Where Is Saudi Arabian Society Heading? - Analysis
By <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/murray-hunter/> Murray Hunter
By Abdullah Abdul Elah Ali Sallam and Murray Hunter
Published on May 1, 2013
Unlike many other countries within the MENA, Saudi Arabia appeared to be
immune from the "Arab Spring" that fell upon the region and changed a number
of societies dramatically. Consequently Saudi Arabia looks like a bastion of
stability within the region. However this relatively closed society is
facing a number of social, religious, political, and economic problems,
which if not dealt with in a wise and just manner by the ruling elite of the
country, could have grave consequences for the country in the future. This
article seeks to look at some of these issues and poses the question "where
Saudi society is heading?"
Saudi Arabia has never been under the direct control of a European power,
unlike most other states within the MENA. The country was founded in 1932 by
Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who returned to Riyadh in the early 1900s to dispose
the Al Rashid Clan, and over the next decade unified the various tribes,
sheikdoms, and emirates over most of the Arabian Peninsula.
Saudi Arabia is geographically the second largest country by landmass within
the MENA after Algeria. It occupies approximately 80% of the Arabian
Peninsula. Saudi Arabia shares common borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait
to the north, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman to the east, by a
portion of Oman to the southeast, by Yemen to the south and southwest, by
the Persian Gulf in the east, and by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba to
the west.
Saudi Arabia has a GDP of USD 740 Billion (2012 est.), the largest of any
MENA state, being ranked 23rd in the worldi. The economy is growing at an
average 6.0% per annumii. The economy is dominated by petroleum and its
associated industries, where Saudi Arabia along with Russia are the largest
producers in the worldiii. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 80% of
the government budget revenues, and 55% of GDP. About 58% of GDP comes from
the private sector. As of 2011, non-oil manufacturing contributed only 16.4
% to Saudi Arabian GDPiv.
Saudi Arabia has a total labor force of 8.02 million, where more than 80%
are immigrant workersv. Saudi Arabia has an official unemployment rate of
10.7%vi, but unofficial estimates put unemployment as high as 20%vii. This
rate is even higher for women, where studies indicate an unemployment rate
of 24.9%viii. These rates are even higher for those under 30 years old,
where it is estimated that 1 in 4 don't have a jobix. Reports in the Arab
press indicate that 49% of those unemployed have never applied for a jobx,
partly because it is cheaper for firms to recruit foreign workersxi. Foreign
workers are paid relatively low wages, often being mistreated, with few laws
to protect themxii.
Saudi Arabia's population has rapidly grown from 6 million in the 1970s to
almost 27 million today, where 49.9% of Saudi Arabia's population is under
24 years of age xiii. Five and one half million are non-nationals.
Government welfare and employment programs have failed to keep up with this
population growth leading to a chronic rise in the incidence of poverty in
the Kingdom, estimated at nearly 25% of the total populationxiv. This is in
great contrast to a middle class that live in moderate wealth, employ maids,
cooks, and drivers, and spend lavishly. In addition there is great rivalry
between the majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shia Muslims in the
country's eastern province which has led to great social friction and open
protests on the streetsxv.
The Saudi Government has made huge efforts to modernize and diversify the
domestic economy to encourage business investment in the non-oil sector.
Even though Saudi Arabia has advanced from 67th to 22nd in the International
Finance Corporation (IFC)-World Bank annual "Doing Business" Report 2013xvi,
liberalization of the economy and growth in new businesses and employment
has been hampered by corruption from members of the Royal familyxvii.
Political influence in the Saudi economy is still strong and the legal
system is still very weak, which is reflected in the Kingdom's fall in the
Heritage Foundation 2013 Economic Freedom index in the rule of law,
regulatory efficiency, and market opennessxviii.
Much of the nation's commence is still controlled by the Al Saud family and
merchant families from the tribes within the Kingdomxix. Many members of the
Royal family obtain oil royalties based on their land concessions, many
holding seats on the boards of petrochemical companies.
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. King Abdullah bin Abdal-Aziz Al Saud
performs the duties of prime minister, where the two deputy prime ministers
along with a number of members of the cabinet are also members of the Al
Saud family. The Al Saud family formed a Family Allegiance Council,
comprising of members of Abdal Aziz's son's family lines to decide on
matters of succession and the sharing of wealth among the family.
The only form of legislature is a consultative council (or Majlis al-shura)
comprising of 150 appointed members by the King. Consequently there are no
formal political parties in Saudi Arabia. However there are a number of
secret societies including the Muslim Brotherhood, various jihadist groups,
and liberals within society. Saudi Arabia has incarcerated around 5,000
political prisoners in jails around the Kingdom.
The second arm of government in Saudi Arabia are the Wahhabi or Salafi
Clerics. This fundamental and strict interpretation of Islam, via Sharia
law, is an essential element of the Saudi State, which makes Saudi Arabia
unique within the MENA. As a consequence society is strongly regulated
through fatwas issued by the Supreme Religious Council appointed by the king
concerning social behavior within Saudi society, where the role of women is
defined as subordinate to menxx, and schooling is strongly orientated around
religious curriculum.
