Yemen's Military Earthquake
By:
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/authors/farea-al-muslimi.html>
Farea al-Muslimi for Al-Monitor Posted on April 16, 2013.
SANAA - "Thawra" (revolution) has been on the tongues of Yemenis for the
past two years, but
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/04/transformations-youth-yeme
n.html> revolutionary changes tend to move at a glacial pace. For example,
it took President Ali Abdullah Saleh nearly a year to agree to the 2011 Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) deal on the transfer of presidential power. This
past week brought an the exception to the rule when
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/06/what-is-the-next-step-for-
presid.html> President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi hastened the pace of change
with presidential decrees altering the political and military balance of
power in Yemen. "Awe" was the most apt word to describe the atmosphere when
it occurred. Indeed, most Yemenis could be heard uttering, "Finally," in
response to Hadi's decision to reshuffle the military.
The presidential decrees not only fulfilled one of the key demands of the
2011 revolution, but also brought to a close the long-standing dispute, and
outright armed conflict, between Ahmed Ali Saleh, eldest son of the deposed
president Saleh and who headed the powerful Republican Guard, and Gen. Ali
Mohsen al-Ahmar, who had earlier defected to protect protesters in 2011.
While Hadi's decree removed the two dueling strongmen, appointed thirty new
military leaders and concluded 30 years of Saleh-family domination of the
Yemeni military, it also contained an important gesture to foster
reconciliation between the Yemeni military and the Yemeni people. The First
Armoured Division base, a sprawling headquarters that effectively served as
the nerve center and staging ground for attacks against protesters in 2011,
will be transformed into a public park.
Yet, recent history and jousting strongmen may not be so easily forgotten in
Yemen. Ahmed Ali Saleh, while being groomed to take over from his father,
had been appointed head of the country's most elite force, the Republican
Guard, and given several sensitive political and economic portfolios. In
2009, Saleh was tapped to implement the 10-point Agenda for transforming the
political and economic landscape of the country in what many viewed as a
ploy to brand him a reformer, bolster his engagement in economic policy,
increase his popularity among the people and, most crucial, spread his role
among assorted high-level positions domestically and firm up contacts with
Western diplomats who largely supported the agenda. The former good friend
of Said al-Islam al-Qadafi tried to learn from his legacy and perhaps Jamal
Mubarak.
Meanwhile, Gen. Ahmar, a long-time confidante and ally of the deposed
president Saleh prior to defecting, had led the First Armoured Division and
maintained a close relationship with the Saudis (and more recently with
Qatar). The popular protests of 2011 put the two strongmen on a collision
course. Intermittent high-profile clashes between their respective forces
brought life in Sanaa to a standstill and evoked tragic memories of the1994
civil war.
The fissure created two ambitious power brokers at odds with each other and
the wishes of the peaceful protesters. Heavy fighting in 2011 carved up
sections of Sanaa in a situation eerily reminiscent of the very real
neighborhood-by-neighborhood frontlines demarcating East Beirut and West
Beirut in the 1980s.
President Hadi was not spared the rivalry between the two men. From the
moment he assumed office, Hadi playfully referred to his home as the "United
Nations," because he was largely unable to quell the violence between their
factions. Hadi, following the Roman tactic of decimating an army to assure
its inability to launch an attack, has been reining in both sides since he
came to power following the GCC deal, but also resorted to raising his own
forces in 2012. Thus there emerged three powerful factions in the capital.
Hadi's recent decrees, however, mark a shift toward a more unified army than
at any other time during his tenure thus far. While the army as a whole may
still be weak, corrupt and lack cohesion, the presidential measures
represent a positive stride toward a more-inclusive and less-fractured
institution. Perhaps more than anything, the reshuffling will bolster Hadi's
political capital and credibility as a capable leader immune to the wills of
Ahmar and Saleh. Ahmar will now serve as an advisor to the president, while
Ahmed Ali will join the slew of other Salehs in diplomatic positions around
the world when he assumes the role of ambassador to the United Arab
Republic.
The assertive decrees have an echo beyond elite politics in Yemen. In the
past, military control and support formed the bedrock of political power in
the country, but Hadi's decrees could mark an important shift toward a new
political-military relationship. The impact potential was particularly
apparent at the
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/03/yemen-dialogue-rough-start
.html> National Dialogue conference, the umbrella under which Yemeni actors
are debating the future of the country for the coming six months. Prior to
the decrees, the conference enjoyed little confidence because of the belief
that the different factions could easily use force to gain what they could
not gain peacefully in roundtable discussions.
Confidence in Hadi, too, has been far from solid since to date he has not
fulfilled the 20-point plan for preparing the country for the National
Dialogue. The points primarily pertain to the
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/south-yemen-struggles-in-
wake-of-unrest-abyan-province-aqap.html> situation with the south. Delays in
the dialogue raised the ire of the factions, but the removal of the two
military strongmen opens a window of opportunity to engage all movements.
The chance to implement the 20 points is now better than ever.
Broad international support is perhaps one of the least discussed aspects of
the recalibration of the political-military power balance. While Hadi's
decision bears little semblance to Saleh's political domination of the
country prior to the transition, there are concerns that Hadi's newfound
credibility may be used to delay the transfer of power beyond February 2014,
when elections are scheduled to take place. According to the GCC plan, Hadi
retains final say in any decision on the transition of power. Furthermore,
the absence of viable competitors, Hadi's background as a southerner
unaffiliated with the northern tribes and widespread international support
could translate into there being few obstacles to a proposal to delay
elections. Today, postponement also seems more likely than ever given the
slow progress by the Supreme Commissions for Elections and Referendum to
prepare the country, not to mention the need for widespread voter
registration and renewal programs.
Beyond all this, the most dangerous aspect of the reshuffling is the
country's habit of keeping all its eggs in one basket. This is currently
reflected in the absence of a vice president. To date, President Hadi has
not filled the position, so it is unclear what would happen in the event a
tragedy struck. In Yemen, such concerns are not unwarranted. The threat to
Hadi's life has increased now that more traditional actors are enraged.
Hadi's decision to end three decades of Saleh domination of the Yemeni
military may reunify the tribal village against him. The legacy of tribes
"unifying with the brother against the cousin and with the cousin against
the stranger" is tried and true in Yemen.
Perhaps what evolves in Yemen will resemble the classic cinematic scene of
relatives hugging each other, tears in their eyes, regretting the
differences that had weakened them and allowed a stranger to exploit them
both; they then soon begin plotting their revenge. At the end of the day,
Yemen is a country where many movie-like things happen. The Hadi reshuffle
seemed possible only in the movies a few years (and even a few months) ago.
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites/almonitor/content
s/authors/farea-al-muslimi.html> Farea al-Muslimi is a Yemeni youth
activist, writer and freelancer. His writings have appeared in Al-Monitor,
The National, Foreign Policy, As Safir and many other regional and
international media outlets.
Read more:
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/yemen-military-president-
hadi-factions.html#ixzz2QcafSSfz>
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/yemen-military-president-h
adi-factions.html#ixzz2QcafSSfz
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Received on Tue Apr 16 2013 - 06:49:48 EDT
