London Conference II marginalizes Somalia stakeholders [Editorial]
May 3, 2013 - 11:07:09 AM
GAROWE ONLINE EDITORIAL | Can London give power to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
that he does not possess in currently Somalia, as demonstrated by Al
Shabaab's seizure of Huddur?
Many Somalis have rejoiced at the sight of Somali President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud's visits to Washington, D.C., London, and Brussels. Finally, a
Somali national government has gained the recognition of Western powers and
perhaps, finally, Somalia can begin to reclaim its rightful seat in the
international community.
That, of course, is the international image peddled and broadcasted through
the global media. Inside this devastated country of Somalia, however, lies a
catastrophe of unimagined proportions. This week, the U.N. reported in a new
study that the 2010-2012 famine in Somalia 'killed 260,000' people, with
over 1.1million Somali refugees living in difficult conditions in
neighboring countries.
The Somali Federal Government (SFG) depends, for its very livelihood, on the
military backing of a 17,000-strong African Union force (AMISOM) funded by
the U.S. and the E.U. since 2007. This point was demonstrated, most
devastatingly, when Ethiopian troops - who are not part of AMISOM - withdrew
abruptly from the border provincial town of Huddur on March 17, 2013.
Local and international reports noted that Al Shabaab militants seized
Huddur "within hours" of the Ethiopian army's withdrawal. This development
marked the weak military capacity of Somali forces under President Hassan,
and whilst highlighting the strength of Al Shabaab militants hiding out in
rural areas of south-central Somalia.
There is a major disconnect between President Hassan's publicity stunt
during visits to Western capitals, and a tragic reality on the ground in
Somalia. Moreover, President Hassan's policies have not been received in
Somalia as conciliatory; on the contrary, some have perceived President
Hassan's policies as an extension of the 1990s clan wars that ruined
Somalia.
Western powers have provided considerably commendable support to
stabilization and humanitarian endeavors in Somalia. However good the
intention, at times, counterproductive events may appear as undesired
outcomes. In the 1990s, the U.S. military transformed its mission from a
humanitarian to a nation-building mission. This sudden shift, ultimately,
led to the withdrawal of American troops from Mogadishu in 1994.
Somalia at the crossroads of London Conference
Similarly today, Somalia stands at a new crossroads with a new federal
constitution, and a new elected parliament and president. This crossroads is
far more important from the crossroads of the 1990s; reason being, if the
lessons of the past are not to be observed and appreciated, then one risks
repeating past mistakes and hoping for new results.
The upcoming London Conference is a major crossroads point for Somalia, but
unlike recent conferences and meetings in London, Dubai, Nairobi, Rome,
Addis Ababa, and Istanbul, the London Conference of May 7, 2013, excludes
all Somali political stakeholders except one: the newly arrived President,
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an untested politician propelled to victory more by
the unpopularity of former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the main election
competitor, and much less by Hassan's own political credentials, because
there are none prior to his election victory on September 10, 2012.
This is a critical crossroads for Somalia which signals that the British
government is putting its weight behind the leadership of President Hassan,
a policy that hinges entirely on the viability that the new federal
government in Somalia represents all people, regions, and political groups
in Somalia.
Naturally, this policy relies on the costly fallacies of assumption.
Assuming that the country's national reconciliation process is complete -
whilst the death and displacement of millions of Somalis since 1991 has yet
to be seriously discussed, whilst the homes and private properties of
Somalis remain under the forceful occupation of fellow Somalis, whilst the
country's former capital (Mogadishu) is a single-clan city where other
Somali communities feel marginalized, or even "second-class citizens" by
some accounts.
A second false assumption is that the country's federal constitution is
complete and that the federal system has been implemented, thereby making
President Hassan the sole representative of the Somali people.
Dividing Somalia
Can London give power to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud that he does not possess in
currently Somalia, as demonstrated by Al Shabaab's seizure of Huddur? Some
corners have viewed President Hassan's policies as taking the country
backwards to the clan conflicts of the 1990s. For example, President Hassan
has opposed the Jubaland state formation process, which begun prior to his
election and which enjoys the support of local communities.
Some have interpreted President Hassan's opposition to Jubaland as purely
clan-based in nature, despite his smooth talking rhetoric. What Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud opposes is not Jubaland state formation per se, but rather,
the emergence of another state (following Puntland) in southern Somalia, a
development that strengthens federalism in Somalia. In this connection, the
British government's policy in Somalia could be interpreted as pursuit of
the so-called "two-state solution" for Somalia; under this disastrous
policy, Somalia would be eventually divided (once again) into two
independent countries, in accordance with the 1960 boundaries of former
British Somaliland and former Italian Somalia. To balance out the existence
of Puntland-Jubaland axis, Mogadishu and Hargeisa [Somaliland] are pursuing
a dangerous policy, "an alliance of convenience", to counter-balance the
perceived threat posed by the Puntland-Jubaland axis.
Speaking in Garowe on April 28, 2013, President Hassan said that he "opposed
the [UN-facilitated] Roadmap process" in the months prior to his election as
Somali president. It was the Roadmap process, which incorporated Somali
stakeholders that led eventually to President Hassan's election. Does it
make sense that he opposes the very process that paved the way for his
election?
National stakeholders in Somalia
The British government has clearly put all its bets on the leadership of
President Hassan, by empowering him to "invite" all Somali stakeholders,
while the UK invites international partners. Both Somaliland and Puntland
have declined President Hassan's invite to "tag along" as part of his
delegation, whilst he addresses the world and expresses his "group-think"
policies connected to mysterious political groups inside and outside of
Somalia.
Somaliland has been administering its own region in northwestern Somalia
since 1992, whilst Puntland has been a regional autonomy since 1998. Both
regions are major stakeholders in Somalia's future, with political
experience, a culture of stability, and offer a politically mature voice
that can contribute towards rebuilding a peaceful, united, democratic, and
federal Somalia.
At the upcoming London Conference, the world's representatives from
different countries will be given the platform to address the London
Conference and to submit proposals for rebuilding Somalia. So why does the
British government marginalize Somali stakeholders to attend, to speak the
truth about their own country's future, and to contribute positively?
Somalia is still undergoing a national political process. The situation is
extremely fragile, in terms of political and social cohesion, and in terms
of security and the humanitarian situation. The British government should
invest wisely to bring together the Somali stakeholders, not to divide them,
by arrogantly empowering one political group at the expense of the country's
unity, sovereignty and political stability.
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Received on Fri May 03 2013 - 18:15:23 EDT
