Resurrecting the popular consultations: a way forward for South Kordofan and
Blue Nile?
– By Aly Verjee
April 17, 2013
I would guess Omar al-Bashir gives more speeches than vice-president Ali
Osman Taha, but I usually find the latter’s statements provide more insight
into the thinking of the Khartoum regime. Recently, I got to see Taha
perform live in Doha: noting his eloquence is nothing new, but it was
striking to see him speak a sight better than his Arab contemporaries.
Naturally, there’s more to Taha than good rhetorical speaking. Depending on
the audience, his speeches usually feature at least one of six elements.
The first is to float policy trial balloons, often reflecting internal
debates and sometimes disputes within the NCP. The second is to either set
the stage for a future policy announcement by al-Bashir, or reinforce one
already made. The third is to provide an alternate characterization of a
situation, event or policy, which while not in direct contradiction to his
president or other senior figures, is typically better nuanced. The fourth
is to shore up the party’s Islamist credentials. The fifth is Taha as
conciliator, whether to the West or to domestic opposition. The sixth is as
hardliner and regime enforcer.
So how to judge Taha’s widely
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-sudan-southsudan-rebels-idUSBR
E92P0UH20130326> reported speech of March 26, in which he called for talks
with the SPLM-N? The speech had at least three of the characteristics
above. Taha sounded conciliatory. He offered the political opposition new
constitutional talks, which foreshadowed Bashir’s more comprehensive offer
in his speech (
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iL-uKEe9wlyIbBxwfvmA7DgR
y8SQ?docId=CNG.715fa7283f20474355be128feef40a4a.c1> AFP,
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/01/sudan-amnesty-idUSL5N0CO1OL201304
01> Reuters) to the national assembly on April 1. But I’m particularly
interested in Taha’s trial balloon, particular to South Kordofan and Blue
Nile: an offer to restart the ‘
<
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2011Docs/FAQ-popular%20consultati
ons%20BNS-Updated.pdf> popular consultations (PCs),’ the CPA’s promised
mechanism to resolve outstanding issues in the Two Areas of South Kordofan
and Blue Nile. (For more on the PCs, see:
<
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR260%20-%20Why%20Sudan%27s%20Popular%2
0Consultation%20Matters.pdf> Why Sudan’s Popular Consultation Matters, Jason
Gluck, USIP, 2010;
<
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/Southern%20Kordofan%20and%20Blue%20Nile%20brie
fing_December%202010.pdf> The Significance of State Elections and the
Popular Consultations for Peace, Saferworld, 2010; and
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Unfinished_Business-_South_Kordofan_s_S
tate_Elections-3.pdf> Unfinished Business: The May 2011 State Elections in
Southern Kordofan, Aly Verjee, 2011.)
Malik Agar, the once elected governor of Blue Nile and now chair of the
SPLM-N was quick to dismiss the Taha offer: “The popular consultation got
buried with the end of the CPA,” he said. But at least measured by current
international policy, PCs are far from dead. UN Security Council
<
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10632.doc.htm> resolution 2046
requires the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N to “reach a negotiated
settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement on Political
Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N.”
The June 28, 2011
<
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Two-Areas-Framework-Agrmt-2
80611.pdf> Framework Agreement states:
“3. i. The Popular Consultations Process is a democratic right and mechanism
to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and
shall be completed and its outcomes fully implemented and fed into the
constitutional reform.
5. c. Without prejudice to the bilateral discussion between the two Parties
on issues to be addressed through the process of popular consultation, the
Popular Consultation process shall be extended beyond 9 July 2011 through an
agreed amendment by the National Assembly.
d. Development of appropriate arrangements or mechanisms to ensure that the
goals of the Popular Consultation process as per the CPA are achieved.”
On July 20, 2011, the National Assembly did amend the Popular Consultation
Act as per article 5.c. of the Framework Agreement, providing a further six
months for the process to conclude. SPLM-N parliamentarians boycotted that
vote.
