Somalia: The Show-Down in Jubbaland Deadlocks
May 26, 2013 - 6:42:01 AM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Somalia carries its political past with it into the present. Its
pre-colonial period in which a single ethnic group was dispersed into
sub-clans by a nomadic-pastoralist economy. The colonial period in which
Somalia became subject to the overweening influence of foreign powers. The
early post-independence democracy gutted by clan-based factionalism and
corruption. The dictatorship of Siad Barre, which, as he lost power,
degenerated into attempted clan domination. The post-Barre statelessness
that froze factionalism territorially as Somalia fragmented into
mini-states, autonomous regions , makeshift authorities, and warlordism
dotted by unsuccessful attempt to achieve a national political community.
The Islamic Courts revolution as an effort to unify south-central Somalia
through an Islamic political formula in the light of the failure of clan to
serve as a social basis for political organization. The Ethiopian occupation
that killed the Courts and set in motion a revolutionary Salafist-jihadist
opposition and efforts by the Western great powers to counter it by
engineering a transition to a permanent anti-Islamist government based on
clan representation. All leading to the present, in which a new transitional
government that is deemed "permanent" by the "international community" is
one domestic actor among competitors.
A decentralized society, domination by external powers, factionalism and
corruption, the state as a tool of clan domination, hyper-fragmentation of
the polity, religion as an alternative formula to clan, the humiliation of
occupation and the strength of resistance to it,
stage-managed-from-the-outside provisional national political structures
based on clan - Somalia carries all of those into the present , the legacy
of each stage layered on the last.
At present, a new period of Somalia's political history has opened centering
on what - if any - form(s) of state(s) the territories of post-independence
Somalia will have. It could be a league of independent states with a common
foreign policy and military, a confederation of largely autonomous
authorities, a federation in which the national government is stronger than
its sub-units, or a decentralized or centralized unitary state. In practice,
the current alternatives are confederation (decentralized federalism) and
centralized federalism. That is the great political drama being enacted in
Somalia today, and its stage is the deep south of the territories of
post-independence Somalia: the regions (inherited from Siad Barre) of Gedo,
Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba. The actors are the familiar repertory troupe
of factions and external actors playing out the latest episode of a
tragi-comedy.
The Last Month in the Deep South: An Overview
The form of political organization to be adopted by the deep southern
regions will determine the state-form that the territories of
post-independence Somalia will have, if they achieve one, and whether or not
Somaliland is part of the resulting entity.
During the past month, the advocates of decentralized federalism advanced by
instituting a Jubbaland state based on a process undertaken independently of
the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.); and the S.F.G. responded by
rejecting the Jubbaland initiative, setting up an interim administration
loyal to it in the Gedo region, and launching an effort to broker the
conflict between the Jubbaland factions and factions (which the S.F.G. has
supported) that feel marginalized by the Jubbaland regime.
At present, the two sides are at a deadlock in their show-down, clan
politics have swept away all other interests, and corrosive fragmentation
has begun to set in. The big "donor"-powers appear to be on the sidelines,
and the major regional powers (most notably, Kenya) are intervening to serve
their interests and preserve and expand their advantages over Somalia. There
is no third party to serve as an honest broker.
The deep south has been effectively chopped up into separate and adversarial
"authorities" - not only is there no regional government in the deep south;
there are competing "governments." In the terms of Somali political analyst
Ahmed Egal, the processes of political fission are prevailing over those of
political fusion, and one can add that fragmentation is hardening into
political structures; the configuration bears close resemblance to what
pertained in the period preceding the Courts revolution, including the
presence of warlords and the exploitation of political weakness by external
actors. The Western "donor"-powers are doing nothing to try to stop the
descent into fragmented deadlock, preferring to hedge their bets by
continuing to pursue their "dual-track" politcy of equivocating between the
forms of centralized and decentralized federalism, as the trenchant Somali
political analyst Abukar Arman has pointed out. That is despite their
professed support of the S.F.G. The "donor"-powers are unwilling to
challenge Kenya, which supports decentralized federalism for its own
interest. As a result, the "donor"-powers and the regional powers have ended
up reinforcing the domestic deadlock.
