Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 22:06:08 +0200
Interim Egyptian Foreign Minister: The View from Cairo
Written by : <http://www.aawsat.net/author/a-ibrahim2> Ali Ibrahim
on : Monday, 5 Aug, 2013
Asharq Al-Awsat Interview
Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat-Career diplomat and politician Nabil Fahmy finds
himself at the helm of Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a very
difficult time in the country's history. With the eyes of the international
community firmly on post-Mursi Egypt, it is Fahmy's task to draw up a
coherent and articulate foreign policy.
In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt's interim foreign
minister spoke about Egypt's turbulent political situation, its focus on
building relations with its Arab and African neighbors, and his hopes for
Egypt's future.
Nabil Fahmy is a career diplomat, having served variously as Egyptian
ambassador to the US, Japan, and the UN. Fahmy's longest diplomatic stint
was as Egyptian ambassador to the US from 1999-2008. Fahmy also held a
number of posts in the Egyptian government since 1974, including deputy
foreign minister. After leaving the diplomatic sector, Fahmy entered
Egyptian politics, and is a former member of Mohamed El-Baradei's
Constitution Party. He is also the founding dean of the American University
in Cairo's School of Public Affairs.
The following interview has been edited for length.
Asharq Al-Awsat: In your last article before June 30 and before becoming
interim foreign minister, you wrote about the political problems facing
Egypt, the obstacles that impeded the first transitional phase following
January 25, 2011, and Egypt's misconceptions regarding the concept of
democracy. Do you feel that these issues have been addressed since June 30,
or will rectifying these issues take more time?
Nabil Fahmy: The fact is that the democratic process is unorganized. By its
nature, it must go through various corrective stages. If we look at the
countries in which democracy has been long established, we find that they
amend their constitutions every now and again and develop their laws until
they eventually align with the principles of basic human rights. If we take
the United States, for instance, the US Constitution did not afford African
Americans any rights, but in the 1960s many legal changes were made
regarding equality and citizens' rights. Thus democracy is a living
political movement; it is not an unchanging, ossified process. When working
to build a democracy it is natural that there will be steps forward and
setbacks. What is important is that the steps forward outnumber the
setbacks.
First, the political character of the state must be determined, and by that
I mean the constitution. It is natural that the political character of the
state emulate other modern models, and it is natural that in the 21st
century the political character of Egyptian society differs from what it was
some seven thousand years ago.
Once the character is determined then the president or prime minister can be
elected and a republican, monarchical, parliamentary or secular system can
be chosen. If mistakes are made in this regard, then they will be made as a
society. If a sound leader is elected then the country will progress forward
without major setbacks. In Egypt, we emerged from the revolution in 2011
demanding comprehensive change. Young people were one of the most innovative
groups throughout that revolution: 65 percent of the Egyptian population is
under 25 years old, and young people are known to demand change and look
toward the future. Thus it is a revolution against the style of governance
and the status quo, in an attempt to shape their future.
The first mistake we made was holding parliamentary and presidential
elections before determining the makeup of the constitution. We found
ourselves with a president and a parliament but without a framework in which
they could function. The president was elected democratically, but he did
not rule in a democratic manner. We had wanted to give the image of a
unified political community in Egypt; however, the Egyptian political
spectrum includes Islamist and secularist currents along with Muslim and
non-Muslim communities, all with different political orientations. No one
has the right to establish a political system that excludes others. In my
opinion, this is the root of the problem and the cause of this most recent
revolution.
The first revolution opened the door, but unfortunately political Islam
seized this opportunity, admittedly having done so through elections. They
forgot that the revolution of 2011 was an expression of the desire to
participate in determining the future, so when they attempted to shape the
future themselves, revolution re-emerged. We must not underestimate the
importance of what happened on June 30. At least 20 million citizens took to
the streets, and some estimates are larger than that. This means that 40
percent of those eligible to vote in Egypt took to the streets. If 50
million Americans took to the streets to protest in front of the US
Congress, or if 30 million British citizens were to do the equivalent, then
it would be a natural consequence that the government would collapse. The
former president decided not to heed this outpouring of people, so what
mechanism for change was left for the people?
Q: The counter-argument to this line of thought criticizes what is described
as a democracy of the street, which depends on the mob. Some ask why
Egyptians did not wait for the next opportunity to change the government via
elections and the ballot box?
What happened is very normal. First, we are in a transitional phase
following the revolution, and society sought to construct a sound democratic
system in which they could participate. Another thing was that during the
year of Mursi's presidency, all other political currents were excluded, and
with the constitution suspended the Islamists had a monopoly over rule. Save
for a limited number of members, the Shura Council was comprised of
individuals adherent to political Islam. Appointments to a variety of posts
were given to Islamists. If [the president] had been left to continue to
exclude others for four years, the makeup of the Egyptian state and the
national security establishment would have been threatened. There were also
measures taken abroad that were cause for alarm. There is a difference
between the Egyptian state and the Muslim Brotherhood nation-a fundamental
difference. The Muslim Brotherhood can have a place and a say in the
Egyptian state, but it cannot be the state.
