Jubaland in Jeopardy: The Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia
21 May 2013 by Africa Program Staff
On 15 May 2013, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni militia and a
close ally of Kenya, was elected Jubaland president by regional clan
representatives. Hours later, Barre Hirale, a warlord from a rival clan
allied with the Somali Federal Government (SFG), declared himself president.
The effort to create a Jubaland state within Somalia will test the limits of
federalism in that country, and threatens to touch off clan warfare not only
within Somalia but also in its neighbours.
We spoke to Zakaria Yusuf, Somalia Analyst , and Claire Elder, Horn of
Africa Research Assistant, to learn more about Jubaland and find out if
there is a risk of conflict.
Q: Where and what is Jubaland?
Jubaland is shorthand for Somalia's diverse, southern-most section, linked
by the course of the Juba River. The original Juba provinces covered a much
larger area, but in 1975 President Siad Barre carved the then Lower and
Upper Juba into Middle and Lower Juba, Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions. Gedo
was created as a predominately Marehan-clan area - a clan bailiwick for the
president, who was a Marehan. The nascent Jubaland State consists of Gedo,
Middle Juba and Lower Juba - all areas adjacent to the Kenya-Somalia border
- and does not include Bay and Bakool regions.
Q. Who are the Jubalanders?
Though Jubaland includes Gedo and Middle Juba, control of Lower Juba and
Kismayo port is the biggest prize. Kismayo city is cosmopolitan, but the
dominant clans are Darod/Harti (long-term "immigrants" from present-day
Puntland and Somaliland), Darod/Marehan (more recent immigrants from central
Somalia and Gedo) and miscellaneous Hawiye communities. Areas outside
Kismayo are predominantly inhabited by Darod/Ogaden clans - also present in
neighbouring northeast Kenya and southeast Ethiopia - as well as Jareer
(also know as Bantu), some Mirifle (collectively known as Rahanweyn),
Awramleh (a small Irir clan) and Galja'al and Sheekhal (often included as
Hawiye). The Bajuni (a Swahili speaking group) inhabit the coastal districts
near the Kenya border. The city of Jamame - still under the control of the
jihadist Al-Shabaab group - is seen as the home of Bimal (Dir), Jareer and
mixed Hawiye groups.
Q. Who has ruled Jubaland?
In September 2012, an alliance of pro-SFG militias, Ras Kamboni militiamen
and Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), all under command of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ousted Al-Shabaab from Kismayo. Jamame district
and most rural areas are still controlled by the radical group. The current
militias are only the latest in a long line of would-be masters of Jubaland
since the collapse of the central Somali state in 1991, as can be seen in
the chart below:
Early 1991
United Somali Congress (USC)
General Farah Aideed's faction (largely Hawiye)
Late 1991
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Colonel Hirsi "Morgan's" faction (largely Ogaden and Harti/Darod)
1992 - 1993 (contested by different groups)
USC/Somali Liberation Army (SLA)
Hawiye/ Habr Gidir
SPM/SLA
Ogaden/Rer Isaq
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)/SLA
Elay/Mirifle (Rahanweyn)
1993 - 1997
SPM
Colonel Morgan and General Adan Gabyow (Ogaden and Harti)
1997 - 2006
JubaValleyAlliance (JVA)
Colonel Barre Hirale and Yusuf Seraar (Marehan and Habr Gedir/Ayr)
Mid-2006 - 2007
Islamic Court Union (ICU)
Hawiye and Ogaden - including leaders from Ras Kamboni and Al Shabaab
Mid-2007 - 2008
Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
Col. Abdirisaq Afgadud with the support of the Ethiopian army
2008 - 2010
Al-Shabaab, Hisbul Islam (another Islamist group) including Ras Kamboni
Ogaden and Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr
2010 - December 2012
Al-Shabaab
Mixed clan
Q: When did the Jubaland initiative start?
The idea started to gain currency in 2009 as part of a desire among local
clan, business and political elites - with support from parts of the Kenyan
state, including politicians of Somali descent - to oust Al-Shabaab. It was
a good fit with the U.S. government's "dual track" policy - conceived to
support local security and stabilisation in the absence of a strong central
state. However, the U.S. and other Western powers were cautious about this
particular project. The Transitional Federal Government (replaced by the
Somalia Federal Government in August 2012) was lukewarm at best, and
Ethiopia was circumspect.