The late King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud laid down a basic law in 1992.
This basic lay states that Islam through the Qur'an, Hadith, and Sunnah are
the ultimate law, of which the basic law supplements but doesn't contradict.
The document lays down the rights of the monarchy, that all Saudis should be
brought up as Muslims, that matters of economy be according to the Sharia,
the benevolent rights and duties of the state, that Islam will be the
cornerstone of governance, that the King will be the Prime Minister and
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and all cabinet ministers will be
Muslimsxxi. This basic law did nothing to liberalize the country, but rather
reflected what isxxii.
Saudi Arabia is at the cross roads. There are undercurrents suggesting that
there will soon be massive social change within the kingdom. The rest of
this article will examines some of the issues involved.
The concentration of political power could be a recipe for self destruction
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, and the king has absolute executive
power of government. All ministers, provincial governors, senior military
officers, and ambassadors are selected by the king. All legislation and
regulation made by ministries, provincial, and local governments are legally
royal decrees. The consultative council's decisions are not binding upon the
king.
As succession is tightly controlled to senior members of the family. There
is no potential for any young liberal reformer to emerge as the king of
Saudi Arabia in the foreseeable future, as the Allegiance Council has
remained faithful to the principle of seniority when naming a new king.
According to House, Saudi will continue to be ruled by "more old men in
their eighties"xxiii. Any selection of a younger prince as leader would
upset the current balance of power within the Al Saud family and create
discord among the various branches of the family, thus the King does not
seem to have the power and authority pass the throne onto his son.
As a consequence, most positions of civil power within the Kingdom are held
by members of the Al-Saud family or influential tribal and clan members.
This makes up a pool of approximately 15,000 people who through their
various family and clan leaders exert some political and business influence.
This is a very diverse group where competition for power exists within the
second generation of the ruling familyxxiv, which has sometimes led to
violence and bloodshedxxv. Further division and conflict within the Al Suad
family would be inevitable in the future because of the increasing numbers
of the clan.
The Ulama in Saudi Arabia is dominated by the Al ash-Sheikh family,
descendents of Muhammad ibn Al-Wahhab, who was the 19th century founder of
Sunni Islam, who share power with the Al-Saud family. They dominate all
religious posts within the kingdom. This makes the family extremely powerful
within the kingdom. Through the Al ash-Sheikh family's "moral authority",
the Al Saud family has been able to maintain the legitimacy of the
monarchyxxvi. The Al ash-Sheikh family's power is also closely linked with
the Al Suad family through strong intermarriagexxvii.
The Ulama, like their Iranian counterparts are directly involved in
government, ruling by Fatwaxxviii. Consequently there is a lack of any
consistent codification, as different Ulama may issue conflicting Fatwa,
giving great unpredictability in the lawxxix. The Ulama have a major
influence in key government decisionsxxx, set religious and moral standards,
and play an important role in both the judicial and education systems within
Saudi Arabiaxxxi. Other members of the Al ash-Sheikh family have important
civilian positions in the religious Department, Judiciary and military.
As we can see, the concentration of political power into just two families
within the Kingdom has inherent weaknesses. The growing numbers of family
members is creating more divisions within the Al Saud family. Increasing
population and demographics is slowly diluting the dominance of Al
ash-Sheikh family members in government as more Saudis are graduating in
religious studies, and taking places in governmentxxxii.
These two factors alone would be expected to force change within the power
structure of the Kingdom within the timeframe of the next generation.
Particularly in the Al Saud family's case, it would appear that there will
need to be a number of restructuring exercises in power distribution within
the family to keep it unified over the next few years.
Saudi Society May be Like a Pressure Cooker
The ruling families of Saudi Arabia are presiding over a changing country.
Social, religious, political and economic forces are bringing subtle changes
to Saudi Arabia where the current political institutions are beginning to
struggle to cope with them. These issues include the youthful population of
Saudi, the role of women, Sunni-Shia conflict, and arising economic
hardships. These will be briefly examined in the next few sections.
The Youth of Saudi Arabia
Today, Saudi Arabia has 37% of the population under the age of 14 and 51%
under the age of 25xxxiii. Among this group the unofficial unemployment rate
is reaching 30%xxxiv. This will bulge out more in the near future, and thus
there will be a need for more job creation. Young Saudis have concerns about
job prospects. In the past graduates have been absorbed into the workforce,
but this is not the case today. The public service has become bloated and
private companies prefer to employ foreign workersxxxv. The government has
launched programs to promote the hiring of Saudis, but this had little
aggregate effect on the numbers of locals employed.
One of the reasons given for this high unemployment rate is a lack of any
work ethic among the local youth in the country. There have been changes in
the school and university curriculum to install more emphasis on leadership,
teamwork, problem solving abilities, and general creativity, however
developing this new direction in pedagogy is slowxxxvi. This is an issue
that is frustrating many youths in the kingdom.
