The Next Phase of the Arab Spring
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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis> Analysis
July 12, 2013 | 1716 <javascript:void(0)> Print Text Size
Analysis
The Arab Spring was an exercise in irony, nowhere more so than in Egypt. On
the surface, it appeared to be the Arab equivalent of 1989 in Eastern
Europe. There, the Soviet occupation suppressed a broad, if not universal
desire for constitutional democracy modeled on Western Europe. The year 1989
shaped a generation's thinking in the West, and when they saw the crowds in
the Arab streets, they assumed that they were seeing Eastern Europe once
again.
There were certainly constitutional democrats in the Arab streets in 2011,
but they were not the main thrust. Looking back on the Arab Spring, it is
striking how few personalities were replaced, how few regimes fell, and how
much chaos was left in its wake. The uprising in Libya resulted in a Western
military intervention that deposed former leader Moammar Gadhafi and
replaced him with massive uncertainty. The uprising in Syria has not
replaced Syrian President Bashar al Assad but instead sparked a war between
him and an Islamist-dominated opposition. Elsewhere, revolts have been
contained with relative ease. The irony of the Arab Spring was that in
opening the door for popular discontent, it demonstrated that while the
discontent was real, it was neither decisive nor clearly inclined toward
constitutional democracy.
This is what makes Egypt so interesting. The Egyptian uprising has always
been the most ambiguous even while being cited as the most decisive. It is
true that former President Hosni Mubarak fell in 2011. It is also true that
elections were held in 2012, when a leader of the
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypt-and-muslim-brotherhood-special-repor
t> Muslim Brotherhood's election as president highlighted the reality that a
democratic election is
<
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/islamists-secularists-and-egypts
-crisis-governance> not guaranteed to produce a liberal democratic result.
In any case, the now-deposed president, Mohammed Morsi, won by only a slim
margin and he was severely constrained as to what he could do.
But the real issue in Egypt has always been something else. Though a general
was forced out of office in 2011, it was not clear that the military regime
did not remain, if not in power, then certainly the ultimate arbiter of
power in Egyptian politics. Over the past year, so long as Morsi remained
the elected president, the argument could be made that the military had lost
its power. But just as we argued that the fall of Hosni Mubarak had been
engineered by the military in order to force a succession that the aging
Mubarak resisted, we can also argue that while the military had faded into
the background, it remained the decisive force in Egypt.
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-modern-egyptian-republic-special-
report> Modern Egypt was founded in 1952 in a military coup by Col. Gamal
Abdel Nasser. Nasser was committed to modernizing Egypt, and he saw the army
as the only real instrument of modernization. He was a secularist committed
to the idea that Arab nations ought to be united, but not Islamist by any
means. He was a socialist, but not a communist. Above all else, he was an
Egyptian army officer committed to the principle that the military
guaranteed the stability of the Egyptian nation.
When the uprisings of the Arab Spring came, Nasser's successors used the
unrest to force Mubarak out, and then they stepped back. It is interesting
to consider whether they would have been content to retain their
institutional position under a Muslim Brotherhood-led government. However,
Morsi never really took control of the machinery of government, partly
because he was politically weak, partly because the Muslim Brotherhood was
not ready to govern, and partly because the military never quite let go.
This dynamic culminated in the demonstrations of this "Egyptian Summer." The
opposition leadership appears to support constitutional democracy. Whether
the masses in the streets do as well or whether they simply dislike the
Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to tell, but we suspect their interests are
about food and jobs more than about the principles of liberalism. Still,
there was an uprising, and once again the military put it to use.
In part, the military did not want to see chaos, and it saw itself as
responsible for averting it. In part, the military distrusted the Muslim
Brotherhood and was happy to see it forced out of office. As in 2011, the
army acted overtly to maintain order and simultaneously to shape the
Egyptian political order. They deposed Morsi, effectively replacing him with
a more secular and overtly liberal leadership.
But what must be kept in mind is that, just as in 2011, when the military
was willing to pave the way for Morsi, so too is it now paving the way for
his opposition. And this is the crucial point -- while Egypt is increasingly
unstable, the army is shaping what order might come out of it. The military
is less interested in the ideology of the government than in containing
chaos. Given this mission, it does not see itself as doing more than
stepping back. It does not see itself as letting go.
The irony of the Egyptian Arab Spring is that while it brought forth new
players, it has not changed the regime or the fundamental architecture of
Egyptian politics. The military remains the dominant force, and while it is
prepared to shape Egypt cleverly, what matters is that it will continue to
shape Egypt.
Therefore, while it is legitimate to discuss a military coup, it is barely
legitimate to do so. What is going on is that there is broad unhappiness in
Egypt that is now free to announce its presence. This unhappiness takes
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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/breakdown-egyptian-opposition-groups> many
ideological paths, as well as many that have nothing to do with ideology.
Standing on stage with the unhappiness is the military, manipulating,
managing and containing it. Everyone else, all of the politicians, come and
go, playing a short role and moving on -- the military and the crowd caught
in a long, complex and barely comprehensible dance.
Read more:
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-phase-arab-spring#ixzz2Ypj8O5fE> The
Next Phase of the Arab Spring | Stratfor
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Received on Fri Jul 12 2013 - 08:23:48 EDT