Sudan: Democratization and the Failure of the Sudan Peace Process
By John Young, 15 May 2013
Analysis
Alex has
<
http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/09/review-the-fate-of-sudan-the-origins
-and-consequences-of-a-flawed-peace-process-by-alex-de-waal/> summarized my
book quite well, but with one major exception: the central theme is the
failure of the peace process to oversee the democratic transformation called
for in the CPA's Machakos Protocol, which I contend was the only hope for
sustainable peace, both between the two states and within them.
Although The Fate of Sudan is not a theoretical study, it proceeds from a
critique of liberal peace-making, the starting point of all peace efforts in
Sudan.
As Alejandro Bendana and other critics have found - and the Sudan experience
backs them up - liberal peace making is a top-down approach designed to stop
violence, but not address its underlying causes, integrate the warring
parties into a Western dominated world order, and while it rhetorically
supports democratic transformation, it is invariably traded off.
The official sponsor of the Sudan peace process was IGAD, an outfit created,
paid for, and directed by a handful of Western states. IGAD (read the U.S.)
then sub-contracted the process to its regional ally Daniel arap Moi who
assigned his protector, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, who long had close
relations with the American security services to oversee the process, and
thus could be trusted.
Under Sumbeiywo the NCP, SPLM, and the Western participants locked out civil
society, other military groups and political parties, imposed a regime of
secrecy, and then contradictorily called for democratic transformation. It
was not believable and what followed proved that.
The NCP and SPLM used the CPA to isolate their challengers, while the flawed
2010 elections served to undermine their joint commitment to Sudan's unity
by effectively dividing the country before the referendum - all with the
support of the U.S. and its allies who feared that confronting the parties
would undermine the peace process.
The needs of peace and democracy were thus held to be at odds and the former
prevailed over the latter - which is usually the case with liberal peace
making.
However, conflict continued directly or through proxies and allies of the
NCP and SPLM in spite of this compromise which also led to the consolidation
of authoritarian regimes in Khartoum and Juba.
It is my contention that unless internationals can oversee peace processes
that genuinely support democratization they should withdraw, that in spite
of their weaknesses local actors not operating at the behest of big powers
should lead these processes, and if the belligerents are not ready to come
to the peace table then we should 'give war a chance'.
No one relishes sitting on the sidelines watching people die, but there is
no conclusive evidence that wars which end as a result of peace agreements
have fewer casualties or are more likely to lead to sustainable peace than
wars decided on the battlefield.
Moreover, all too often wars that end with peace agreements that do not
involve empowering local people leave them as bad or worse off than when the
conflict began.
That was clearly the case with the peace agreement that ended the war in
eastern Sudan and it could also be argued that was true for the people of
Sudan and South Sudan post-CPA.
Meanwhile, many of those killed in what was billed as a north-south war -
indeed, maybe the majority - in fact died as a result intra-south conflicts.
In the final years of the war fighting was largely between the South Sudan
Defense Force (SSDF) and the SPLA, and that conflict ended as a result of
the Juba Declaration in which the role of the internationals was negligible.
Finally it must be noted that unlike the SPLA, insurgents in neighbouring
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda built powerful mass based organizations able
to militarily defeat their foes and were thus able - thankfully - to keep
out liberal saviors from the West.
John Young is the author of The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences
of a Flawed Peace Process.
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Received on Wed May 15 2013 - 17:57:31 EDT