Saudi youth are much more complex than the generation before them. There is
a large proportion of this group that wants some form of change as can be
seen through social media and the blogsphere. However they still remain
socially conservative and to some degree traditional in their views and
lifestylexxxvii.
Boredom is becoming a major issue where males can be seen lingering around
shopping malls. There is a distinct lack of leisure and recreational
activities available, leaving home as the only place of entertainment where
they watch television and spend time on the internet to pass time. This
brings close family ties but weak community integration. Very few undertake
much physical activity or exercisexxxviii. Strict gender segregation is
causing sexual frustration, as many cannot afford the cost of a marriage.
This is bringing depression, 'delinquent behavior', illicit drug use, and a
rise in HIV cases as some cross the border to Yemen to hire
prostitutesxxxix.
The 'Arab awakening' did influence Saudi youth to think about their society.
Although the young express great respect for their king and have a strong
love for their country. However, they are not without criticisms of the
extended Royal family, and frustration about aspirations that have not been
met.
Some young people launched a petition on the Internet that was signed by
more than 9,000xl. The petition presented to King Abdullah demanded that the
government tackle the problem of unemployment, release of all prisoners of
conscience, compensate them and to stop political arrests and spying on
citizens, reform the judiciary, criminalize all forms of favoritism, bias ,
territorial discrimination, tribal and sectarianism among citizens in the
distribution of wealth, and also called to fight all forms of financial and
administrative corruption, activating the principle of full transparency in
the oversight in government budgets and all work that carried out. They also
called to end all forms of discrimination against women, and give them full
political ,economic, social and cultural rights, and the right of people to
participate in political decision-making through the election of their
representatives.
Again in 2011 a 'day of rage' was called through Facebook, but nobody turned
out on the streets. This 'no-show' was most probably due to a fear of brutal
repressive force the police are known to use during protests, and general
apathy and a hesitancy to protest publiclyxli.
There appears to be a tendency towards conformity with the status quo, and
complacency about political activism within Saudi youth. This doesn't mean
that the youth of Saudi Arabia don't want more say in the decision making
processes of government. These aspirations can be seen on Youtube where many
video clips poke fun at Saudi Royals and Clerics.
In regards to religion, many young Saudis take a more contemporary view of
Islam, and not the conservative approach that the generation before accept.
Consequently the influence of the Clerics upon society today is slowly
weakening. The continued training of Saudis as professionals is slowly
bringing a new religious culture to the country.
Through changing demographics, Saudi society will be under great pressure
for change. This is particularly relevant to the current leadership in the
country. Royals are enjoying privileges that the new generation are noticing
and questioning. If the Royal family doesn't adapt to changing perceptions,
there could be some conflict in the future as political awareness grows. The
greatest challenge to the Saudi Government will be generating employment. If
this is not solved there will be fiscal issues to contend with, as well as
economic difficulties within the country.
The Role of Women
One of the most publicized issues within the 'western' media is about the
role of women in Saudi society, which therefore requires some focus, and
evaluation as to whether this issue is a strong force for change within the
Kingdom.
Women's rights in Saudi Arabia are defined by the Ulama's Sunni
interpretation of Islam and tribal customs under patriarchal culture of the
country. However, these interpretations are not always consistent, where for
example Sheikh Ahman Qassim Al-Ghamdi, Chief of Mecca Region Mulaween or
religious police said that prohibiting ikhtilat or gender mixing has no
basis within the Shariahxlii. However in contradiction, another prominent
cleric Sheikh Abdul Rahman Al-Barrak issued a Fatwa that proponents of
iktilat should be killedxliii. In addition, the enforcement of restrictions
varies by region, where Jeddah is relatively relaxed, but Riyadh and the
surrounding regions are much stricter.
Under tribal customs all women are required to have a male guardian, who is
either a father, brother, or husband. A guardian has both rights and duties
over the person they protect. Male guardianship concerns the concept of
namus or honor. This carries connotations of modesty and responsibility
where the protection of females provides honor to the malexliv. This is a
social convention rather than a law, however this custom is observed
throughout Saudi society. The stationing of US troops after 911 in 2001 saw
some relaxation of restrictions upon womenxlv.
When a male believes the actions of a woman has brought dishonor to the
family, punishment is the way the male seeks to cleanse this dishonorxlvi.
There have been many abuses of guardianship where the strong embeddedness of
this custom within society makes it very difficult for any woman to make a
formal complaintxlvii. Saudi activist Wajeha Al-Huwaider claims that the
concept of guardianship descends women to the status of pets, and at worst
is a form of slavery, where ownership of a woman can be passed from male to
male like a piece of merchandisexlviii. However from the point of view of
many Saudi women, this custom is accepted and valuedxlix. Consequently, its
Saudi custom rather than any mandate within Islam that appears to be
defining the rights of women within the countryl.
