Libya and the Sahel: Has a Dictator’s Demise Doomed the Region?
Humanitarian Affairs
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/zscott/> Zach Scott | on July
16th, 2013 |
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/07/16/libya-and-the-sahel-has-a-dictator
s-demise-doomed-the-region/#comments> 0 comments
After the fall from power in 2011 of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, Libya’s de
facto ruler for forty-two years, there was no lack of backslapping bonhomie
among NATO country members who had helped overthrow the despot from power.
Indeed, the West’s bombing sorties had been skillfully executed, with France
and Great Britain playing key roles in a campaign that required flexibility
and skill in order to support a disorganized rebel force and to avoid the
political fallout that would have resulted from high civilian casualties.
Although some Republican foreign policy hawks in Washington chafed at the
characterization of America’s role in the campaign as “leading from behind,”
it was difficult at that time for anyone to argue against the success of the
mission.
Fast-forward nearly two years since the end of the civil war, and the
situation in Libya
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/world/africa/libyan-violence-threatens-to
-undercut-power-of-militias.html?_r=0> has changed dramatically. The initial
exuberance following the fall of Qaddafi has given way to hand-wringing in
Washington, as a fierce battle rages between Republicans and Democrats over
whom to blame for the death of Christopher Stevens, the former U.S.
Ambassador to Libya, last September 11 in an attack of the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi. While Washington engages in political posturing and
finger-pointing, deeper concerns about post-intervention policies are being
ignored with grave consequences not only for Libya but also for other
countries in the region.
Developments in countries located in the Sahel, the Sahara desert’s southern
fringe, reflect the unrest spreading beyond Libya’s borders since Qaddafi
was thrown out. The proliferation of weapons, escalation of armed attacks by
radical Islamic groups, and the return of hundreds of thousands of Africans
no longer welcome in Libya are three phenomena with consequences that the
international community, in its rush to claim credit for toppling Qaddafi
and bringing democracy to Libya, did not foresee and which are now wreaking
havoc in Africa’s arguably most volatile region.
First, the weapons. It is important to remember that Libya, under Qaddafi’s
watch, was a large-scale purchaser of arms. Since the beginning of the civil
war in February 2011, an unknown volume of munitions have been smuggled into
the Sahel, as well as into parts of the Middle East, including Egypt, Gaza
and Syria. Indeed, Islamic militant groups in Mali, whose control of the
northern part of the country and near takeover of the capital, Bamako,
precipitated France’s military intervention in January 2013, were armed with
high-powered weaponry from Qaddafi stockpiles. Reports have also indicated
that Syria’s rebels have
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/world/africa/in-a-turnabout-syria-rebels-
get-libyan-weapons.html?pagewanted=all> received substantial arms from Libya
through shipments financed by Qatar, adding to the militarization of that
country amid its worsening humanitarian crisis and increasing concerns that
once inside Syria, the weapons may fall into the hands of extremist groups
operating in the country. Countries in the Sahel, particularly Niger,
Algeria and Mauritania, were always wary of Libya’s civil war and the
toppling of Qaddafi, and it now seems their concerns were justifiable.
Following close on the heels of increased weaponry in the region has been an
escalation in armed attacks by extremists in the Sahel. The U.N.’s decision
to deploy a 12,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force, the world body’s third
largest, to Mali by the end of this year, while laudable in its aims, is
likely akin to a game of whac-a-mole: Jihadists confronted by a superior
force have only to move through porous, sparsely populated borders to other
desperately poor countries to rest, rearm and plot renewed strikes. And
while troops may be able to bring stability to the area in which they are
deployed, there are already indications in the Sahel that security gains in
one country may come at the cost of increased extremism in others. For
instance, there are reports that
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/13/us-sudan-south-mali-idUSBRE91C1G7
20130213> Malian rebels have fled to Darfur in the western part of Sudan;
similarly, large tracts of land in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger have
little to no government presence, allowing jihadists to move unencumbered
and control large swathes of rugged terrain.
<
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21580498-another-poor-
saharan-state-has-come-under-attack-violent-islamists-bad-omens> Recent
suicide-bombings in Niger, the first known in the country’s history,
demonstrate that armed groups have spread out across the Sahel, while
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigerian-islamic-extremist-leade
r-we-will-burn-down-schools-kill-teachers-but-not%20children/2013/07/13/6de6
3dac-ebb0-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html> continued turmoil caused by
Boko Haram (“western education is sacrilegious”) in Nigeria’s northeast
shows little progress is being made in the government’s effort to provide
security.
In addition to the threat an expansion of arms and extremist groups across
international borders pose to the region, many countries in the Sahel now
have to cope with the return home of hundreds of thousands of their citizens
who had relocated to Libya prior to its civil war. The Libyan economy
provided jobs for many sub-Saharan Africans who had fled countries with
internal strife and were able to send much-needed remittances to their
families as a means to combat poverty. The influx of the returnees to their
home-countries has resulted not only in a sudden drop-off of important
financial support, but has also applied additional strain on already fragile
socioeconomic structures as families and governments try to cope with a
large influx of jobless young men. In an
<
http://www.reliefweb.int/report/mali/report-assessment-mission-impact-libya
n-crisis-sahel-region-7-23-december-2011-s201242> U.N. report issued in
2012, the International Organization for migration estimated that 95 percent
of returnees from Libya were male, between the ages of 20 to 40, and had
low-levels of educational attainment. These men, many of whom suffered
severe psychological trauma, human rights violations and extortion while
fleeing Libya during its civil war, make eager recruits for jihadist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which, according to
the same U.N. report, have reportedly assumed a humanitarian posture,
providing services and assistance in remote areas that aid organizations are
unable to reach. This influx of now unemployed returnees, combined with the
prevalence of food insecurity, natural disasters such as drought and floods,
and epidemics (polio, meningitis, cholera and malaria) have only increased
the vulnerability of communities in the Sahel.
If the West is going to accept credit for the toppling of Qaddafi, it must
also take responsibility for the unintended consequences precipitated by his
ousting. The toppling of a dictator looks less impressive when his expulsion
threatens the territorial integrity of other states and enhances the appeal
of extremist forces. The mistaken belief that American and European
intervention in Libya could be reduced to getting in quickly, avoiding boots
on the ground and leaving as soon as possible points to a misunderstanding
of the regional importance of Libya to the Sahel and the complex
interrelationship of Libya and its neighbors. It seems that Western
governments failed to see (or chose to ignore) the extent to which
instability in Libya would exacerbate the rise of extremist elements and,
combined with the spread of Libyan arms, foment insurrections in the Sahel.
Moreover, NATO’s course suggests a lack of clear understanding of the
economic impact removing Qaddafi would have on the wider region and its
implication vis-à-vis the recruitment of young men into the jihadists’
ranks.
The spillover from Qaddafi’s fall is likely to continue to have a profound
impact on the Sahel, influencing insurgencies across the region. And while
leaders in Washington continue to point fingers at one another over
Ambassador Stevens’ death, they would be wise to use that energy, instead,
to work in concert with their European partners to develop a plan to tackle
the grave issues that have bubbled over since the lid of Qaddafi’s control
has been removed from the pot.
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Received on Tue Jul 16 2013 - 17:55:16 EDT