Analysis-Somalia: War Dances in the Jubbaland Deadlock
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Jun 23, 2013 - 6:41:16 AM
From late May through the middle of June, the deadlock over the political
fate of the deep-southern regions of the territories of post-independence
Somalia persisted. The structuring conflict between centralized federalism,
championed by the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and its allies in the
southern regions; and decentralized federalism, pressed by the Jubbaland
administration, based in Kismayo, and its allies led by Puntland surfaced on
the ground with a confrontation between an S.F.G. “reconciliation”
delegation that had been dispatched to Kismayo, and the Jubbaland
administration; and the first outbreak of violent clashes over the issue.
Kenya, which occupies the Lower Jubba region under the imprimatur of the
African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was drawn into the
conflict as a result of its contradictory position of backing Jubbaland for
its own strategic reasons and having to act under AMISOM’s mandate of
protecting the S.F.G. A flurry of diplomatic activity transpired in Nairobi,
as various combinations of the domestic actors met with each other and with
the Kenyan government, all supposedly aimed at resolving the conflict, but
to no effect.
The Western “donor”-powers working through the United Nations abstained from
taking sides in the conflict, with the U.N. Security Council issuing a
non-binding “presidential statement” in early June that skirted the core
political dispute and, in mid-June, a press release expressing concern that
the situation in the deep south had “deteriorated,” but taking no measures
to break the deadlock.
Power Default
The cause of the deadlock in the deep south can be traced to the power
distribution among the actors involved in the Jubbaland conflict. The
“donor”-powers/U.N. hold the high economic, military, and diplomatic cards,
and the regional and domestic actors know that keenly, but they are unable
or unwilling to play them. Left without direction and commitment from the
“donor”-powers/U.N., the regional actors (Kenya and Ethiopia) and the
domestic actors equivocate or harden their positions, attempting to sway the
“donor”-powers/U.N. to their respective sides as they wait for decisive
action from the former, which is unlikely to come. Were the
“donor”-powers/U.N. to let the regional powers and domestic actors try to
resolve the conflict themselves, or were the “donor”-powers/U.N. to take
responsibility for resolving the conflict, the deadlock might be broken. As
it stands, they are doing neither, making a break in the deadlock
impossible: the “donor”-powers/U.N. have defaulted on their power, but they
will not allow any of the other actors to fill their place.
The rhetoric of “African solutions for African problems” and a “Somali-owned
process” rings hollow here; it is at least naïve, more likely disingenuous,
or perhaps outright cynical. A closed source in East Africa with access to
Western thinking reports that “donor”-power support for the S.F.G. only runs
as far as maintaining “the illusion of a sovereign government” with which
they can sign agreements and their corporations can sign contracts. Any
expectation of more robust Western support for the S.F.G. is, according to
the source, a “misreading” of Western intentions.
Under the condition of defaulted power, the deadlock over Jubbaland has,
indeed, “deteriorated,” as the story from late May to mid-June demonstrates.
Deteriorated Deadlock
The phase of exacerbated deadlock began on May 24 when the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), the Horn of Africa
regional organization, issued a communique on the Jubbaland conflict urging
“that the Federal Government of Somalia should timely convene and lead a
reconciliation conference with the support of IGAD while consulting key
stakeholders in the Juba Regions with a view to chart out a roadmap on the
establishment of interim administration and formation of a permanent
regional administration in accordance with the Provisional Constitution with
IGAD playing a supporting role.”
I.G.A.D., which is dominated by Kenya and Ethiopia, and has been tasked by
the “donor”-powers/U.N. with mediating the Jubbaland conflict, had, in its
communique, offered a recommendation/directive that, through its ambiguity,
satisfied neither the S.F.G. nor the Jubbaland administration, and impelled
both of them to respond to the document according to their respective
perceived interests.