The conservativeness of Saudi society can be seen in a poll that indicated
80% of Saudi women don't think women should work in mixed gender
environmentsli. Further, many women believe that they shouldn't hold
political office, claiming that gender roles changes are opposed to Islam
and would exert an unwelcome western cultural influence, and they already
have a high degree of independencelii.
This can be seen with the controversial issue of the niqab in Europe. The
niqab is a custom that predates Islam on the Arab Peninsula, and has been
interpreted as repressive by many within 'western' society'liii. There are
also differences in opinion as to whether the niqab is obligatory in
Islamliv.
King Abdullah opened Saudi Arabia's first co-educational university in 2009.
He also appointed Norah Al-Faiz as the county's first woman deputy minister
during the same year. In 2010 women lawyers could represent females in court
over family matterslv. Thirty seats in the consultative assembly have been
allocated for women in 2013lvi. New decrees against women's violence have
been enacted and women have been granted the right to vote and run for
public office in the 2015 local government elections. However some
commentators have argued that the above reforms are more symbolic rather
than substantivelvii. But it must also be pointed out that there is a deep
conservative element within government and society that seeks to preserve
the traditional gender role in Saudi Societylviii.
Women's advancement is also shaping up in education where more females now
receive secondary schooling and tertiary education than maleslix. The King
Abdullah University of Science and Technology is a major social experiment
where co-education, and unveiled dress is permitted on campus.
Another area where women's rights have been dramatically liberalized is in
the area of employment. Traditionally girls had been taught that their
primary role in society was to raise children and take care of the
householdlx. Women's employment opportunities have increased dramatically
over the last few years where mixed gender workplaces have developed
particularly in the areas, of banking, finance, and medicine. However, the
percentage of Saudi women in the workforce is far behind other Islamic
countrieslxi. Saudi women are now becoming medical doctors, lawyers,
teachers, and business leaders. However again, conservatism within the Saudi
Labour Ministry has not always been enthusiastically supportive of the
growing trend of women in the workplacelxii.
Women's freedom of movement is still severely restricted. Women are
forbidden to leave their house and neighborhood without permission of their
male guardian. However in practice this is not the case. Women actually
drive in rural areas where enforcement of strict rules are much more
relaxed. Women are also forbidden to use public transport, but this is also
often unenforcedlxiii. Technically hiring a taxi or having a driver who is
not a member of the family is technically khalwa, or illegal, but occurs on
a daily basis. There have been a number of attempts to legalize women
driving in the Kingdom, but traditional values within society and government
have severely hampered these attemptslxiv.
Although the deprivation of women's rights is seen from a western
perspective as a major force for change, this in Saudi Arabia according to
reports on "the ground" doesn't appear to be the case. There are mixed ideas
about the change of women's roles in Saudi society, where change is seen by
many to be a threat to Saudi culturelxv, while at the same time others see
the current changes going on as being too slow. Saudi's see their society as
an Islamic one, based on tribal customs and wish to preserve this.
Sunni-Shia Conflict
Sunni Muslims make up approximately 85% of Saudi Arabia's population. The
remaining 15% are Shia, who tend to inhabit the oil rich eastern part of the
country, with other Shia communities along the border with Yemen. Relations
between the Sunni and Shia in Saudi Arabia are strained over the
disagreement of certain beliefs and rituals, although Shia have been allowed
their own mosques. However Shia religious books, certain Shia rituals
displayed at rituals like the Ashuralxvi are forbidden. The government has
restricted the names Shias can use for their children, and even
characterized Shia beliefs as heresy, and something worse than Christian or
Judaismlxvii. In addition reports suggest that Shia citizens of Saudi Arabia
face discrimination in employment, been marginalized economically, and are
prevented from political and cultural expression as welllxviii.
Some commentators draw the analogy of economic deprivation and political
marginalization of the Shia in Saudi as religious apartheidlxix.
On a number of occasions, Sunni-Shia friction has broken out into violence.
For example after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Saudi Shia celebrated
Ashura openly defying the Government , which led to three days of rampage
where cars were burned, shops looted, and banks attacked. The Shia movement
against the Saudi monarchy was supported by Iran, leading to numerous
arrests and detention of Shia activists by the Saudi authorities over the
years. The Salafis (also called Wahhabism) are an ultra conservative branch
of Sunni Islam. Most Saudi's follow Salafi teachings which could be
considered an orthodox version of Sunnism that follows the examples of early
Islamic practicelxx. Salafism has become associated with the strict
traditional practices that occur within Saudi society today. It is based
upon a morality and piety by following tradition and rejecting any
'speculative philosophy' that would be put by any modern interpretation of
Islam. Consequently, the scope of Islamic beliefs rests with the Qur'an,
Hadith, and consensus of "approved" Ulama.
Some of the ultra-extreme elements of Salafism has become associated with
fighting international jihad. One of Saudi Arabia's leading Ulamas issued a
Fatwa denouncing Shia as heretics, and the most vicious enemies of
Muslimslxxi. In 2006, 38 Saudi Clerics called on Sunni Muslims around the
world to mobilize against Shia Muslimslxxii. Some Salafi groups have been
heavily involved in violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shia gatherings
and mosqueslxxiii. A large number of Saudi Sunni extremists have gone to
Iraq and Syria to fight Shia.
