Egypt after the Coup
North Africa
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/scottmonje/> Scott Monje | on
July 11th, 2013 |
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/07/11/egypt-after-the-coup/#comments> 0
comments
Recent events in Egypt have been tumultuous, to say the least. The country's
first elected president in history was deposed by the military three days
after his first anniversary in office. The
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/a-d
ifficult-way-forward-in-egypt.aspx> International Crisis Group's description
of current Egyptian politics gives the impression of a grand competition in
short-sightedness. What happens next will depend on a multitude of factors.
Among those will be the ways in which the political parties and activists
define the current situation and the way in which they choose to react to
the recent coup and to each others' reactions.* It also depends on how
regular Egyptian citizens define the situation, the parties and their own
options.
The opposition to Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood government included a largely
spontaneous mass protest movement known as Rebel and an ad hoc coalition of
liberal and leftist political parties called the National Salvation Front,
which endorsed the protest movement after the fact. It is unlikely, though
not impossible, that either of these groups will survive for long in its
present form now that the common enemy that drew them together has been
deposed.
The members of the National Salvation Front viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as
a latent totalitarian movement, and every action that the government took
was colored by that interpretation. For instance, the staffing of
bureaucratic positions with members of the president's party - which is
common in many countries - was seen as subversive infiltration of the state.
A key turning point came late last year, when a constitutional assembly
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood rushed to push through a new
constitution on its own terms and Morsi declared his own decrees to be
beyond the scope of judicial review. This was taken as proof of the
government's basically antidemocratic aims.
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, saw the opposition as
determined to keep them from enjoying the fruits of government, which they
had legitimately won in fair elections. In the category of opposition, they
include not only the parties of the National Salvation Front but also the
bureaucracy and the judiciary, all still staffed with hostile holdovers from
the Mubarak era. On the eve of the presidential election, the Supreme
Constitutional Court had shut down the elected parliament, in which the
Muslim Brotherhood controlled the largest bloc of seats. Then, after he had
been deprived of a parliament, people complained that Morsi was ruling by
decree. After that, Morsi was convinced that the Mubarak-era judges were
also about to shut down the constitutional assembly, which - he will tell
you - was dominated by Islamists because the leftists and the liberals had
walked out. Where the opposition saw a totalitarian movement imposing its
will on the state, the government's backers viewed their own leaders as too
willing to compromise, too concerned about abiding by the rules, and too
reluctant to enforce a true Islamist agenda.
The Western media describe Egypt as a country divided into two
confrontational factions, secular and Islamist, but
<
http://themonkeycage.org/2013/07/04/this-is-not-the-end-of-islamism-in-egyp
t-beyond-the-pro-and-anti-islamist-divide/> that is not really true.
Relations between the National Salvation Front and the Muslim Brotherhood
might be described that way, but most of those spontaneous protesters'
complaints focused not on Islamist politics but on
<
http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/08/following_the_money_in_eg
ypt> economic conditions (economic positions, to be sure, made worse by
constant demonstrations as well as by incompetent policies). Polls suggest
that 70 percent to 80 percent of Egyptians are sympathetic to Shari'ah law
and to the notion of blending religion and politics; they just didn't like
Morsi any more. Al-Nur, the second largest party in the parliament, is a
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139565/william-mccants/salafis-after
-the-coup> Salafi Islamist party, generally considered well to the right of
the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet the leader of Al-Nur, along with National
Salvation Front leaders, was standing next to General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi
when he announced the overthrow of the Morsi government. Thus the overall
confrontation is not clearly one of secularists against Islamists, unless
people choose to make it so.
The question, of course, is what comes next. Many have called for the Muslim
Brotherhood to reconcile itself to events, cooperate with the opposition,
and help start over with a new constitution and a new government, presumably
run by someone else. This is an optimistic call given the likely reservoir
of resentment: the army has just overthrown their legitimate government and
replaced it with a Mubarak-era judge, issued arrest warrants for literally
hundreds of their leaders, and shot 50 of their followers dead during a
prayer vigil. That much does not bode well for a future of peaceful
politics. Brotherhood leaders could conclude - as many Salafis did long ago
- that they will never be permitted to come to power legally. Some have
called for an uprising.
The existence of Al-Nur, however, also presents an alternative model. It
could lead its own armed rebellion, or it could give Islamist voters an
option other than the Muslim Brotherhood and other than armed rebellion. To
the extent that Morsi has already discredited himself among voters (and that
does seem to be a considerable extent), Al-Nur may well benefit. How the
army and the other opposition parties would react to a Salafi Islamist
government would be very interesting to see, indeed. They could end up
regretting that they put an end to the Muslim Brotherhood's experiment in
Islamist democracy. So far Al-Nur has been notable for its repeated efforts
to bring the sides together, albeit without a great deal of success. It is
an open question whether they would sustain that conciliatory approach in
power with the opposition arrayed against them instead of against their
Islamist rivals.
Thus, as always, the course of future developments will depend on many
contingent decisions made by many independent but interacting players. Will
the army agree to stop arresting Brotherhood leaders? Will the army allow
free and fair elections, whether or not they stick to the highly ambitious
six-month schedule just announced? Will the Brotherhood return to electoral
politics if allowed or give up and opt for a path of violence? If they
choose the path of insurrection, how many people will follow them? Which
path will Al-Nur follow? If it follows the electoral path, will it pick up
some of the 45 percent of parliamentary seats that the Muslim Brotherhood
had as well as its own 25 percent? (Some argue that its extreme positions
limit its appeal to a narrower slice of the electorate.) If everyone plays
by the rules and adheres to peaceful electoral politics, will the army and
the parties of the National Salvation Front permit the Muslim Brotherhood or
Al-Nur to form a government and carry out its preferred agenda if it wins?
Or would the army react with yet another coup?
*Yes, it was a coup. The fact that U.S. officials have not used the word
does not mean that they don't know what a coup looks like. U.S. law requires
our government to withhold financial aid if their army overthrows their
government in a coup. Withholding aid from a country in as desperate straits
as Egypt, however, would make the situation there even less stable. Thus the
Obama administration (like just about any other administration) will resort
to convoluted reasoning to suggest that it was something other than a coup
rather than to stoke the already chaotic situation in a strategic but
fragile ally.
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Received on Thu Jul 11 2013 - 18:02:46 EDT