The Show-Down Deadlocks
The show-down between the coalition of forces in favor of the Jubbaland
initiative and the coalition opposing it, led by the S.F.G. and its allies
in Gedo, was approaching its second phase of direct confrontation between
the adversaries by the end of April. A closed source reported that the
conflict had evolved to a clan-based struggle with one side mainly
Ogaden-Darod and Majertein-Darod (pro-Jubbaland) and the other mainly
Marehan-Darod and non-Darod clans (anti-Jubbaland), although there were
members of each of the clans on both sides. The source further reported that
the S.F.G. had made an agreement with Barre Hiralie, the powerful (former)
Marehan warlord, to have him unify the Marehan opposition to Jubbaland,
possibly to gain more influence for the Marehan in the conference moving to
establish a Jubbaland state. The source added that the Marehan
representatives at the conference were already getting concessions from the
other large Darod sub-clans.
On April 24, RBC Radio reported that the organizing committee for the
Jubbaland conference had announced that the elders at the conference
representing the deep-southern clans would choose a 550-member committee to
elect a president and parliament for Jubbaland within two weeks. On the same
day, Shabelle Media quoted an elder, Istin Hassan Bass, stating that his
delegation had left the conference, as, he said, other groups had don
previously, because the direction of the conference was coming from "unknown
sources." Shabelle Media also reported that the conference was stalemated.
On April 25, Barre Hirale arrived in Kismayo from Mogadishu, announcing that
he was there to oppose the Jubbaland initiative and would meet with clan
elders to be "part of the solution" to the political problems in the deep
south. On the same day, Voice of America quoted politician Hassan Samatar as
saying that sub-clans representation at the Jubbaland conference was
"unbalanced," with some sub-clans represented by ten elders and others by
two.
Reflecting the reports of disputes at the conference, RBC reported on April
28 that former prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government
(T.F.G.), which preceded the S.F.G., Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, warned
candidates competing for the presidency of Jubbaland to compromise with one
another on pain of the S.F.G. taking over the deep south.
On May 1, Shabelle reported that the commander of S.F.G. military forces in
the deep-southern regions, General Abbas Mohamed Diriye, announced that
S.F.G. troops were is Kismayo. He requested cooperation from the military
forces of the Raskamboni Movement (R.K.M), which are dominant in the city
and are controlled by Sh. Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), the leader of the
Jubbaland initiative, an Ogaden-Darod and a (former ) Islamist warlord.
On May 2, speaking before the federal parliament, the S.F.G.'s president,
Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, repeated his opposition to the Jubbaland initiative,
stating that the S.F.G. would facilitate the formation of an "equally
representative" administration for the deep-southern regions when the
Islamist-jihadist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S. M.) had been defeated
in those regions.
The leadership of the Jubbaland conference quickly responded to Hassan,
issuing a statement on May 4 that the S.F.G.'s president had violated the
Provisional Federal Constitution (P.F.C.) by interfering with the Jubbaland
conference and trying to undermine the P.F.C.'s commitment to a federal
state-form for Somalia. On the same day, the regional organization composed
of Horn of Africa states and dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya, the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), announced that it
would send a "confidence-building mission" to Kismayo. The Mareeg website
quoted elder Mohamed Ismail as calling on the S.F.G. to "eradicate the
Raskamboni criminals."
On May 13, a flight carrying a delegation led by former member of the
Transitional Federal Parliament, Mohamed Amin Abdullahi, was forced to
return to Mogadishu from the Kismayo airport, although the flight had been
cleared by the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Amin
said that the Kenyan Defense Force (K.D.F.), which was folded into AMISOM
after Kenya occupied the Lower Jubba region in 2011, was behind the flight
being turned back. Amin expressed his opposition to the Jubbaland
conference, and Garoweonline reported rumors that S.F.G. President Hassan
had appointed Amin to be the interim governor of Lower Jubba. Shabelle
reported on local opposition by elders and ex-T.F.G. officials to Kenyan
"interference."
On May 15, S.F.G. Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon appointed a Joint
Reconciliation Committee, chaired by Deputy Interior Minister Abdi Jama
Ahmed (Oday) and composed of S.F.G. officials and parliamentarians, to
attempt to resolve the conflict in the deep south. Garoweonline reported
that a flight carrying Amin and his delegation was given clearance to land
in Kismayo, but that the passengers were jailed by local officials when they
refused to return to Mogadishu.
