Somalia: A New Solution That Brings New Problems for Somalia's Jubaland
By Emmanuel Kisiangani And Hawa Noor,
12 July 2013
Analysis
Nairobi - On 15 May 2013, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, aka Madobe, a former
warlord and the leader of the Ras Kamboni Movement (a Somali militia group),
was elected president of Somalia's strategic region of Jubaland.
In a move that conjured up images of Somalia's separatist northern regions
of Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug, the election of Madobe, an ally of the
Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), has raised questions about legitimacy and
federal jurisdiction in Somalia and stirred fears of renewed fragmentation
and loss of influence by the nascent regime in Mogadishu. In turn, it is
alleged that the Somali federal government in Mogadishu covertly supported
other candidates such as former warlord Colonel Barre Hirale in order to
undercut Madobe and improve the political fortunes of the Mogadishu-based
government.
Nearly two months after Madobe's election by the majority of the 500
delegates who gathered at the Jubaland conference in Kismayo, the situation
in the important port city and the fertile region of Jubaland remains
precarious. It threatens to undermine the advances made in the fight against
al-Shabaab and state-building efforts by the federal government. Of concern
too is Mogadishu's persistent accusations of non-impartiality by the
Kismayo-based African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Section Two forces,
most of whom are from the KDF, and its potential effect on sub-regional
relations.
The newly elected Somali federal government president, Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, has already warned that Somalis must remain united and that
federalism, as provided for in the country's constitution, can only provide
a constructive platform for promoting unity as opposed to secession.
Speaking for the first time since the Jubaland conference, Hassan called on
the people of Jubaland to support the central government as the only
legitimate governing body of Somalia.
Jubaland (which consists of the Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba regions)
remains largely under the control of al-Shabaab, with the government and
AMISOM/Ras Kamboni Movement controlling urban and peri-urban sections. In
the months preceding the Jubaland election, Mogadishu attempted to gain
control over political dialogue on the formation of Jubaland, but this came
to naught due to the Ras Kamboni Movement's leverage. The government then
began criticising the process, arguing that it was not inclusive. While the
Somali federal government acknowledges that Somalia's provisional federal
constitution allows for the formation of a federal system of government, it
argues that all the regions of Somalia still fall under the central
government.
For its part, the new Jubaland administration refutes the allegation of
having formed an autonomous government and claims that its search for a
strong administration in Kismayo is in line with the federal constitution
and that the Somali federal government had been invited to participate in
the dialogue process.
Jubaland (formerly Azania) is geo-politically and economically strategic
because of possible gas and oil deposits, its charcoal industry and its
fertile agricultural land, all of which make it attractive to both local
clans and neighbouring countries. For Kenya, a Jubaland backed by a strong
administration could provide a buffer zone solution to security problems in
its north-eastern region, and in particular to its ongoing Lamu Port and
South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor infrastructure project.
Kenya, however, finds itself in a difficult position, having played a
central role in Somalia's various peace processes but needing the support of
the Ras Kamboni Movement in its intervention in Somalia against al-Shabaab.
The implication of this is that Kenya cannot easily disregard its ally,
particularly given the role each is playing in pacifying southern Somalia.
However, supporting the formation of Jubaland and Madobe's leadership is
seen as a betrayal of the same national government that it helped to create.
Kismayo also holds geostrategic possibilities for land-locked Ethiopia, as
it could provide it with a new route to the Indian Ocean. The formation of a
new Jubaland administration, however, is a double-edged sword for Ethiopia
due to clan affiliations that continue to define cross-border relations in
the region. The majority of Jubalanders, including its new leader, are from
the Ogaden clan, which also occupies the Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia
(bordering Jubaland). Thus an independent Jubaland could lead to Ogaden
National Liberation Front rebels increasing their demands for secession from
Ethiopia.
With the ongoing blame game over Kismayo, the stand-off has the potential to
destabilise southern Somalia and re-invigorate al-Shabaab. It can also
undermine Somalia's state-building process and relations with neighbouring
states. The federal government in Mogadishu has legitimate fears about the
potential threat to its influence over parts of Somalia, but the Ras Kamboni
Movement has contributed significantly to fighting al-Shabaab and the two
parties need to find a middle ground. There have been reports that the
federal government is willing to compromise by granting the Ras Kamboni
Movement an interim regional leadership, which is quite encouraging.
Importantly, the federal government needs to initiate formal dialogue, with
the support of the United Nations, over Kismayo - dialogue that should
include neighbouring member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD). That way the parties can address their perceived
grievances, which at the moment do not seem very entrenched. The federal
government also needs to move quickly to revisit the question of its interim
federal constitution, whose merits remain divisive. Otherwise, it will do
itself more harm by engaging in proxy warfare over Kismayo, in the face of
momentous priorities that at a very basic level include extending its
influence beyond Mogadishu and basic service provision under tenuous
political circumstances and with serious resource constraints.
Emmanuel Kisiangani, Senior Researcher and Hawa Noor, Research Intern,
Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Nairobi
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Received on Sat Jul 13 2013 - 20:44:40 EDT