New negotiations between the SPLM-N and the NCP might drop the idea of
resuming PCs. But given Taha’s recent statement and the earlier 2011
agreement by the SPLM-N and Malik Agar himself to continue with the PC
process, burial announcements seem premature.
Agar is right to be wary, though: there were many difficulties with the
ill-defined, vague process. It is, though, an interesting thought
experiment to consider how PCs might work if and when a new peace is
negotiated. A few key questions:
1. Begin again, or continue from where the last PC stopped?
The delayed electoral process in South Kordofan delayed the start of the
state’s PC. War put the process on hold indefinitely. But in Blue Nile,
preparations for the PC were already underway in 2010, and by the time war
broke out there, the PC had sufficiently advanced to hear written and oral
testimony from almost 70,000 Blue Nile citizens in more than 100 separate
hearings across the state. However, by August 2011, the PC in Blue Nile
was, in the words of the Carter Center
<
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-082611.html> observation mission,
at a “stalemate,” beset by both technical disputes over the means by which
the PC continued, as well as more fundamental political difficulties.
Continuing from where the Blue Nile PC stopped in the CPA era means an
asymmetric process continues, with South Kordofan again delayed behind Blue
Nile. Starting again probably means re-negotiating every element of
previous agreement reached in Blue Nile.
South Kordofan has particular difficulties in even starting: given that
members of the PC commission are appointed from the state legislative
assemblies, agreeing the membership of the body would be complicated, given
lingering problems from the contested state elections of May 2011.
2. Allow a genuine consultation, or play the same old games of manipulation?
Again to quote the Carter Center, in its
<
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/blue-nile-pop-con%20sult
-comm-032111.pdf> March 2011 assessment:
“While the Center praises the [PC] commission for conducting efficient,
well-attended citizen hearings, it is worrying that what appears to be
coaching by the NCP and SPLM undermined the overall goal and spirit of the
popular consultations.
There have been reports that the parties’ campaigning amounted to coaching,
pressure, or intimidation. In some areas, this reportedly included bringing
individuals to a nearby location for a last-minute information session
before taking them to a hearing. In other areas, Carter Center observers
heard accusations of bribery and threats, though none could be verified.
Both major parties accuse the other of manipulating the process and
inappropriately influencing participants. At the very least, the parties’
mobilization calls into question the popular nature of the views expressed
during the hearings.
The SPLM and NCP’s apparent orchestration of people’s statements in the
popular consultations undermines the intent of the process…”
Perhaps it is naïve to expect either party to be really interested in a
genuine consultation of ordinary people. Perhaps it is just politics for
both parties to use whatever tools they have to obtain the best dispensation
they can get. But this is an approach that only further devalues the PC
process.
3. The governors: accept Haroun, reinstate Agar?
State governors are not formally part of the PC commissions. But it is
inconceivable that a state-level PC process could take place without the
substantial involvement of the state’s most powerful official. Malik Agar
was elected as governor in April 2010; he was dismissed by President
al-Bashir in September 2011. Ahmed Haroun was declared elected in the May
2011 elections in South Kordofan; notwithstanding his disputed
<
http://riftvalley.net/resources/file/RVI%20Report%20-%20Disputed%20Election
,%20Deficient%20%20%20Observation%20%25C3%25B1%2021%20August%202011%20-%20Fi
nal.pdf> victory, Harun’s subsequent role as lead prosecutor of the war in
South Kordofan has made him an even more polarizing figure. Sacking Haroun
as part of a peace deal is an option, but brings its own political
difficulties for the NCP. Both Haroun and Agar will need to be
accommodated, whatever deal is reached. If either is in power and PCs take
place, their roles will be crucial: state governors may have limited
budgets, but power brings influence money can’t always buy.
Aly Verjee is senior researcher at the <
http://www.riftvalley.net/> Rift
Valley Institute.
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Received on Wed Apr 17 2013 - 16:39:12 EDT