A number of events have lessened the tension between Sunni and Shia in Saudi
Arabia. A moderate Shia Cleric Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar preached
reconciliation in the 1990s, calling for an abandoning of the rhetoric of
the Iranian Revolutionary leader Khomeini to a more pragmatic stance.
However the Shia community is deeply splintered with many militant
minoritieslxxiv, such as the Saudi Hezbollah that undertook attacks on oil
infrastructure and murdered Saudi diplomats in Ankara, Bangkok, and Karachi.
In 1996 another splinter group bombed the City of Al-Khubar.
Since 2005, the then monarch of Saudi Arabia King Abdullah relaxed some of
the restrictions on the Shialxxv. In 2007, the then Saudi King Abdullah met
with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a summit on Sunni-Shia relations.
Although there was general agreement to try and stop the escalating tensions
between the two groups, no concrete agenda was produced.
Today there are only four Shia members on the Consultative Council, no
cabinet ministers, no governors, mayors, or police chiefs. However violent
uprisings later occurred in Medina by Saudi Shia pilgrims, which led to a
major crackdown by the authorities. The Shia Ulama Nimr al-Nimr called for
the Shia to consider succession from Saudi Arabia.
Attitudes of hate between the Sunnis and Shias have developed over
generations in Saudi Arabia. They are ingrained from childhood and run deep,
where potential violence can erupt over any mishap. There are outspoken
people on both sides that seem to have vested interests in conflict. With
the Syrian conflict still ongoing, a rise in Iraqi tension and repression of
Shia in neighboring Bahrain, not forgetting rivalry between Iran and Saudi
within the Gulf, Sunni-Shia rivalry appears to be on the rise again within
the Middle East. Many analysts give a pessimistic assessment about the
futurelxxvi. The Sunni Royal families of the Arabian Peninsula have tended
to see the "Arab Spring" as a Shia revolt, and as a consequence there is
every potential that sectarian conflict could flare up again in Saudi
Arabialxxvii.
Arising Economic Hardships
Despite Saudi Arabia being one of the world's wealthiest nations, much of
the country is living in poverty. As previously discussed, unemployment is
extremely high and job development initiatives have failed to keep up with
the demands of a growing population. Reports suggest that between 2-4
million people in Saudi Arabia live in povertylxxviii. Many of those
experiencing poverty are the youth, single mothers without any support from
a male, and approximately 70,000 stateless people not entitled to any
government supportlxxix. Poverty is causing a number of social problems like
the sale of child brides to old men in the countrysidelxxx.
Despite government efforts through the building of apartments and social
welfare programs, there is growing anger over poverty and corruption in the
Kingdom. To a great degree, the government has suppressed the problem and
jailed two young activists Feras Bughnah and Hosam al-Deraiwish who produced
a Youtube video about the problemlxxxi.
Conclusion: What's in store for Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia is faced with both internal and external pressures.
There must be a massive diversification of the economy to absorb more
employment over the next decade. This at present does not appear to be
happening quick enough and as a consequence there will be; 1) increasing
unemployment, particularly among the youth, 2) fiscal pressure upon the
government in future to provide welfare to citizens, and, 3) a dissatisfied
population that could through organization become a politically conscious
force.
Given the political turmoil in the rest of the Middle East, Saudi leaders
must have concerns over the potential spread of turmoil within Saudi Arabia
itself. The protests in the neighboring Kingdom of Bahrain, and Oman are a
particular concern for the Saudi Royal family.
The intuition of the Saudi leadership has been to deal harshly with any
dissent. Most of these protests have been by the youth of the country,
students in particular. However, the news of these protests can't be
suppressed by the government as before, due to the widespread access to
social media.
The Shia community is of utmost concern. There are continual small protests
outside government ministry buildings in Riyadh, Taif and Tabuk, and in
Qatif and other small towns in the eastern region, such as Al-Awamiyah,
Hofuf, and Qatif, which is composed of the majority of Saudi Shia citizens
who face discrimination in government jobs by the authorities.
One of the reasons why Saudi Arabia has not faced the turmoil like Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Syria, or Yemen is because political parties are formally
prohibited. The only way for opposition groups to communicate is through
home meetings and social media. Mass protests on the street is still beyond
the "threshold" of discontent at this stage, where there is little precedent
for such protests. In addition, the authorities in an attempt to avoid any
popular protests issued a decree banning public protests, which has been
reinforced by a number of fatwas from clerics who are support the Saudi
government.
However this doesn't mean that Saudi society is not evolving naturally.
Saudi society is likely to strata into a large middle/professional class
with more contemporary Islamic beliefs, and a core of Islamic
traditionalists. The nature of economic modernization and education are the
forces behind this, and it remains to be seen what reaction the more
conservative religious elements in the country will do, if they can do
anything. This trend could lead to a steady liberalization of society, or
further enforcement of religious rituals and traditions to maintain the
status quo. The important question here is "Will the Ulama allow Saudi
culture to evolve into a modern Islamic society, balanced with tribal
customs that Saudis value?"