Q: This brings us to another question: some say that the Brotherhood's
ideology is incompatible with the state model and national identity. How can
there be meaningful dialogue and reconciliation if that does not change?
Putting the constitution first would ensure that everyone participates in
government in accordance with it. This means, for instance, that secularism
in its purest form cannot be adopted if it runs contrary to society's norms.
Likewise, political Islam-by which I mean the Brotherhood-cannot be
implemented in its purest form. If the Brotherhood was unbending in its
commitment to the tenets of political Islam, and neglected the tenets of
nationhood and the Egyptian state, then undoubtedly they would be at
loggerheads.
We must accept that there is a state governed by the edicts of the
constitution. This is a problem that the old guard of the Brotherhood faces,
evidenced by its reliance on violence, as we can see and hear. If the middle
generation or younger generation within the Brotherhood wishes to bring some
of the Brotherhood's principles to bear on the Egyptian state while still
operating within the framework of the state system, and eschew withdrawing
from the state and excluding themselves, then they are more than welcome to
join in governance.
This reminds me of how, during the revolution of 2011, I met with some young
Muslim Brotherhood members and other young people, including women, Copts
and others. There was a young Brotherhood member there who spoke extremely
eloquently and coherently, and I asked him some questions to which he
replied, saying, 'I am a member of the Muslim Brotherhood through and
through, but these people were my partners in this revolution.' Despite the
fact that the other people in the room did not belong to the same group as
him, this young man accepted that they still had a role to play in the
state. If the Brotherhood were to adopt this stance, then they would be
welcome in government. However, if they cling to the notion that they are
the Islamic nation of Egypt or that they represent Egypt itself, then there
is no place for them. There is and will continue to be a standing invitation
for them, but only as long as they embrace the state system.
Q: When you heard that you were to be included in the transitional
government, which is a difficult task in precarious times, did you hesitate?
And what was your reaction?
This transitional government bears a historic responsibility: the stability
of the country, achieving national consensus, and developing a healthy
democracy for Egypt's future, all in nine months. I had been asked to take
this job three times before and each time I had to apologize and turn down
the offer, once during the Mubarak era and twice since then. Frankly, I am
not interested in such posts or continuing within government, even though I
had the honor of representing Egypt abroad, which I enjoyed very much. This
time, unlike times past, I did not have to pause to consider for the same
reason stated in your question, that this is a very sensitive stage, and I
thought of this as a national calling, and my answer surprised many: I said
'I'm in' and began to work. I know very well that the challenges will be
tough, but it is a national duty, we must all do our part.
Q: Egypt seems quite polarized regarding how it should approach the Arab
world. How do you think this should happen?
Egypt-rather, the entire Arab community-is in a state of transition as it
attempts to establish its identity. The Arab people want to determine their
character going forward. We live in the information age, and as such what
transpires in any one location is relayed across the world in moments, and
thus it is inevitable that we take a two-pronged approach: the first is to
accept that this chapter in our political history is highly active, and
second that there will always be conflicting opinions.
Adopting an uncompromising position was absurd in years past, but it is even
more so now, both on the domestic scene and abroad. The presence of
diverging viewpoints is a positive thing as long as they do not devolve into
conflict. In a related matter, we must be more forthcoming as regards
transparency; the more honest the government the more credibility it will
have. There may be differences in opinion, but the information should be
irrefutable. The third day after I took over the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, I held a press conference where I made known our mindset, goals and
priorities for the next nine months. I will be held accountable according to
those statements, because I know we operate in an open system.
These policies will yield positive results once we return to our
Arab-African orientation. We will renew our relations and reactivate our
traditional strategic approach. In all honesty, a number of Gulf states,
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, have greeted this
pivot in our foreign policy with gratitude. Jordan, the heart of the Arab
world, has also made its political support known. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Syria have always been aligned, but the latter is currently in disarray. We
must also reach out to North Africa. Harping on the division of the Arab
world is pointless, especially when the Arab world is divided by its
allegiances to countries outside the Arab world.
Q: What about Turkey and the stance it has taken?
Several Turkish leaders are approaching this in ideological terms, which is
a big mistake. They exaggerate in their statements in a manner that quite
frankly is unacceptable. The people's voice is louder than any external
party. We will evaluate our strategic relations with every country,
including Turkey. However, the voice of the people is the voice that will be
heard. If countries overstep their bounds it will have an impact on the
interests at a certain stage and in the long term. I completely believe that
there will be stable relations between the two countries.
Q: The West is highly interconnected with the situation in Egypt and has
taken its customary cautious stance regarding the army's intervention in the
public sphere. What is the message you are sending to the West? Are you
influencing their views in a positive manner?