Nevertheless, clan elders from the region met in Kenya from March to April
2011 - the regions in question were still controlled by Al-Shabaab to create
what was initially called Azania - swearing in ex-TFG minister Mohamed Abdi
"Gandhi" as interim president. Ethiopia and Marehan politicians from Gedo
opposed what they perceived as an Ogaden-clan-dominated, Kenya-initiated
project.
Following the Kenyan military intervention [see our report
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184-the-k
enyan-military-intervention-in-somalia.aspx> The Kenya Military Intervention
in Somalia, Feb 2012] in October 2011, further Nairobi-based talks began in
May 2012 to broker agreement between the Ogaden, Marehan and Harti as well
as many smaller clans. A 32-member technical committee was charged with
establishing a Jubaland administration. But the perception of clan dominance
was hard to shift since the main signatories at the Jubaland conference -
with the exception of one Galja'al - were all from Darod clans.
Q: How does Jubaland fit with the current Somalia Federal Government?
After Kismayo's September 2012 capture by Kenyan Defense Forces troops (by
that time under AMISOM command) and allied Somali groups - especially Ahmed
Madobe's Ras Kamboni militia - the SFG and the local interim administration
disagreed over who should lead the formation of a new regional federal
state. Talks reconvened in Kismayo in late February 2013 paid for by
Jubaland supporters.
The SFG opposed the talks and Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon declared
them unconstitutional. He said they should follow the precedent of
SFG-appointed interim administrations elsewhere in the south. However, the
local leadership - with support from disgruntled SFG parliamentarians,
Puntland (the Harti-Darod homeland) and the regional body, IGAD
(Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) - argued that they should
establish a regional state as per the provisional federal constitution.
There is enough ambiguity within the federal constitution for both the SFG
and Jubaland to have a case, but each accuses the other of inflexibility.
Q: What are the local and regional interests at play?
Jubaland is a potentially rich region, with good seasonal rainfall,
year-round rivers, forests, and lush farm- and range-lands, as well as
potential off-shore oil and gas deposits. The harvesting and export of
charcoal has become a particularly lucrative industry, a trade currently
banned by UNSC resolution 2036 (2012) which nonetheless is flourishing with
the cooperation of AMISOM-allied militias. The domestic stakes of the
Jubaland process are high, as clan factions fight over the division of
resources.
Ethiopia and Kenya have used the regional organisation IGAD as a forum to
support a Jubaland regional state through a "Grand Stabilisation Plan". An
IGAD "confidence-building mission" is currently visiting Jubaland. Kenya's
interest is strategic and economic: a semi-autonomous Jubaland as a
buffer-zone from Al-Shabaab attacks on both its tourism industry and a
massive Lamu port development project; secure access to the Kismayo market;
and influence over oil and gas deposits in a contested maritime zone.
Stability could also facilitate plans to repatriate 500,000 Somali refugees
now living in Kenya. Ethiopia's interest is primarily that an
Ogadeni-dominated Jubaland could complicate its struggle against the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited south-east.
But Ethiopia also has economic interests, including the possibility of
alternative access to the sea.
Q: Is there a risk of conflict?
Clan and inter-regional tensions between Darod clans (particularly Marehan
and Ogaden) were already evident during the process of electing Ahmed Madobe
(a former Islamist militant) as Jubaland's president. To counter Ogaden-clan
dominance, Marehan will back Barre Hirale's rival presidency. Smaller clans
have also staked their claims to a Jubaland presidency, including Omar
Burale Ahmed (a Bimaal/Dir candidate) and Abdi Baaleey Huseen (a Galja'al).
Nationally, Jubaland is perceived as a struggle between Hawiye (who
influence the SFG) and Darod clan elites (who feel excluded). Al-Shabaab
still maintains a significant presence in southern Somalia and is exploiting
divisions; for example, tensions between rival militias allowed Al-Shabaab
militants to attack a Ras Kamboni military base at Kismayo airport in late
April.
<
http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/files/2013/05/Jubaland
-Map.jpg>
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Received on Tue May 21 2013 - 21:46:24 EDT
