kataib,
the video, “The Path To Paradise”. The 40 minute long video chronicles the
lives of young recruits from Minnesota who joined Al Shabaab. The major
theme of the video revolves around the evils the West is perpetrating on
earth, and calls on every Muslim to participate, as a religious duty in
defeating the Kufars (infidels.)
For Kenya, the lack of clear timetable for withdrawal from the outset was
problematic because it provided a sort of open-ended commitment, which will
inevitably fall prey to the ever lurking danger of mission creep. The window
when Kenyans troops were regarded as liberators has long been closed and
with it the goodwill of the Somalis. An indefinite stay and interference in
Somalia’s internal politics will make the AMISOM mission in Somalia – billed
as ‘Africa’s solution to Africa’s problem’ – look like an occupation.
Abdullahi Boru Halakhe is a Horn of Africa Analyst.
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Received on Wed Sep 11 2013 - 19:01:54 EDT