S.F.G. president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, expressed “whole hearted” support for
the communique, but the quickly added a number of complaints and
reservations. Hassan complained that AMISOM forces (Kenyan) had hindered the
S.F.G. reconciliation delegations from efforts at outreach in Kismayo; said
that the process that had established Jubbaland violated the “spirit of the
constitution,” was undertaken without “government leadership,” and lacked
“inclusivity;” and criticized the International Community for adopting a
“culture to be neutral to all groups” when it should be backing the S.F.G.
Hassan said that the S.F.G. was “ready and committed to hold a genuine
reconciliation conference to key stakeholders.” He was unclear about
whether a “genuine” reconciliation conference would include the Jubbaland
administration, which his remarks had discredited.
Jubbaland president, Ahmed Madobe, immediately replied that the S.F.G. had
organized “clan violence” in the southern regions and had sent delegations
to Kismayo without informing his administration. He threatened that the
“people” in the south would recall their members of the federal parliament
and consult on Jubbaland’s future relationship with the S.F.G., adding that
the S.F.G. was funding people who had declared themselves “president” of the
southern regions after Madobe had been installed by the Jubbaland process.
Nevertheless, Madobe pledged allegiance to the S.F.G.; he simply wanted
Jubbaland to be “treated like other [regional] states” (the only one that
comes to mind is Puntland). In a May 26 statement, the Jubbaland
administration backed the “IGAD dialogue,” but only if it was held at a
“neutral venue,” which would exclude Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, where the
S.F.G. is based. Jubbaland spokesman, Abdinasir Serar, warned the S.F.G.
against deploying its forces in Kismayo and said that the S.F.G. had
“exaggerated” the I.G.A.D. communique, which had only given the federal
government a facilitating and not a directing role in reconciliation.
It is clear from the initial responses of the adversaries to the I.G.A.D.
communique that the document had not provided guidance for mediating the
conflict, but instead had presented a focus around which the contending
positions could be crystallized and hardened. One can understand the
ambiguity in the communique in terms of I.G.A.D.’s compromised position as a
proxy for the “donor”-powers/U.N. and a vehicle for Kenyan and Ethiopian
interests, most importantly keeping Somalia divided into their presumptive
spheres of influence; as a result of that equivocal position, I.G.A.D. could
not place itself on either the S.F.G.’s or Jubbaland’s side, so it
defaulted. After May 24, neither open nor closed sources have reported any
action by I.G.A.D. on the conflict in the deep south, nor has there been any
but halting movement towards a reconciliation conference. In the absence of
external direction, the adversaries have been left to do war dances in the
deadlock.
The first move in the post-communique conflict was made by the supporters of
the S.F.G. acting on Hassan’s complaints against the Kenyan-AMISOM forces.
On May 25, member of the federal parliament (S.F.P.), Abdirahman Hosh
Jibril, accused the Kenyan Defense Forces (K.D.F.) in AMISOM of violating
their mandate by failing to provide security for the S.F.G.-S.F.P. outreach
delegation in Kismayo. On the same day, the new S.F.G. force commander in
the Jubba regions, Col. Salah Makoma Mohamed, said that there were no S.F.G.
forces in Kismayo, only clan militias, and that he had met with Madobe, who
told him that all security forces in Kismayo were under the Jubbaland
administration’s command.
On May 26, Abdullahi Jama, chair of the S.F.P.’s committee on economic
reforms, said that the S.F.G. needed to take steps against Kenyan
“interference” in the south. On the same day, part of the S.F.G.’s
“reconciliation mission” in Kismayo left that city for Mogadishu. Shabelle
Media reported that Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, said that his
government would support the S.F.G.’s efforts to form regional
administrations.
