Sudan: African Sequel to the Arab Spring?
by <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/jason-b-nicholson> Jason B.
Nicholson
Journal Article | April 8, 2013 - 2:25am
Following the Arab Spring's sweep through North Africa, many observers
questioned if the unrest would spread to southern Africa. While that has not
come to pass, the Arab Spring winds are strongly buffeting Sudan. It
occupies a unique place in the geopolitical landscape of Africa. Sudan is
the Sub-Saharan country that most resembles those of North Africa, with its
shared religion, culture, and language. An Arab Spring in Sudan could result
in a more authoritarian dictatorship, a theocracy, or a failed state in
which extremists are free to train and operate.
Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, despite having many authoritarian
regimes where living conditions remain mired in poverty and high single
digit GDP growth, has proven resistant to the widespread social protests
that toppled regimes in North Africa. Despite similar political environments
in many northern and southern African nations, there are important reasons
why the Arab Spring has not spread south of the Sahara
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn1> [1].
In Africa, most governments are formed on traditional social hierarchies,
relying upon devolved power to local elites at multiple complimentary levels
such as tribe, clan, and social class. Sub-Saharan countries do not often
possess the highly centralized state structures found in North Africa. There
are many reasons for this, but key traits are homogenous ethnic identity and
shared religion. Despite significant exceptions to both in North Africa, the
diversity of religions and ethnicities in Sub-Saharan Africa is much
greater.
Many Sub-Saharan countries have widespread corruption, governments
intolerant of personal freedoms, and stifled political opposition. However,
these conditions alone do not lead directly to an environment conducive to
abrupt political change. One must have a catalyst, such as Bouazizi's
sacrifice in Tunisia that gives people the motivation to put their lives at
risk to affect change. One also needs a way to spread the call to action - a
task much easier in North Africa, with its much deeper penetration of social
media and higher rates of education.
Many Sudanese view the Arab Spring's 'successes' with envy. Sudan is more
susceptible to influence of the Arab Spring than other Sub-Saharan African
nations is its Arab culture, linguistic and identity ties matter. Sudanese
feel it is their time to choose a government representative of their own
desires. However, the lack of political space has stifled almost all
legitimate protest or dissent, leaving the population little choice, but to
use other means in its challenges to the ruling regime.
Sudan is deeply affected by legacy ideologies from the Cold War. It's
highly educated urban population are increasingly informed about the wider
world through the same lens as their North African cousins via television
channels such as Al Jazeera. Additionally, Islam had been intertwined with
the political development of Sudan through both its direct and indirect
involvement in politics <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn2>
[2]. This created an autocracy wrapped in Islamist trappings. Both Qaddafi's
Libya and Sadat's Egypt claimed to be Islamic but were essentially secular
in governance.
The National Congress Party (NCP) leads the government in power in Sudan. It
derives its platform directly from the Muslim Brotherhood, the name it went
under in the 1970s <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn3> [3].
The party came to power in 1989 during a military-coup, led by Omar
al-Bashir, who is currently under indictment by the International Criminal
Court for genocide in Darfur. Much like Mubarak in Egypt, Bashir's power
base in Sudan is grounded in a vast system of patronage within the military
and other security apparatus. These stakeholders are heavily invested in
Sudanese industries. Sudan's systems of patronage and control resemble the
"Deep State" under Mubarak in Egypt or the Generals in Turkey.
Since independence in 1956, most of Sudan's history has been marked by civil
war. Following two prolonged periods of conflict, a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was signed in 2005 that eventually led to South Sudan's
independence. South Sudanese petroleum production provided approximately 75%
of revenue for Sudan <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn4>
[4]. The years of war and the loss of South Sudan have left the government
in Khartoum destitute.
Additionally, the scale and scope of the wars left infrastructure
underdeveloped, as the diversion of resources to the military over such a
long period resulted in underinvestment in the population. Today, Khartoum
remains engaged in multiple concurrent armed and political conflicts
internally and externally, such as in Darfur, where, due Their presence
highlights Sudan's unresolved internal stability problems, which also
include many internally displaced persons throughout the country. These
conflicts distract the government from delivering services and opportunities
for prosperity. This particularly affects the urbane, Islamist, and
increasingly connected urban population that forms the NCPs support base. As
dissent is met with repression, the currents of discontent are strengthened;
eventually these could become self-defeating
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn5> [5].
Focused on multiple simultaneous conflicts, the stilted NCP government
cannot produce meaningful improvements in quality of life. Political
isolation of Sudan keeps away most donors except for Chinese parastatals,
whose main interest is in extractive industry, not development. For a
country where 42% of the population is below the age of 14, problems
associated with lack of economic opportunity will compound difficulties in
the future.
Highly stove-piped state institutions have formed very narrow power bases
for important ministers. The dependency of the government's ministers and
stakeholders on Bashir increases daily as Sudan remains isolated.
Increasingly the government controls the only revenue streams available to
serve as sources of patronage. The lack of broad popular support has created
a precarious situation where the government is strong, but rests upon a weak
foundation. Even Islamist parties are abandoning the NCP; this is striking
for a party that was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and in a country
Al Qaeda once called home
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn6> [6]. Many of these same
parties serve as the base of support for Bashir and the NCP.
Recent events in Sudan show the social strain influenced by the Arab Spring.
Protests initially broke out in Sudan in early 2011, reflecting the unrest
throughout much of the Arab world. They have continued off and on since
then, through 2012, and into 2013. The epicenter for these protests has been
Khartoum <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn7> [7]. The
regime draws most of its support from the "Arab" tribes of the central
region of Sudan. These are also the most populous groups in the country.