Generally Saudis are not pushing for radical political reforms. Employment,
social problems, equity, fairness, and discrimination seem to be the major
issues of concern, although there is some yearn to participate more in
decision making that affects their future. There will be pressure on the
Royal family to go down the path of allowing more participation in
government, and this must be handled appropriately and wisely.
The emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Saudi support for Iraq
in the Iran-Iraq war contributed to a rekindling of confrontation between
the Shia and Saudi authorities. Economic hardship, coupled with the lack of
opportunity within mainstream Saudi society, have contributed to the
reopening of these wounds. given that the Shia still tend to be religiously
and politically dependent upon outside influences, any upsetting events
could potentially trigger calls for autonomy or independence from the Saudi
state. Such aspiration would no doubt lead to protests, violence and even an
insurgency in the future, if not handled wisely.
Consequently, Saudi Arabia is at the crossroads and the leadership must look
very closely at its economy and needs of the younger generation within
society. Urbanization and industrialization has brought massive changes to
indigenous cultures all around the world, and there is no reason to believe
that the same would not happen within Saudi society. The question is how the
Saudi royal family will see this; as a threat to their position in power, or
as inevitable change, to which they must adapt.
Notes:
1. See: CIA Factbook: Country Comparison GDP (purchasing Power Parity),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001ra
nk.html?countryName=Saudi Arabia&countryCode=sa®ionCode=mde&rank=23#sa,
accessed 22nd April 2013.
2. See: CIA Factbook: Country Comparison GDP real growth rate,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2003ra
nk.html?countryName=Saudi Arabia&countryCode=sa®ionCode=mde&rank=45#sa,
accessed 22nd April 2013.
3. See: CIA Factbook: Country Comparison oil production,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2173ra
nk.html, accessed 22nd April 2013.
4. The Saudi Industrial Development Fund
http://www.sidf.gov.sa/Ar/INDUSTRYINSAUDIARABIA/Pages/IndustrialDevelopmenti
nSaudiArabia.aspx and
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012report.pdf
5. See: CIA Factbook: Country Profile Saudi Arabia,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html,
accessed 22nd April 2013.
6."CIA Factbook: Country Profile Saudi Arabia".
7. See interview of Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed, Unemployment and Resistance
in Saudi Arabia, 6th August 2011,
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemi
d=74&jumival=6891, accessed 22nd April 2013.
8. Bladd, J., (2010), Female Jobless rate at 24% in Saudi Arabia - study,
Arabian Business.com, 3rd August,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/female-jobless-rate-at-24-in-saudi-arabia-stu
dy-339584.html, access 22nd April 2013.
9. Knickmeyer, E., (2012), Saudis push young people, including women into
jobs, The Wall Street Journal, January 31,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204368104577139762604811028.ht
ml, accessed 22nd April 2013.
10. 49% of unemployed in Saudi Arabia never applied for jobs, Arab News,
20th February 2013,
http://www.zawya.com/story/49_of_unemployed_in_Saudi_Arabia_never_applied_fo
r_jobs-ZAWYA20130220030803/, accessed 22nd April 2013.
11. Nikolas, K., (2013), Prince Alwaleed warns of unemployment 'time bomb'
in Saudi Arabia, Digital News, February 21,
http://digitaljournal.com/article/343988, accessed 22nd April 2013.
12. See: Saudi Arabia - labor and employment, Global Security.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sa-labor.htm, accessed
22nd April 2013.
13. "CIA Factbook: Country Profile Saudi Arabia".
14. Sullivan, K., (2012), In Saudi Arabia, unemployment and booming
population drive growing poverty, The Washington Post, December 3,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-03/world/35623000_1_saudi-arabia-
poverty-rate-royals, accessed 22nd April 2013.
15. See: Matthiesen, T., (2013), Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
the Arab Spring that wasn't, Palo Altp, Stanford University Press.
16. See: Doing Business 2013 Report, 10th Edition, International Finance
Corporation, The World Bank, Washington DC, P. 3,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual
-Reports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf, accessed 22nd April 2013.
17. Lawson, T., (2011), Saudi Arabia: Leaked cable reveals how royals get
rich, Green Left, October 9,
http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48999,
accessed 22nd April 2013.
18. 2013 Index of Economic freedom, Saudi Arabia, Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/saudiarabia, accessed 22nd April 2013.
19. Ali, A., J., (2009), Business and management Environment in Saudi
Arabia: Challenges and opportunities for multinational corporations, New
York, Routledge.
20. Dankowitz, A., (2006), Saudi Writer and Journalist Wajeha Al-Huwaider
Fights for Women's Rights, Memri, 28th December,
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1805.htm, accessed 23rd April
2013.