On May 27, Hassan, speaking at an African Union summit, said that he had “no
complaint” against Kenya, but that the K.D.F. in AMISOM had “misbehaved and
operated outside their mandate.” Hassan added that he was “satisfied with
I.G.A.D.,” but stressed that there was a “wrongly led” group in Kismayo that
thought it could “establish its own state.” K.D.F. spokesman, Cyrus Oguna,
refused to comment on Kenyan-AMISOM treatment of the S.F.G.’s reconciliation
delegation, but insisted that AMISOM was “impartial and neutral” towards the
political conflict in the south (earlier Oguna had applauded the successful
conclusion of the Jubbaland process).
The rhetoric of the S.F.G. and its parliamentary supporters heated up on May
28 when M.P. Suleiman Mohamed Ibrahim accused Madobe’s Ras Kamboni (R.K.)
militia, which serves as Jubbaland’s security force, of facilitating Kenyan
interests in the south; and criticized Kenya for having a “hidden agenda;”
he said that the S.F.G. should dismiss the K.D.F. in the south and rely on
the new contingent in AMISOM from Sierra Leone. The S.F.G. took its position
more assertively when its prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, said that his
government would not accept “unbalanced administrations,” and called on the
people in the south to reject administrations that were formed outside the
S.F.G.’s authority.The S.F.G.’s foreign minister, Fowzia Yusuf Haji
clarified the government’s position, announcing that the S.F.G. would set up
“all-inclusive and balanced administrations” in the south that would
“represent majority and minority communities.” An S.F.G. delegation led by
its defense minister, Abdihakin Mohamed Fiqi, arrived in Kismayo and was not
allowed to leave the airport.
The S.F.G.’s push went from rhetoric to action on May 30, when M.P. Mohamed
Hassan Abullahi told Kenya’s Standard newspaper that he was among a group of
parliamentarians preparing a motion against the K.D.F. The Starndard
reported sources saying that Hassan’s close ally, Farah Abdikadir, minister
of state in the presidency, was spearheading the parliamentary move against
the K.D.F.
Having been stranded at Kismayo’s airport for three days by Jubbaland
authorities, Fiqi and his delegation were permitted by R.K. to enter the
city on May 31 under R.K. supervision, but were not allowed to meet local
clan elders. Somali commentator Daahir Sheikh, writing in the Raxanreeb
website, reported that Madobe had released the S.F.G. delegation after being
told to do so by Kenyatta, who was responding to a request from Hassan.
On June 4, the parliamentary push against Kenya lost momentum when M.P. Jama
Abdullahi, who had written the motion against K.D.F. interference, announced
that plans to file it had been suspended, because there had been “calls for
caution.” Pro-Jubbaland M.P.s mounted a counter-ofensive, with Abdirashid
Hidig telling the Standard that his group would “shoot down” any ani-Kenyan
motion; indeed, Hidig observed that a motion should be drawn up against the
S.F.G. and Prime Minister Shirdon, and warned that his group “would even
look for ways to impeach Hassan.”
A new player entered the conflict on June 4 when Puntland’s president,
Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, arrived in Nairobi. Daahir Sheikh reported that
Farole had met with Kenyatta, who had assured him that Kenya was committed
to a federal state-form for Somalia. On June 6, Farole said that he would
meet with Hassan and would urge him to hold reconciliation talks with
Madobe. Anti-Jubbaland southern politician Barre Hirale, who had declared
himself president of the southern regions after Madobe’s election, warned
Farole to stop his “blind interference” in the region’s politics.
On June 7, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and Farole had met and had
“reached consesnsus on most issues.” Shabelle Media reported that the two
presidents had not agreed on how to resolve the Jubbaland conflict, with
Farole insisting on Jubbaland’s legitimacy and Hassan insisting that
administrations could not be formed independently of the S.F.G.
