Ongoing efforts to build a lasting peace in Somalia represent one of the
greatest challenges facing the Horn of Africa with implications for all of
Somalia's neighbours and countries further afield. How has the government
performed so far?
Veteran Somalia watcher and former co-ordinator of the UN Monitoring Group
for Eritrea and Somalia, Matt Bryden, spoke to Sunday Nation correspondent
Rashid Abdi on this issue and the question of the deadlock over Jubaland,
which has become a hot-button issue in Mogadishu and Kismayu.
Q: How would you rate the government's overall performance in the last 11
months?
A: I think the government came in with a great deal of goodwill and optimism
and has set out a very ambitious programme. And one of the problems in
setting out such an ambitious programme is that it has, obviously, not been
able to meet all of those expectations.
The Six-Pillar Strategy is very broad, and it requires much greater capacity
than the government possesses. Most of the objectives the government has set
for itself will not be realised in the near-term or even in the medium-term.
These objectives will require years (to achieve).
So, there is disillusionment. There is criticism that the government has
failed to meet those objectives.
More importantly though, I think the government has lost track of some of
its core responsibilities under the provisional constitution. The Somali
Federal Government's (SFG) predecessors - the Transitional Federal
Governments that have succeeded each other over few years since 2000 - all
failed to accomplish any of the tasks required to set up a stable
government.
The constitution is incomplete; the structure of the state is not complete;
there is no electoral system yet in place. And so with little more than 36
months remaining in its term of office, it is incumbent upon the SFG to
complete all of these tasks.
If you consider that it will take at least 12 months - more realistically 18
- to prepare and conduct elections and a constitutional referendum, then we
have 18 months remaining in which the government must complete the
groundwork. And unless it is able to focus on those tasks with laser-like
concentration, then the SFG is going to reach the end of its term of office
without having done what it needs to do under the constitution.
Q: Running out of time, perhaps, but isn't there a sense too the government
may be also complicating matters for itself by fighting over issues that,
arguably, distract it from concentrating on those more critical core
objectives you have just outlined? I am thinking here of Jubaland? What in
your view would be the best way to resolve the Jubaland deadlock?
A: The Jubaland issue has become, unexpectedly, the issue on which this
government has chosen to fight for its platform, for its agenda and for its
term of office. It is an extremely dangerous and divisive issue for a number
of reasons.
The Jubaland dispute revives the clan-based narrative of Hawiye-Darood
contestation that fuelled horrific violence in the early days of the civil
war. And it involves geopolitical competition between those that believe the
government of Somalia should be more closely tied to Igad and the African
Union and those that believe the government should look towards the Arab
League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference as well as new,
non-traditional international partners - which is generating serious
friction within the Igad region.
But most importantly, Jubaland is a distraction. The government cannot
afford the time and energy to become embroiled in a battle over Jubaland,
and I believe it should avoid becoming party to one. The Federal Government
has the opportunity to rise above this and to leave such disputes over
federalism to the Independent Boundaries and Federation Commission that is
to be established by Parliament.
On the other hand, the Jubaland initiative which, to some extent, represents
the desire of the people of southern Somalia to have their own regional
government is, without question, incomplete, and is based on only one of
several legitimate, but very different, interpretations of the federal
constitution.
What is needed is a dialogue where the Federal Government can engage with
the Jubaland authorities to find ways to enlarge participation in the
government that has been recently declared, to discuss the distribution of
powers and responsibilities between Mogadishu and Kismayo, and to insist
that the final structure of any Jubaland administration will be ultimately
resolved under the auspices of an independent and credible boundaries and
federation commission.
I think if the Jubaland leadership would agree to enlarge their political
base and to accept that the commission will ultimately be able to modify
whatever has been agreed before the end of the SFG's term of office, and
before the federal constitution is ratified, then I believe we would be on
our way to finding the middle ground.
Q: The Somalia-Somaliland dialogue has been mooted for a while now and
preparations are under way for a new round of talks despite the recent
ill-tempered row over airspace and aviation issues. How do you assess
overall prospects and what would be the outcome?
A: The dialogue between the SFG and before it the TFG and Somaliland is a
very positive step. This is the first time a government in Mogadishu and an
administration in Hargeisa have recognised one another as parties to a
dispute and that they have something to discuss. The fact that the ice has
been broken and they are talking to each other is a very important
development.
However, it is extremely difficult and the greatest risk in this dialogue is
trying to move too fast and arriving inadvertently at a point of
disagreement, rupture and recriminations.
So, it is very important that these talks proceed, initially, on a technical
basis, exploring common ground, where they look primarily at those issues
that are of mutual concern - principally security, airspace, maritime space,
commerce, economic issues and the movement of people and goods. These are
the kind of things that are happening anyway, but could be formally agreed
and codified between them.
When it comes to political issues between them, there is a dichotomy - a
diabolical paradox. Both governments see themselves as constitutionally
bound to uphold the rule of law.
For Somaliland, that is respect for the declaration of independence in 1991.
For the SFG, that is respect for the unity and territorial integrity of
Somalia, which is recognised by the AU, the UN and the broader international
community. For either of these authorities to shift from those positions
would be political suicide. And so neither is able to engage in a political
dialogue that leads to an unfavourable predetermined outcome, one way or
another. I think the only way they are going to be able to talk about final
status is if the outcome remains open, because peaceful resolution of the
unity issue can only be achieved through mutual consent - not coercion.
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Received on Tue Jun 25 2013 - 21:55:24 EDT