Also on May 15, the Jubbaland conference elected Ahmed Madobe as president
of the new presumptive regional state by a vote of 485-10-5 after his
competitors, Mohamed Nur and Hilowle Adan Mohamed dropped out. A closed
source reported that Madobe's opponents had left the Jubbaland convention to
greet Amin's delegation at Kismayo's airport. In short order, Barre Hirale
announced that he had been named president of the deep southern regions by a
conference of elders, which, he said, "belonged to the peop," whereas the
Jubbaland convention was "organized and pushed by Kenya." (On May 23,
Kenya's Daily Nation newspaper quoted a source as saying that Hirale had
called Marehan elders to his residence and told them to name him president,
which they did.) Madobe warned that if there was "fighting," the S.F.G.
would be to blame, reflecting widespread belief at the Jubbaland conference
that Hirale's move was inspired by S.F.G. President Hassan. After Hirale's
announcement, two other presumptive "presidents" stepped forward.
By mid-May, the show-down in Jubbaland had deadlocked, a result, of course,
that neither side had desired, yet that was dictated by the power
distribution in the deep-southern regions. The preceding account of the
movement of the show-down to deadlock was purposely pared down to a
chronology of news bits and bites with minimum commentary and analysis in
order to give the reader a sense of the day-to-day movement of factional
positions, as each actor pursued its own agenda. The narrative was likened
to a tragi-comedy, which might seem to be harsh, unfeeling or facetious; yet
what is one to call the behavior of actors who are so self-involved and
distrustful that they end up defeating themselves and cannot lift their
heads high enough to see that they hold the future of Somalia's political
organization in their hands? For genuine tragedy, some nobility is required.
Jubbaland is now a "fact;" neither the S.F.G. nor dissident Marehan nor
minority clans nor anti-Jubbaland Ogaden and Majertein was able to stop it.
Yet how far does Jubbaland's writ run? Similarly the pro-S.F.G. Gedo
administration is a "fact" and so are Barre Hirale's forces; the Jubbaland
initiative could not stop them. Yet how far does their writ run? The
weakness of the S.F.G. is glaringly obvious. The indifference of the
"international community" (Western "donor"-powers) is equally so. Is it back
to the pre-Courts period?
With the deadlock in place, the S.F.G. maneuvered to take advantage of it by
appearing to stand above the conflict. RBC reported that Prime Minister
Shirdon's office issued a statement that the government could not recognize
two presidents in the deep-southern regions, and that it had warned four
months ago about the destructive consequences of "self-declared"
presidencies. S.F.G. Interior Minister Abdikarin Hussein Guled called on
AMISOM and S.F.G. military forces to remain neutral in the political
dispute, warned that the conflict could open the way to the resurgence of
H.S.M., and insisted that the presidential "elections" violated the
provisional constitution.
The Puntland regional state, which advocates decentralized federalism and
has consistently supported the Jubbaland initiative, countered the S.F.G. by
congratulating the Jubbaland conference for having elected a president in
accordance with the P.F.C., calling for other south-central regions to
follow the Jubbaland example, and added that "the spoilers" had "failed
again."
The Sabahi news service quoted elder Osman Ibrahim Shabgani as calling on
the S.F.G. to intervene to resolve the conflict and claiming that several
prospective delegates to the Jubbaland convention had been denied entry into
Kismayo. Former spokesman for the Jubbaland convention, Abdinasir Serar,
accused the S.F.G. of "fomenting communal violence." Shabelle reported that
forces loyal to Madobe and Hirale were facing off in Kismayo, and that
Kenyan-AMISOM troops were "confused" about how to respond, since they did
not have close relations with the S.F.G. Members of the federal parliament
from the deep-southern regions were reported to be split, with some
supporting the Jubbaland state and backing a group seeking a vote of
confidence on Shirdon, and others opposing the Jubbaland project and urging
the S.F.G. to intervene in Lower Jubba. On May 17, Garoweonline reported
that Madobe had named General Abdullahi Ismail Fartag, from the Gedo region,
as his vice president.
On the same day, the "confidence-building mission" from I.G.A.D. arrived in
Mogadishu and met with Shirdon who expressed to the delegation the S.F.G.'s
position that a "reconciliation process" managed by the S.F.G. needed to be
put in place in the deep south. The I.G.A.D. mission also met with elders,
positicians, and civil-society figures in Mogadishu. RBC reported that the
I.G.A.D. delegation had insisted that the dispute "between warlords" be
resolved and committed to cooperating with the S.F.G. The interim governor
of the Gedo region, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, announced that his administration
did not recognize Madobe's government and that the S.F.G. was "entrusted"
with forming administrations in the deep south.