As the war dances in the deadlock went on, with Kenya taking apparently
incompatible positions and the S.F.G. and Jubbaland coalitions hardening
theirs, the U.N.S.C., on June 6, issued a non-binding presidential statement
on Somalia that only paid glancing attention to the Jubbaland conflict. The
U.N.S.C. “took note” of the May 24 I.G.A.D. communique, stating that it
“shares the concerns of IGAD on the situation in Kismayo, and in that
context calls on all parties to refrain from any actions which may threaten
the peace and stability of Somalia. Welcoming the S.F.G.’s “commitment … to
lead reconciliation efforts in the Juba Regions, with the support of UNSOM
[the new U.N. mission in Somalia], IGAD, and other appropriate actors,” the
U.N.S.C. expressed “its intention to keep the situation under review.” U.S.
representative Jeffrey Delaurentis was more pointed along the same line,
stating that the situation in the south was “particularly worrisome,” and
that the U.S. was looking to “Somalia’s neighbors to help resolve it.” The
statements of the other U.N.S.C. members skirted the Jubbaland conflict.
The U.N.S.C.’s unwillingness/inability to put any teeth behind its call for
“peace and stability” set the stage for the Jubbaland conflict to take a
violent turn. On June 8, thirteen combatants died when R.K. forces clashed
with troops guarding self-declared president of the south, Iftin Hassan
Basto, who was attempting to meet with Fiqi at a Kismayo hotel.
Garoweonline reported that Basto’s guards were members of Fiqi’s retinue.
Sporadic confrontations continued through June 9 when, as reported by the
Sabahi news service, local elders succeeded in brokering a cease fire. On
June 10, A.F.P. reported that R.K. was in control of Kismayo and the
opposition had retreated outside the city. Each side blamed the other for
the clash. Basto claimed that he had been “ambushed” by R.K. , whereas
Madobe said that “people” in the S.F.G. were responsible for the violence.
Serar said that the “attack” on Jubbaland forces was “funded from Mogadishu”
and had involved the al-Shabaab Islamist insurgents. Pro-Jubbaland sources
linked Basto to the S.F.G., noting that he had been an S.F.G. military
officer. Basto denied that he was part of the S.F.G.
During the dust-up, Farole met with Madobe in Nairobi, their first meeting
after Madobe had been named president of Jubbaland. On June 9, Puntland’s
vice president, Abdisamad Ali Shire, warned that if the S.F.G. did not
adhere to Somalia’s provisional constitution, Puntland “would readjust its
position on collaboration” with the S.F.G.
On June 11, both sides appeared to temper their rhetoric. Shirdon said that
the government would address the “turmoil” in Kismayo through “dialogue and
reconciliation,” calling for direct negotiations between the contending
sides. Madobe told Kenya’s Star newspaper that he was not seeking to secede
from the S.F.G. and was ready to “work out a formula” for Jubbaland’s
recognition. Niether side wanted to cross a red line that would put the
“donor”-powers/U.N. in the other’s camp
.
Having failed to make any difference in the Jubbaland conflict by issuing
its June 6 presidential statement, the U.N.S.C. released a “Press Statement
on Somalia” on June 14, expressing “concern at the deterioration in the
security situation in the Juba regions, particularly in Kismayo.”
Reiterating the positions that it had taken in its presidential statement,
the U.N.S.C. added the U.S. position, inviting “IGAD and neighboring
countries to play a strong and positive role in helping to decrease the
tension and identify a way forward.” Again, the “donor”-powers/U.N. had
defaulted.
As one would anticipate, the U.N.S.C.’s press statement did nothing to
ameliorate the conflict on the ground. Shabelle Media reported a clash
between R.K. and forces allied to the S.F.G. on June 15 in the town of
Hosingow in the Lower Jubba region, in which 14 combatants died. Shabelle
reported that, during the fire fight, rocket propelled grenades had been
fired from a Kenyan-AMISOM base. On June 16, Shabelle reported that R.K. had
attacked an S.F.G. official in Kismayo and had been repelled by “government”
forces. Garoweonline and Shabelle Media reported on June 18 that close
Madobe ally, deputy mayor of Kismayo, Yasin Nur, was injured when his car
encountered a roadblock; and that a landmine explosion had destroyed a truck
in a Kenyan-AMISOM convoy passing through the center of Kismayo.
