<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4851/The_campaign_stretches_o
ut> The campaign stretches out
21th April 2013
France commits to a long war just three months after launching its biggest
military operation in Africa in 50 years
The official version is that France’s Mali operation has achieved all its
objectives – the expulsion of jihadist forces from main northern towns and
the destruction of several bases in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains – apart
from the rescue of seven hostages still held in the region. This week the
withdrawal began, with 100 or so French soldiers going home. France had
airlifted 4,000 troops to Mali and sent another 2,000 from its bases in Chad
and Côte d’Ivoire. Initially, French President François Hollande’s
government had said that all French troops would be out after elections were
organised: they are scheduled for July. However, Foreign Minister Laurent
Fabius, who has been sceptical about the operation from the start, announced
on a 5 April visit to Bamako that France would maintain a ‘support force’ of
1,000 soldiers in Mali on a ‘permanent basis’. This was France’s first
public commitment to a long-term military presence. It was more forceful
coming from the cautious Fabius rather than the more bullish Defence
Minister, Jean-Yves le Drian.
Not so temporary
Until then, Hollande’s ministers had insisted that this was an emergency
operation and that it would be temporary. After ejecting jihadists from
northern Mali, the plan went, French troops would hand over the job to
Malian soldiers and the Mission internationale de soutien au Mali (Misma),
which drew in forces from a dozen west African countries. The resolution
approved by the United Nations Security Council last December envisaged
troops from the Economic Community of West African States playing the
front-line role. France would provide logistical and intelligence support
and some European Union countries would retrain the national army.
Under the original plan, France was not going to send combat troops.
Hollande had said categorically that there would be no boots on the ground,
although security experts suspected that French special forces would
continue the search for Western hostages. After Hollande sent the troops on
11 January to block the jihadist advance towards Mopti, his ministers gave
differing reasons for the intervention, ranging from the need to protect
Mali’s sovereignty and to reunite the country, to driving out armed
Islamists and fighting a terrorist threat to France and the rest of Europe.
Fabius emphasised the temporary nature of the French deployment. Having gone
to such lengths last year to differentiate itself from former President
Nicolas Sarkozy’s model of Françafrique policy, Fabius wanted Hollande’s
Parti Socialiste government to make a clear break with that legacy. At the
same time, Hollande and Le Drian, one of his closest allies, said that
French troops would remain as long as necessary, until Malian sovereignty
was restored and the jihadists defeated. They said that there was no point
in sending troops to Mali unless they were able to restore and consolidate
security.
Budgetary pressure, concern about the longer-term success of the
intervention and local issues in France meant ministers were careful to
avoid any commitment to a permanent presence. Reporting of the war by French
and other international media was carefully controlled in northern Mali.
Journalists were embedded with the French troops and very little reporting
has come from the rapidly moving front line.
A month ago, security experts were predicting that French forces would pull
back to existing bases elsewhere in West Africa: in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire,
Burkina Faso and Chad, from where they could fly back if Misma needed
emergency reinforcement. Security experts and the wider public in France
remained obsessed by parallels with Afghanistan and Iraq. Would France get
stuck in the quicksands or quit without defeating the jihadists? In fact,
French strategic planners and their political directors have been refining
their approach as events develop, so as to get a clear sense of the likely
prospects.
In mid-January, Hollande had to set aside the assumption that Misma would
take the lead. The immediate threat then was the rapid jihadist advance
towards Mopti and the key Sévaré military airbase in central Mali (
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4746/Taking_the_fight_to_the_
desert> AC Vol 54 No 2, Taking the fight to the desert). Once French troops
were on the ground and the militants in retreat, they pressed forward to end
Islamist control of northern towns, right up to Kidal, Tessalit and Aguelhok
in the central Sahara.
By mid-February, French military planners were reflecting on what the
long-term challenge would be. They knew that the struggle to hunt down
militant groups hiding in the desert or in the Sahel bush near Gao would be
slow and difficult. Sporadic attacks by suicide bombers and land mines would
continue, while finding the hostages could take months. In spite of the
quick early successes, the planners realised their troops might have to stay
on much longer – to the frustration of a government whose popularity at home
was declining rapidly due to the economy.
The experiences of the last six weeks have confirmed this analysis. Despite
the killing in late February of Abdel Hamid Abou Zeid, a prominent commander
from Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), other key Islamist leaders are
still at large, including Iyad ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar Eddine (
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4767/Alghabass_ag_Intallah_ch
anges_sides> AC Vol 54 No 3 Alghabass ag Intallah changes sides). After a
huge manhunt in the Ifoghas massif in the Sahara, there is no sign of the
hostages. Meanwhile, the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de
l’ouest (MUJAO) continues to mount spectacular attacks in Gao and Timbuktu
and launched a mine attack between Ansongo and Ménaka, south-east of Gao.
