In Somalia, western donors made famine more, not less likely
Despite early warnings, the Somalia famine was allowed to happen. Why?
Because of politics, al-Shabaab and donor fears.
Posted by
Rob Bailey
Thursday 2 May 2013 15.34 BST <
http://www.guardian.co.uk/> guardian.co.uk
The 2011 <
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/famine> famine in
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/somalia> Somalia, which the famine early
warning systems network (Fewsnet) and the food security nutrition and
analysis unit (FSNAU) estimate in a report published on Thursday to have
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/may/02/somalia-famine-wor
st-25-years> killed almost 260,000 people, was avoidable.
Over the previous year, <
http://www.fews.net> Fewsnet and
<
http://www.fsnau.org/> FSNAU flagged the impending tragedy with increasing
urgency, producing more than 70 early warning bulletins and undertaking a
similar number of briefings with agencies and donor governments. Had the
international community responded, early interventions could have been
undertaken to shore up livelihoods and prevent the downward spiral into
destitution and starvation.
But these warnings fell on deaf ears. Donor governments failed to increase
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/aid> aid, and humanitarian
agencies failed to increase their appeals.
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jul/20/un-declares-famine
-somalia> Only when famine was declared did the humanitarian system
mobilise, by when the opportunity to avert disaster had passed.
Despite a year of early warnings, the Somalia famine was allowed to happen.
Why? The one word answer is politics.
The worst affected areas of Somalia were under the control of the Islamist
group al-Shabaab, engaged in a war with the then Somali transitional federal
government (TFG), itself supported by the west. Western donor governments
were alarmed at the possibility of their aid being captured by an adversary
in the war on terror, and introduced a plethora of initiatives to minimise
the risk.
In particular, US legislation meant that humanitarians working in Somalia
could have been liable to prosecution in the US and up to 15 years in prison
should the aid they were distributing be diverted to al-Shabaab. These legal
constraints were accompanied by onerous reporting requirements for agencies
and their partners, and a significant decline in aid, which halved between
2008 and 2011.
By ignoring early warnings, withdrawing aid and constraining the ability of
humanitarian organisations to operate in Somalia, western donors made famine
more, not less likely. Donor antipathy meant humanitarian agencies concluded
it would be politically unfeasible to raise their appeal as early warnings
accumulated. It contributed to al-Shabaab's catastrophic decision
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/02/2010228132350935473.html> to
expel the UN's World Food Programme in 2010, and a further 16 UN agencies
and international NGOs for "illicit activities and misconduct" the following
year. Al-Shabaab's deeply antagonistic relations with the donor governments
on which these agencies depended provided the rationale for these
inexcusable decisions, however misguided and wrong.
Western donors prioritised their geopolitical agendas over the humanitarian
imperative to prevent famine. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab subordinated the needs
of the population under its control to its war against the TFG and its
propaganda campaign against the west. Not only did al-Shabaab restrict
humanitarian access and reject emergency aid, it also limited the movement
of populations and taxed food production.
An early, large-scale, decisive mobilisation of aid to prevent famine was in
the immediate interest of neither side. It was only when famine was declared
that the political calculus of donor governments shifted: once the news
story broke, they could no longer stand by as people starved without
attracting criticism from domestic media and the public.
Two years later, what has been learned? Donors and humanitarian agencies
were quick to announce they had learned the lessons from Somalia, yet
fundamentally little appears to have changed. Aid structures remain highly
politicised, far from neutral or impartial. There are no rules for how early
warnings should lead to early action, and a lack of clear processes for how
decisions should be triggered, escalated and justified. Ultimately, despite
having the early warning systems and resources needed to prevent famine,
accountability for doing so remains minimal.
. Rob Bailey is a senior research fellow at Chatham House specialising in
food security. His research on the causes of the Somalia famine is included
in the recent report
<
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20E
nvironment%20and%20Development/0413r_earlywarnings.pdf> Managing famine
risk: linking early warning to early action (pdf)
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Received on Thu May 02 2013 - 21:21:16 EDT