On May 18, the I.G.A.D. delegation arrived in Kismayo and quickly held a
three-way meeting with Jubbaland leaders, local elders, and the S.F.G.'s
Joint Reconciliation Committee, which had also arrived in the city. On May
19, Shabelle reported that the I.G.A.D. delegation had met with four
presumptive "presidents" of the deep-southern regions and had urged them to
refrain from conflict. The Mareeg website reported that a demonstration took
place in Kismayo against I.G.A.D., Kenya, and Madobe. Kenya's Standard
newspaper quoted the spokesman for the K.D.F., Cyrus Oguna, as endorsing
Madobe's election: "Having a government out of the efforts of the Somali
people is something worth applauding." S.F.G. President Hassan said that it
was "clear that the Jubbaland conference had excluded groups."
I.G.A.D. departed from Kismayo having failed to break the deadlock. On May
20, Reuters reported that Shirdon had called for "peaceful and authentic
negotiations" among the disputants. The S.F.G.'s Joint Reconciliation
Committee met with three of the presidential rivals. Reuters also reported
that the Western powers had become concerned that a resurgence of H.S.M. was
possible.
On May 21, Shabelle reported that the new S.F.G. military commander in the
deep south, Col. Farah Makombo, had said that there were no S.F.G. troops in
Kismayo, only clan militias. He appealed to the S.F.G. to send forces to the
city.
As the deadlock tightened, the Standard reported on May 23 that
hyper-fragmentation had set in with six declared "presidents," each one with
a base of sub-clan support: Madobe (Ogaden-Majertein), Hirale (Marehan),
Abdi Baley (Galcee), Iffin Mohamed Saysun (Ormale), Abdikadir Ali Mohamed
(Rahanweyne), and Omar Buare Ahmed (Sh. Ali).
According to a closed source, the conflict has taken on the aspect of a
dispute over the S.F.G., with the Ogaden and Majertein seeking to weaken and
displace Shirdon, who is Marehan and whom they accuse of being "soft and not
assertive enough" with President Hassan (Hawiye); whereas the Marehan are
trying to defend their hold on the prime minister's office, accusing the
Ogaden and Majertein of engineering a power grab.
On May 23, The Standard reported that the S.F.G. "reconciliation" mission in
Kismayo had complained that the Jubbaland administration and the Kenyan
AMISOM forces had refused to provide it with protection, making it
impossible for the mission to perform its "fact-finding" function. The
mission also noted that flights between Mogadishu and Kismayo had been
suspended. The Standard also reported that a group of Kenyan businessmen had
asked their government to reconsider its support for Jubbaland and not to
take sides in "the emerging conflict" between Jubbaland and the S.F.G. The
businessmen predicted "a new wave of insecurity" as "warlords" fought over
control of Kismayo's lucrative port.
On May 24, the I.G.A.D. "Confidence-Building Mission" presented its report
to the parent organization, confirming the deadlock. The mission found that
both sides agreed on "the need to follow the provisional constitution," but
differed in its interpretation; and that the inclusivity of the Jubbaland
process was "contestable, especially among the minority." The report
recommended that the S.F.G. and the federal parliament "expedite enactment
of the necessary laws that govern the establishment of regional
administration," and proposed that the S.F.G. take "the lead role in the
formation of regional administrations including Juba regions." Seeming to
favor the S.F.G.'s position over Jubbaland's, the report, however, in its
only practical recommendation, recognized "the fragility of the situation in
Kismayo" and said that the S.F.G. should "convene and lead" a
"reconciliation conference with the support of I.G.A.D. while consulting key
Stakeholders in Kismayo;" and that "stakeholders in Kismayo" should "go to
Mogadishu and dialogue with the Federal Government regarding the interim
regional administration." The report, then, gives neither side what it
wanted: Jubbaland has not been endorsed as a legitimate regional state, yet
the S.F.G. has been told to negotiate with Jubbaland rather than take sole
responsibility for forming an administration in Lower Jubba.
It is possible that a "reconciliation conference" would break the deadlock;
whether or not one even takes place depends on how much pressure external
actors are willing to bring on the two sides. The root of the problem, of
course, is the engineering by the Western powers through the United Nations
of a forced "transition" from the T.F.G. to the S.F.G. in 2012 that left
unwritten "the necessary laws that govern the establishment of regional
administration" - an act of egregious negligence. As a result, the
deep-southern regions are "stateless" and the determination of a state-form
for "Somalia" remains unresolved.
Reprise
Re-read the introduction to the foregoing analysis, which offered a
thumbnail political history of "Somalia," in light of the chronology of
developments during the past month in the deep south, and it will become
clear that the past oppresses the present. Everything that was is here and
now, layer upon layer of toxic sediment.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
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Received on Sun May 26 2013 - 22:22:22 EDT
