Analysis- Somalia: The Deadlocked Conflict over Jubbaland Ruptures
21 Jul, 2013 - 3:31:28 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
From the end of June into the end of July, the deadlocked conflict between
the forces of decentralized federalism and centralized federalism in the
three deep-southern regions of Somalia - Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba
- ruptured.
The previous month's posturing - war dances in the deadlock -turned
seriously violent, ripped the rivals apart, polarized the positions of the
rivals and left them more distrustful of each other, spurred the rivals to
organize themselves more tightly and mobilize themselves, and, as a
consequence, brought the conflict closer to the brink of civil war.
As the forces of the Jubaland administration, established independently of
the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.), and those supporting the S.F.G.
squared off, the key regional player in the conflict - Kenya - got
inextricably caught in its contradiction between its international mandate
to support the S.F.G. as a member of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM), and its interest in having the deep-southern regions as
a sphere of influence, which would be more easily served by the
decentralized federalism advanced by the Jubaland administration. The last
big player in the conflict - The Western "donor"-powers/U.N. - urged cease
fires and negotiations, and took no discernible action.
As is so often the case in political history, the serious issue in the
conflict - What form of state will Somalia have? - is subsumed under and
occluded by more narrow conflicts among local interests. In the
deep-southern regions, those conflicts center on clan and sub-clan
interests. In a highly simplified sketch, the clan dimension of the conflict
has, as polarization set in, resolved into rivalry between the
Ogaden-Majertein alliance (Jubaland) and the Marehan alliance (pro-S.F.G.).
The situation is complicated by the fact that there are members of all major
clans on both sides, yet the general pattern holds.
The territorial base of the Marehan is the southwestern Gedo region, which
is controlled by a pro-S.F.G. administration. The territorial base of the
Ogaden-Majertein is the southeastern Lower Juba region, which contains the
prize of the deep south, the port of Kismayo. At least thirty clans and
sub-clans reside in Kismayo, some of them affiliated with one side, and the
others with the other side. The war dances turned into a mini-war in
Kismayo.
The fighting took place from June 26 to June 30 between the Jubaland
security forces (mainly the Ogaden-dominated Ras Kamboni (R.K.) militia
under the control of the Jubaland administration's president, Ahmed Madobe),
and opposition forces (mainly the Marehan militia under (ex-)warlord Barre
Hirale allied with other clan militia). How the mini-war started, who
started it, which actors were fighting, and how the Jubaland forces won and
took firmer control of Kismayo cannot be determine with confidence from open
and closed sources, since the accounts tend to emphasize putative facts that
justify one side or the other. What one can say with confidence is that the
R.K., most likely with the military support of Kenyan AMISOM, defeated the
Marehan alliance and drove its forces out of Kismayo.
Score one for the Jubaland administration (and decentralized federalism for
those who care), but the story does not end there. The price of victory has
been borne initially by Kenya, Jubaland's major backer.
Almost immediately, the anti-Jubaland factions charged that Kenyan AMISOM
had used heavy weapons to support the Jubaland forces against the
anti-Jubaland militia and against civilians belonging to anti-Jubaland clans
and sub-clans. They demanded a withdrawal of Kenya from the deep-southern
regions, an investigation of Kenya's conduct by the "international
community," and the deployment of S.F.G. forces against the Jubaland
administration. After a few days of hesitation, the S.F.G. followed suit,
opening up a rupture with Kenya. Kenya countered by denying its
participation in the fighting, saying that it would remain in the deep south
under AMISOM, and insisting on its neutrality in the conflict and its
support of the S.F.G.
Score one for the anti-Jubaland coalition (and centralized federalism);
Kenya has been compromised and is on its back foot. Whatever its role in the
fighting was, Kenya has alienated the Marehan coalition and is no longer
credible as a peacekeeper. That, of course, does not mean that Kenya will
have to withdraw from the deep south; whether it has to do so depends on its
paymasters, the Western "donor"-powers/U.N., which have so far sat on their
hands.
The events of late June and July have changed the configuration of power in
the deep south, but they have not substantially altered the balance of power
there, and the deadlock remains in place. The Jubaland administration
controls Kismayo (for the moment), the Marehan-S.F.G. controls Gedo, Kenya
has lost its credibility, relations between Kenya and the S.F.G. have
ruptured, and the two domestic coalitions are mobilized to renew the fight.
In the aftermath of the fighting, the rhetoric on both sides has become - to
put it mildly and euphemistically - extravagant. It will not be repeated
here, simply noted; Hegel would have called it "dust over the city," only,
it must be added, mentally toxic dust over Kismayo.
The most important development in the wake of the fighting has gone
relatively unnoticed in the public media. On July 14, a group of "Marehan
Community Elders" issued a press released signed by twenty notables,
including Gedo's governor, Mohammed Abdi Kaliil, and Barre Hirale. The
document deserves close attention, if only for its polarized position.
The Marehan notables announce that they have withdrawn their trust in Kenyan
troops, who are not, they say, impartial peacekeepers, but who have
collaborated with Ogaden militia, the latter which are engaged in "pillage,
rape, and torture." The notables attribute the fighting to repression of a
"popular uprising" against the R.K. by the Marehan, Gaaljecel, Shikhal, and
Awremale clans in Kismayo. The notables accuse Kenya of having "vested
interests" in Lower Juba that it implements through its Jubaland "proxy,"
which it has fashioned into a "satellite state." The notables end by calling
on all Somalis to take up arms to defend Somalia's sovereignty, citing the
right of self-defense in international law.
The point here is not to endorse the Marehan interpretation of the conflict,
but to underscore how the Marehan have been alienated and how Kenya has been
severely compromised. Taken together, those consequences of the late-June
mini-war have exacerbated the deadlock.
For the present, to repeat, the Jubaland administration controls Kismayo
(somewhat uneasily), the Marehan alliance has been alienated, and Kenya has
lost credibility. The southern regions are closer to the brink of civil war.
The deadlock has ruptured, but it has not been broken.
Clan rivalry is set to determine what form of state Somalia adopts, if it
ever gets one out of a (violent) deadlock that seems to be interminable.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
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Received on Sun Jul 21 2013 - 05:51:04 EDT