21. See:
http://www.saudinf.com/main/c541.htm
22. See:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/saudi/INTROTHR.htm#TopOfPage
23. House, K., E., (2012), On Saudi Arabia: Its people, past, religion,
fault lines - and future, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, P. 9.
24. Report: Power struggle getting critical in Saudi Royal Family, FARS News
Agency, July 3,
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9103084914,
Accessed 18th February 2013.
25. Hanna, M., W., (2011), Saudi Arabia: Royal Succession, Regional Turmoil,
World Politics Review, March 8,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8120/saudi-arabia-royal-successi
on-regional-turmoil, accessed 28th April 2013.
26. Korany, B., & Hillal Dessouki, A., E., (2010), Foreign Policies of Arab
States: The Challenge of Globalization, Cairo, American University in Cairo
Press, P. 358.
27. Hassner, R., E., (2009), War on Sacred Grounds, London, Cornell
University Press, P. 143.
28. Goldstein, N., & Brown-Foster, W., (2010), Religion and the State, New
York, Infobase learning, P. 118.
29. Eakin, H., (2012), Will Saudi Arabia ever Change?, The New York Review
of Books,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jan/10/will-saudi-arabia-ever-
change/?pagination=false#fn-1, accessed 29th April 2013.
30. Obaid, N., R., (1999), The power of Saudi Arabia's Islamic Leaders, The
Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 6., No., 3, pp. 51-58.
31. Al-Farsy, F., (1992), Modernity and tradition: The Saudi Equation,
London, Knight Communications Ltd., P. 29.
32. Bligh, A., (1985), The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as participant in
the political system of the Kingdom, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, Vol., 17, pp. 37-50.
33. CIA Factbook: Saudi Arabia Population
34. Sfakianakis, J., (2011), Saudi Youth Struggle to Find Work Raises
Urgency for Reform, Arab News, February 16,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/368519, accessed 30th April 2013.
35. Murphy, C., (2011), Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Kingdom's Future,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Occasional Paper,
Washington, P. 3,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Saudi%20Arabia%E2%80%99s%20Y
outh%20and%20the%20Kingdom%E2%80%99s%20Future%20FINAL.pdf, accessed 30th
April 2013.
36. Al-Mulhim, A., (2013), Saudi Youth, the Issue of Unemployment and Work
Ethic, Arab News, March 9,
http://www.arabnews.com/columns/saudi-youth-issue-unemployment-and-work-ethi
c, accessed 30th April 2013.
37. Murphy, C., (2011), "Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Kingdom's Future", P.
2.
38. Murphy, C., (2011), "Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Kingdom's Future", P.
6.
39. Ali Sallam, A., A.., (2012), HIV/AIDS in Yemen between Society Review
and Services Weakness, December 27,
http://www.ovimagazine.com/art/9484,
accessed 27th December 2012.
40.
http://shababsaudi.wordpress.com/
http://arabsfordemocracy.org/democracy/pages/view/pageId/410 and
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/e6188d6b-2332-4a62-80df-0f1f5b1c467b
41. Murphy, C., (2011), "Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Kingdom's Future", P.
5.
42. Hai's Chief "ikhtilat' interview welcomed, Saudi Gazette, 16th December
2009,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=200912
1657187, accessed 29th April 2013.
43. Zoepf, K., (2010), Talk of Women's rights Divides Saudi Arabia, The New
York Times, May 31st,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01iht-saudi.html?pagewant
ed=1&src=me&_r=0, accessed 27th April 2013.
44. Mackey, S., (2002), The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, New York, WW
Norton & Company.
45. Butters, A., L., (2009), Saudi's Small Steps, Time Magazine, October 19,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1929235,00.html,
accessed29th April 2013.
46. Calvo, V., L., (2009), United Kingdom: "Honour' crimes and namus, Women
Living Under Muslim laws,
http://www.wluml.org/node/5802, accessed 29th
April 2013.
47. Erturk, Y., (2009), Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil.
Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences, United Nations Human Rights Council, New York,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.6.Add
.3_en.pdf, accessed 29th April 2013.
48. Al-Huwaider, W., (2007), For Saudi Women, Every Day is a Battle,
http://www.jewishtoronto.com/page.aspx?id=146618, accessed 29th April 2013.
49. Zoepf, K., (2010), "Talk of Women's rights Divides Saudi Arabia"
50. Wagner, R., L., Saudi female journalist defies stereotypes,
https://sites.google.com/site/roblwagnerarchives/saudi-female-journalist-def
ies-stereotypes, accessed 29th April 2013, Aboulola, M., S., (2010), Story
of Success, Saudi Gazette, April 25th,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=201004
2570427, accessed 29th April 2013.
51. Butters, A., L., (2009), "Saudi's Small Steps"
52. Ambah, F., S., (2006), "Saudi Women Rise in Defense of the Veil"
53. Bloomfield, A., (2009), Egypt purges niqab from schools and colleges,
The Telegraph, October 5,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/6262819
/Egypt-purges-niqab-from-schools-and-colleges.html, accessed 29th April
2013.