Why France is staying on
The French military has also had the chance to get the measure of Misma,
which is likely to be restructured as a UN force later this year. The
African force now has 6,300 troops in Mali and its numbers could reach
10,000. The first 200 Ivorian soldiers, newly retrained by France, will
arrive before the end of April. The capability of the different national
contingents varies. The Nigeriens are well regarded and units have now
arrived from countries with long experience of peacekeeping and intervention
elsewhere, such as Senegal. Mauritania, previously reluctant, has also
indicated that it may provide troops; at least they would already be trained
for desert warfare. Burundi may also contribute: it has solid experience of
serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia, fighting Al Haraka al
Shabaab al Mujahideen. Yet only the 2,400 Chadian soldiers have been trusted
to fight alongside the French in offensive desert warfare against the
jihadists.
This is why France has concluded that it makes sense to keep 1,000 troops in
Mali, where they will presumably focus largely on offensive operations
against the Islamists – one such has been under way outside Gao over recent
days – while the African forces concentrate on consolidating security and
order in the settled areas of the north. As Fabius put it, the goal is to
ensure that ‘all the work done to break the terrorists is not destroyed’.
The decision is all the more significant given the difficult domestic
political context for Hollande at present. It follows reports that the
co-chairman of his presidential election campaign had money in the British
Virgin Islands offshore tax haven, while Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac had
to resign and has been charged with fraud.
As France’s campaign hits more problems within Mali, the security position
in neighbouring countries such as Mauritania and Niger is also causing
concern. Although the United States wants no involvement with a ground
campaign, its officials have been taking the regional implications of Mali’s
crisis increasingly seriously. The most obvious sign of this new involvement
is the USA’s agreements with Niger (to launch surveillance drones) and
Burkina Faso for various military facilities. Yet Washington is concerned
about France’s strategy of turning the military mission under French/Malian
control into a purely UN operation. US officials know that the UN’s linkage
to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation operations in Afghanistan has proved
generally disastrous for the UN’s position there.
?As the main promoters of the Mali strategy, Hollande and Le Drian have
become increasingly reliant on the military Chief of Staff, General Benoît
Puga. Foreign Minister Fabius, a more seasoned politician than either
Hollande or Le Drian, has been far more cautious about the mission. That
makes Gen. Puga’s role all the more important. Formerly head of the Special
Forces and also Commander of Operations in Chad (2006-2009) and in Libya
(2011), Puga is one of the most experienced officers in France. Appointed by
Sarkozy, he quickly gained Hollande’s confidence and, according to insiders,
his advice is taken more seriously than the Cellule africaine at the Elysée
Palace.
?When Hollande took over the government in May 2012, he and Fabius
commissioned a fresh assessment of Mali which recommended the immediate end
of French backing for the Mouvement national de Libération de l’Azawad.This,
we hear, led to a change of tactics by the Direction Générale de la Sécurité
Extérieure, the foreign intelligence service. The DGSE had developed close
ties with some Tuareg leaders, which had proved useful to them in Sahel
operation and in attempts to contain AQIM. The DGSE’s new Director, Bernard
Bajolet, a former intelligence coordinator at the Elysée who also served as
Ambassador to Algeria and Afghanistan, is understood to view the Mali
mission as his top priority. He replaces Erard Corbin De Mangoux, who took
the blame for the failed mission to rescue a DGSE agent from his Somali
captors in early January (
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4758/Regional_alliances_shift
ing> AC Vol 54 No 2, Regional alliances shifting).
France, Algeria and Mali
The Commandement des Opérations Spéciales backed an early intervention
because it believed the jihadist forces – about 5,000 in early January – had
not put down strong enough roots locally to mount a serious resistance. That
has proved true so far in Kidal and Timbuktu, but the jihadists have
established several clandestine bases around Gao, allowing them to sneak
into the city and attack Malian and French forces there.
Key to improving security in northern Mali and across the region is the
triangular relationship between Hollande, Algeria’s President
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/896/Abdelaziz_Boutef
lika> Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Mali’s President Dioncounda Traoré. This week
another Mali delegation is heading for more talks in Algiers: relations have
improved slowly over the past three years. In April 2010, Algeria set up the
Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint with Mali, Niger, and Mauritania
to coordinate action against AQIM and other jihadist groups but the CEMOC
lacked substance and capacity.
During the past year, all the jihadist groups in northern Mali received
supplies from Algeria, apparently with no attempt by its security services
to cut off the supply lines. Since France launched its intervention in
January, Algeria has shut its border with Mali. The In Amenas attack in
February concentrated minds and Algiers has stepped up security. It is also
watching developments in Western Sahara, where it backs the Polisario Front
against Morocco’s occupation.
A new report from UN Secretary General
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3070/Ban_Ki-moon>
Ban Ki-moon’s office warns that fighting on the Mali-Algeria border could
spill over into Western Sahara, and that jihadists could cross into camps
and radicalise the refugees there. The report also calls for independent,
sustained human rights monitoring in Western Sahara, a call backed by
Polisario but opposed by Morocco. King Mohammed VI’s government has been
trying to convince Polisario to accept its offer of autonomy within the
borders of Morocco.
Morocco’s occupation of Western Saharan territory is not recognised
internationally, a point delicately avoided in public by Hollande on his
state visit to Rabat last week, and there has been no serious pressure on
Morocco to cooperate on organising a credible election. Algeria and South
Africa believe Western support for Rabat on the issue could change.
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Received on Sun Apr 21 2013 - 17:23:27 EDT