Before I answer your question, I want to say that my first tour abroad will
be to Arab-African countries, not just for appearances but because that is
where Egypt's foreign policy priorities lie. As for the West, most of the
international media news sources are based in the West, even if they are
broadcast in the East. Many Western interests lie in the Arab world and in
Egypt, and the West knows very well that what happens in Egypt affects the
Arab world. They have a stake in what happens here, and the democratic West
traditionally holds that any politician who is elected to power represents
democracy, and that any intervention on the part of the armed forces is
incompatible with democracy. The fact is that neither is true. The
democratic system encompasses elections and the civil state, this much is
true. However, there have been many European leaders in the past who were
elected but then went on to rule in a non-democratic fashion and caused
major disasters.
What happened in Egypt was an exceptional situation: two revolutions in two
and a half years. In both cases, the people mobilized first, then the Army.
In the first instance, the president stepped down and the army took control
of the country for a year or a year and a half as a result of that. In the
second instance, the president refused to step down and the military handed
power over to the head of the constitutional court in accordance with the
constitutional edicts, for in the absence of a prime minister, the head of
the constitutional court is next in line. Now we have put in place a road
map that will restore the democratic institutions. In all honesty, we are
telling the West that Egyptian national security was threatened and this
could not be tolerated. Every country in the world takes certain measures
when its national security is threatened, and there are many examples of
this.
The identity of Egypt was under threat. There was an attempt to alter it by
excluding some in favor of others. What we saw was popular activism. The
people mobilized twice and the army intervened as a result. This is the will
of the vast majority of Egyptians, and if the international community
understands this then that would please us. However, if the international
community does not understand this, then we are still doing the right thing
and moving in the right direction. The road map has been put in place. The
armed forces did not choose this road map, it was a cooperative effort on
the part of the political currents and the armed forces, and was approved by
the younger generation, various political currents, Al-Azhar and the
[Coptic] Church. We recognize that we are in an exceptional phase.
Q: To what extent do you think the instability affects Egypt's strategic and
vital interests, such as the Nile Basin issue?
[. . .]
A positive message to take away is the widely acknowledged fact that an
awakening is spreading across Egyptian society, and there is a positive new
energy that did not exist five years ago, or if it had existed, had since
diminished. Stability brings some advantages, but there is also the price of
the recession. The awakening has its costs but it also has a payoff. I
believe that Egypt's standing in the international arena is improving, not
receding. Why? Because now everyone knows that the success of this
experiment will have positive results, and its failure will have
consequences. So everyone wants to know what the implications of success and
failure might be.
Egypt will mobilize and stabilize internally, God willing, sooner rather
than later. Abroad, it will become increasingly active in the near future.
This, in large part, will depend on the stability of the security situation.
We in ministry of foreign affairs intend to implement a different plan than
what was in place last year. The first thing we will restore will be the
core tenets of Egyptian identity, that is, its Arab and African roots. From
there, we will tend to our relations with other Arab nations and maximize
the mutually beneficial and historical aspects of those relations. If any
problems arise, we will try to navigate them as deftly as possible. We will
look at strategic policy not in terms of action and reaction: international
relations are much more complex than that. Moreover, the national security
of the country will always be paramount. We may disagree with certain
figures now and again, but we will not let these differences affect the
greater political interest, and we will not let them undermine Egypt's
dignity and short-term interests.
Regarding the water issue, more specifically the Renaissance Dam, we
strongly reaffirm Egypt's historic right to water; however, we will work
with the same conviction towards finding solutions so that Ethiopia may
realize its economic and developmental aspirations. The issue is not a
zero-sum game; the issue is what rights are involved and what interests are
at stake. We endeavor to respect all rights and secure our interests.
Moreover, the Middle East will never witness peace if there is more division
in the Arab world. The Syrian issue and GCC relations with Iran are both
critical for Egypt, not to mention the peace process.
Q: Regarding Ethiopia, the previous government issued contradicting
statements, which still have yet to be clarified, regarding the Renaissance
Dam. . .
First, as I have said, it is the mindset that matters. The first thing I did
after being charged with resolving the Renaissance Dam issue was to form a
fact-finding commission that could reveal the truth regarding the real risks
and what needs to be done. This way, when we are in talks with one party or
another we are able to base our discussions on tangible facts, minimize
risks and allay some concerns. Our approach abroad will be based on
verifiable, scientific facts, and we hope that as a result of this we can
achieve some compatibility, at least in regards to official statements. It
may be the case that a foreign party has a dissenting opinion, but there
should at least be credible information available, and from there each group
will be free to interpret the situation and offer policy suggestions as they
like.
<http://www.aawsat.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/nabil-fahmy-e1375534906475
.jpg> Egypt's interim Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy. (REUTERS/Amr Abdallah
Dalsh)
Egypt's interim Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy. (REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh)
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