On June 18, Serar announced from Addis Ababa, where Madobe was meeting with
Ethiopian officials to win support for the Jubbaland administration, that
Jubbaland would not participate in any reconciliation meeting organized by
the S.F.G., reversing the administration’s previous position.
On June 19, S.F.G. interior minister and close Hassan ally, Abdikarin
Hussein Guled, called on clan elders throughout the southern regions to
organize the contending political factions in preparation for a
reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, which has yet to be finalized. Were
Guled’s proposal to be accepted, Jubbaland would be excluded from formal
representation at the S.F.G.-organized reconciliation conference, explaining
Jubbaland’s rejection of participation in an S.F.G. conference.
Short-Term Forecast
Based on the current power distribution of the actors involved in the
conjuncture making up the Jubbaland conflict, and a reading of their
perceived interests, the highest likelihood is that the deadlock will
persist in the short term.
The most potentially effective actor(s) in the conjuncture –the
“donor”-powers/U.N. – have as their primary interest drawing back from
political commitment to Somalia under the pretense of having set Somalia on
a course to full statehood by engineering, in 2011 through 2012, a
transition to a “permanent” government – the S.F.G. It is intelligible that,
from the viewpoint of the Western “donor”-powers, they would like to
disembarrass themselves as much as possible of Somalia. They are still
suffering the effects of the 2009 financial crisis and have more important
and pressing foreign-policy issues in the Middle East and Asia. Somalia has
been pushed down their priority list even further than it had been
previously.
The “donor”-powers cannot, of course, leave Somalia alone; they have an
interest in suppressing what they call “terrorism” (revolutionary Salafist
jihadism) and in extracting whatever commercial benefits they might be able
to derive from the country. They will provide inadequate development and
military aid to Somalia, enough so that Somali elites feel that they have to
curry the favor of the “donor”-powers.
It is the in-and-out position of the “donor”-powers that freezes the other
actors in place. They cannot do anything decisive, either on their own or
together, for fear that the “donor”-powers will reject their initiatives.
That is the consequence of the “donor”-powers’ default – fighting below
their weight, but still in the ring.
The “donor”-powers’ drawback strategy involves their laying off conflict
resolution on regional states and the S.F.G. According to the U.N.S.C.’s
presidential statement and press release of June, I.G.A.D. and regional
states are to facilitate a reconciliation conference among the adversaries
in the Jubbaland conflict, with the S.F.G. taking the lead role in
organizing that reconciliation conference.
The “donor”-powers shift of responsibility to I.G.A.D. and the regional
states (Kenya and Ethiopia) has put the latter in an internally conflicted
position. Their basic policy towards Somalia is to divide it into spheres of
influence, but they cannot implement that policy to the point that their
actions threaten the pretense that the S.F.G. is a “permanent” government of
a “sovereign” state; the regional states have been boxed in by the
“donor”-powers’ default, but they have not entirely lost their ability to
act for their own interests. Far from being honest brokers, they are
contradicted reluctant brokers. The leverage of the regional states comes
from the “donor”-powers’ dependence on them. Their position – in the
southern regions Kenya’s position – draws them into professions of support
for the S.F.G. while frequently impeding it. That situation is likely to
persist. From the viewpoint of the regional states, they have no reason to
surrender their interest in a decentralized Somalia just because of the
“donor”-powers’ tepid and toothless support for centralization; the regional
states are unreliable proxies, not pawns, of the “donor”-powers.
Given the default of the “donor”-powers and the forced default of the
regional states, the S.F.G. and its allied anti-Jubbaland southern factions,
and Jubbaland and its Puntland ally are left to do war dances in the
deadlock, which are likely to continue in the short term, if not well beyond
that.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
<mailto:weinstem_at_purdue.edu>
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Received on Sun Jun 23 2013 - 17:23:59 EDT