Various student movements have played a pivotal role in leading protests. It
must be noted that previous popular revolts, in both 1964 and 1985, have
resulted in removals of government. In both 1964 and 1985 popular uprisings
overthrew Sudanese governments
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn8> [8]. This influences
every decision made by the NCP government regarding how to contain on-going
protests.
In September 2012, Sudan, like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and countries
throughout the Muslim World, was wracked by violent protests in response to
the release of a film seen by many Muslims as blaspheming the Prophet
Mohammed <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn9> [9]. In
Khartoum, both the US and German embassies security walls were breached. The
missions were vandalized heavily and lit on fire. This protest involved an
estimated crowd of between 10,000 and 15,000 people. Coming just after the
US Ambassador to Libya's killing in Benghazi, these protests attracted
significant attention internationally.
During the protests, Sudanese government security forces intervened to
protect the two embassies and three protesters were killed. As news of the
protester's deaths spread, the crowd turned from anti-Western to anti-Bashir
chants <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn10> [10]. Direct
criticism of Bashir has been rare during previous periods of unrest.
Ironically, the Sudanese government itself had called for protests, albeit
peaceful ones. The storming of the embassies and quick turn of the crowd to
anti-Bashir chants shows the political volatility underlying Sudanese
society. It is apparent that strong popular currents of dissent exist.
Residual protests continued throughout 2012 into late December.
What could tip the balance in Sudan to spark more widespread protests?
Clearly, economic pressure will directly impact the population. In an
already poor country, additional fiscal burdens could drive many unemployed
people to extremes <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn11>
[11]. This is particularly true of young unemployed men. The near tripling
of the minimum wage will severely limit job growth in 2013. The huge deficit
in the annual budget will also impact the ability of the government to
provide basic services.
The increasing frequency of protests in Khartoum could indicate a lessening
of fear towards the regime. The examples from the revolutions in North
Africa, coupled with the loss of South Sudan and inability to end fighting
in Darfur could make the once unthinkable a viable future course of action.
If history is a guide, the Sudanese regime's reaction will not deescalate
the situation in any meaningful way.
The NCP is unwilling or unable to make the compromises necessary to address
the long-term political and economic fixes that address legitimate
grievances <
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftn12> [12]. An
unforeseen variable will provide the specific catalyst that could eventually
lead Sudanese protests to resemble those of their northern neighbors. It is
inevitable that any subsequent regime will also be Islamist inspired. The
Islamist movements are more highly organized than pro-democracy ones and
Sudanese civil society is highly religious in its own right. In the event of
a revolution, Sudanese civil society would have to ensure Islamic extremists
do not hijack their future.
An African sequel to the Arab Spring in Sudan would most likely resemble
those in Egypt and Tunisia. The majority of the regime's supporters would
simply quit acting against their own countrymen. Internal collapse of
support for the NCP government would provide a brief window of political
uncertainty. Competing stakeholders, from regime revanchists to radical
Islamists, will maneuver for dominance when the Arab Spring winds stop
blowing.
Sudan lies at the heart of the greater Horn of Africa and East Africa, with
many ongoing and frozen conflicts. Future challenges of religious tension,
resource scarcity, and international geo-political competition are all
represented in microcosm in Sudan. The international community must be
prepared to provide political and development support, while ensuring the
country can continue to provide security for its people. Failure to address
these challenges could result in Sudan's becoming a conduit for an immense
wave of societal change throughout the continent. Many Africans,
increasingly connected to the global community, are watching the winds of
change blow.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref1> [1] Joseph Siegle,
"Some Small Signs That The Arab Spring Is Spreading Into Africa," Africa
Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, November 07, 2011.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref2> [2] Ismail bin
Matt, "Toward an Islamic Constitutional Government in Sudan," presented at
the 35th Annual AMSS Conference, Hartford Seminary, October 27-29, 2006.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref3> [3] See overview of
Sudanese political parties at <
http://www.sudanupdate.org/>
www.SudanUpdate.org, Significant People and Organizations,
<
http://www.sudanupdate.org/WHOSWHO/NIF.HTM>
http://www.sudanupdate.org/WHOSWHO/NIF.HTM, accessed January 18, 2013.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref4> [4] CIA World Fact
Book, Sudan, Economy,
<
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html>
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html,
accessed January 18,2013.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref5> [5] Igihe News,
"Anti-Bashir Protests Sweep Through Khartoum," June 29, 2012.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref6> [6] "Sudanese
Islamist Figure Announces Movement to Opposition Ranks," Sudanese Tribune,
January 6, 2013.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref7> [7] "Sudan Protest:
UN Urges Restraint and Respect for Human Rights," Sudanese Tribune, June 29,
2012.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref8> [8] "Revolution in
Sudan: The Spectre of Sudan's Popular Uprising," Economist, February 18,
2011.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref9> [9] Matthew Weaver,
Haroon Siddique, Tom McCarthy, "Protests Over Anti-Islam Film and Mohammed
Cartoons - As It Happened," The Guardian, September 21, 2012.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref10> [10] Khalid
Abdelaziz, "Three Killed As Sudanese Storm US, German Embassies," Reuters,
September 14, 2012.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref11> [11] "Bashir's
Lifting of Minimum Wage Leaves Sudan's 2013 Budget Subject to Amendments,"
Sudanese Tribune, December 31, 2012.
<
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/add/article#_ftnref12> [12] "The New Dawn
Charter Represents a Crucial Moment for Sudan," Sudanese Tribune, January
15, 2013.
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Received on Mon Apr 08 2013 - 16:23:10 EDT