54. Niqab, BBC Religions, September 22,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/niqab_1.shtml,
accessed 29th April 2013.
55. Saudi to grant women court access, Aljazeera, February 21, 2010,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/02/201022117114465818.html,
accessed 29th April 2013.
56. Women on 3 Shoura Panels, Saudi Gazette, February 25,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=201302
25154468, accessed 29th April 2013.
57. Ambah, F., S., (2005), Saudi king Tiptoes toward More Openness, The
Christian Science Monitor, October 6,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1006/p01s03-wome.html, accessed 29th April
2013.
58. Ambah, F., S., (2006), Saudi Women Rise in Defense of the Veil, The
Washington Post, June 1,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/31/AR2006053101
994_pf.html, accessed 27th April 2013.
59. Hausmann, R., Tyson, L., D., & Zahidi, S., (2012), The Global Gender Gap
Report 2102, World Economic Forum,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf, accesssed 26th
April 2013.
60. Balaa, H., (2005), Behind the closed doors of Saudi Harems, P., 6,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:A20zyGDL9twJ:arabian-ec
ho.com/downloads/author.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk
61. BI-ME Staff, (2010), Women's employment in Saudi Arabia: A Major
Challenge, Bi-me.com, March 30,
http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=45534&t=1&c=62&cg=4&mset=, accessed 29th
April 2013.
62. Azuri, L., (2006), Public Debate in Saudi Arabia on Employment
Opportunities for Women, MEMRI, November 17,
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1793.htm#_edn1, 29th April 2013.
63. Nazir, S., (2005), Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa:
Citizenship and Justice, London, Rowman & Littleford.
64. Ambah, F., S., (2008), Saudi Women See a Brighter Road on Rights, The
Washington Post, January 31st,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013003
805.html, accessed 29th April 2013.
65. Zoepf, K., (2010), "Talk of Women's rights Divides Saudi Arabia"
66. Ashura is the commemoration of the martyrdom of Muhammad's grandson
Husayn Bin Ali.
67. Nasr., V., (2006), The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will
Shape the Future, New York, W.W. Norton, P. 237.
68. Human Rights Developments in Saudi Arabia, World report 2001,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html, accessed 30th April
2013.
69. Taqi, M., (2011), Saudi Arabia: the prized domino, March 10, Daily
Times,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C03%5C10%5Cstory_10-3-20
11_pg3_2, accessed 30th April 2013.
70. Moosa, E., (2005), Ghazali & the Poetics of Imagination, Chapel Hill,
The University of North Carolina Press, P. 21.
71. Top Saudi Cleric Issues Religious Edict Declaring Shiites to be
Infidels, International Herald Tribune, December 29, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/29/africa/ME_Saudi_Shiites.php.
72. Saudi Clerics seek help for Iraqi Sunnis, Daily times, December 12,
2006,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\12\12\story_12-12-2006_pg
4_8, accessed 30th April 2013
73. Blasts target Iraq's Shia Muslims, BBC News, February 18, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4276367.stm, El-Tablawy, T., (2005),
Latest Iraq Blast Targets Shia Mosque, Rediff India Abroad, September 16,
http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/16iraq.htm, Hurst, S., R., (2005),
Sectarian Killing Spree Against Shia, U-T San Diego, September 18,
http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050918/news_7n18iraq.html, accessed
30th April 2013.
74. Beranek, O., (2009), Divided We Survive: A Landscape of fragmentation in
Saudi Arabia, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle east Studies,
Brandeis University, January,
http://aapjs.brandeis.edu/globalbrandeis/documents/mebjan09.pdf, accessed
30th April 2013.
75. Nasr., V., (2006), "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will
Shape the Future", pp. 238, 240.
76. Murphy, C., (2013), Conflict between sunni and Shia Muslims seen as
escalating across the Middle East, Global Post, February 16,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/belief/conflict-betwee
n-sunni-and-shia-muslims-seen-escalating-across-mi, accessed 28th April
2013.
77. Taqi, M., (2011), "Saudi Arabia: the prized domino".
78. Poverty Growing in Saudi Arabia: report, PressTV, January 5, 2013,
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/05/281992/poverty-growing-in-saudi-ara
bia/, accessed 1st May 2013.
79. Nelson, S., S., (2011), Poverty Hides Amid Saudi Arabia's Oil Wealth,
npr, May 19,
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/19/136439885/poverty-hides-amid-saudi-arabias-oil
-wealth, accessed 1st May 2013.
80. Toumi, H., (2013), Poverty blamed for forced union in Saudi,
Gulfnews.com, January 12,
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/poverty-blamed-for-forced-union-i
n-saudi-1.1130400, 28th April 2013
81. Are we fine? Two Saudi men detained over Youtube video, 18th October
2011,
http://saudijeans.org/2011/10/18/are-we-fine-two-saudi-men-arrested-over-you
tube-video/, accessed 1st May 2013.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Wed May 01 2013 - 17:38:46 EDT
