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[Dehai-WN] Thenational.ae: Seeds of future wars sown by Yemen's military shake-up

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2013 16:38:24 +0200

Seeds of future wars sown by Yemen's military shake-up


Sama'a Al Hamdani

Apr 15, 2013

  _____

On April 10, Yemen's President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi boldly issued a decree to
restructure the nation's military. The most notable achievements of this
decree was dismantling former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's grip on the
military by sending many of his relatives abroad as diplomats.

The decision reinforced Mr Hadi's previous military decrees to abolish the
First Armoured Division led by Gen Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, and the Republican
Guard, led by Mr Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed. These two units stirred the most
controversy.

Still, the decree is a major gamble by Mr Hadi, who is looking to ease the
tensions that have paralysed Yemen for the past two years. This move is
aimed to define the function of the new military, but it will likely
increase tensions in the long run rather than solve them.

The military structure is made up of three different powers: From the north,
Gen Mohsen, who defected from the former regime, was named the chief
military adviser to the president. As such, he will have major influence on
the military. Together with the Islah party, the main opposition party in
Yemen, they control almost half of the military.

Mr Hadi, who hails from the south, controls the second large portion of the
country's forces.

The last component of the military belongs to the remnants of Mr Saleh's
regime.

Based on these divisions, it is apparent that the military wasn't able to
shake off former tribal influences, which leads to the conclusion that three
main struggles are likely to arise due to geographical and ideological
differences.

First, the northern powers of Gen Mohsen and Islah could threaten the
Houthis, who control a largely autonomous area on the border with Saudi
Arabia. Second, the southern powers of Mr Hadi could try to curb Hirak's
separatist influence in the south. But the real struggle will manifest
within the military, between the components as they strive for power and
dominance.

In the past decade, the Yemeni government has fought an on-again, off-again
guerrilla war against the Houthis, a Shia revivalist group. All of the six
wars were spearheaded by Gen Mohsen under Saleh's regime. But, once Mr Saleh
agreed to step down in late 2011, the conflict took on more of a sectarian
character, as the Houthis increasingly clashed with tribal and religious
militias linked to Islah. These two strands of anti-Houthi resistance are
now coming together.

Gen Mohsen may have lost his armoured division, but he remains a key
military figure in the new order. More importantly, two of his allies have
been named regional commanders in the areas bordering the Houthis'
stronghold in the north. As expected, the Houthis have marched against Mr
Hadi's military reshuffling, believing that their enemies are looking to
surround them and destroy them.

The threat to the Houthis is highly dangerous, particularly since the
Houthis tend to lash out whenever they feel cornered.

In the south, the rest of the military will be occupied with a different
conflict. The leadership of Hirak, the southern movement pushing for
secession, has refused to join the National Dialogue which is now underway.
Almost all of the south's leadership, including Mr Hadi himself, belonged at
some point to Yemen's Socialist Party.

Today, these leaders are divided between those who support the president,
and in turn unity, and those who do not. Personal vendettas and
long-standing feuds still colour much of the interaction in the south.

Two scenarios are possible: First, as is the case in the past, mysterious
assassinations could begin between these opposing forces. Or, the conflict
could morph into several regional conflicts.

Ultimately, the lives of separatists will be in danger. The military will
always support the home region of the president, Abyan, and Islahis will not
hesitate to involve their militias and their hold on the military to gain
control over southern territories.

Yet the most important struggle will be the one within the military itself.
The two dominating powers of the military, Gen Mohsen and Islah on the one
hand and Mr Hadi's forces on the other, could easily result in a typical
north-south regional schism. But it could also take on a more ideological
flavour between those aligned with Islah and those who oppose the
conservative religious party. Islah is looking to rule and Mr Hadi, at some
point, will have to seriously consider joining forces with them.

That leaves Mr Saleh's allies, the vulnerable component of the military, to
seek new alliances outside of the military. It is likely that they will
collaborate with the Houthis and Hirak.

The new military decree suggests that Mr Hadi is unlikely to step down in
2014, or even 2016 for that matter. Through the military, Mr Hadi is finally
establishing his authority and if he leaves in the near future, the balance
of power in Yemen will be skewed. Yemenis will continue to battle over
political, ideological and regional influence.

The military restructuring doesn't solve Yemen's infighting. Rather, it
could exacerbate it at a time when the country has more pressing issues.
Within this military reshuffle are the seeds of years of future conflicts.

 

Sama'a Al Hamdani is a Yemeni researcher who lives in Washington DC and
blogs at yemeniaty.com

 




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