The Dark Side Of “Revolution”: The Arab Spring And State Fragmentation –
Analysis
By <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/inegma/> INEGMA -- (April 8, 2013
By Sabahat Khan
The Arab Spring represents a series of uprisings which had less in common
with each other than its broad-brush characterization suggested and each
uprising in its own way pointed to future crises born out of tribal,
sectarian, or ideological rivalries. It is now apparent that the Arab Spring
set off a complex milieu of prolonged crises with political process,
legitimacy, and ultimately state authority itself, unraveling at their own
pace inside their distinctive national contexts. A lasting impact of these
transformations will be the creation of new linkages between state and
non-state actors inside a region that may just be embarking on rather than
seeing off the most radical period of change since the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire.
The Arab Spring – Leaderless and Directionless
Debates surrounding the Arab Spring, its causes and implications have raged
for as long as the political transformations it supposedly refers to
themselves. For some, the Arab Spring was an Islamic awakening – for others,
a new era had dawned with an empowered youth and middle class emancipated
from the ills of unaccountable government. Internationally, one group of
states welcomed the Arab Spring as an opportunity while others saw in it a
spiraling crisis destabilizing an entire region – by design, even. Few
though questioned the correctness of the broad-brush term of Arab Spring,
which conveniently sought to explain a series of complex political upheavals
across a region monolithically. Aside from their general timing, each
upheaval was a separate story and inertly different from political
developments occurring anywhere else. Still, the temptation to explain a
pan-regional geopolitical transformation through an overarching explanation
and a single point of reference over-rode the far more challenging
alternative of developing a more nuanced and intrinsic understanding to each
development within their distinctive socio-political contexts.
The most damaging result of those impulses was to fall into the trap of
believing that the trajectories of each country affected by the Arab Spring
flowed in the same direction – a direction that had been pre-determined as
being positive for all. However, as ruling regimes were overthrown, each
uprising fragmented into the myriad of socio-political forces that comprised
them – each with its own identity, narrative, and aspirations to fill the
political vacuum they had engineered. Amidst the frenzy of political changes
occurring, the long-term ramifications of the tribal, sectarian, and
ideological ruptures rapidly being brought into play drew less attention
than was warranted. As a non-homogenous spectrum of political forces and
tastes congregated under a temporary cause, the gaping absence of a unified
leadership, refined political agenda, or future roadmap to address national
challenges pointed to future crises in political process, legitimacy and,
ultimately, with state authority itself. Those crises have now emerged into
the foreground and are set to impact the role and viability of the
nation-state around the region in no uncertain terms.
Prolonged Crises in Political Process, Legitimacy, and State Authority
Reformists and traditionalists were quickly overshadowed in street and
voting power by Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt. With credibility among their
own supporters the priority, ideological loyalties repeatedly trumped
considerations on building broader political consensus for the new Islamist
governments. The mantra of political engagement had limited impact, but also
carried limited risks in the context of domestic realpolitik where the focus
was placed firmly on enacting constitutional amendments and a state-wide
consolidation of power by Islamists. Alienated political opponents began to
reject the political process itself that brought and would now sustain
Islamists in office. As the Muslim Brotherhood sought to regenerate a
relapsing system based on their own ideological convictions, with limited
constitutional alternatives available to them the opposition adopted a
strategy of confrontation –still hoping to trigger a military coup d’état by
creating civil unrest and government paralysis. The opposition strategy is
however shortsighted as Islamists could begin reacting to assaults on their
mandate with less restraint, and because any military intervention would be
both reluctant and unable to sustain for long.
Consider also Libya and Yemen, which, despite their starkly different
demographic challenges and the ownership of exportable natural resources,
face two important challenges to national cohesion in the form of
inter-tribal rivalries and Islamist militias. In Libya as in Yemen, national
institutions are undergoing an unrelenting erosion of their legitimacy as
they become politicized and the focus of zero sum tribal competition. The
lack of political process and the continued de-legitimization of state
institutions in Libya and Yemen is creating new vacuums that will
consolidate rather than weaken the influence of actors which present hurdles
for successful nation rebuilding. For example, Al Qaeda affiliates and
sympathizers, having gained a grassroots foothold in urban as well as
outlying pockets, are being now coopted rather than challenged by mainstream
political forces in their own push for power in both Libya and Yemen.
Moreover, militias have already outgrown the ability of the state to
restrain let alone disarm them, and their growing influence is paving the
way for parallel structures of authority to be built alongside traditional
state ones.
Elsewhere, sectarian schisms are exerting other powerful effects on the
state. Syria represents a complex political crisis especially due to its
significance in the regional balance of power. Even leaving aside the impact
of the Syrian crisis on popular perceptions from within, the role of
external forces in the crisis has offset the creation of new political
vacuums by either displacing state institutions with alternative mechanisms,
or their legitimacy. As the assigning of authority is delimited from a
traditional political process-based framework and placed inside an
internationalized paradigm of strategic balancing and patronage, the notion
of the state is being affected at its roots in Syria as parallel governance
structures emerge around increasingly degenerated traditional ones. In stark
contrast, Iranian interference has triggered the deployment of the Peninsula
Shield Force for the first time in its history in Bahrain. The activation of
the Peninsula Shield Force and the subsequent announcement that Bahrain will
host the Unified GCC Military Command represent watershed moments for the
GCC as it reacts to instability around its periphery and interference with
movement towards a model reminiscent of the European Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP).
Conclusion – Transitioning Towards a New Paradigm of Power
Post-Arab Spring, although the de-legitimization of state institutions and
traditional structures of government may be reversible, the urgency and
scale of effort required is rapidly putting those possibilities beyond
reach. Opportunities will continue to be produced for new categories of
political actors and governance structures drawing on support from external
patrons and sympathizers to emerge alongside traditional ones. Existing
challenges will be exacerbated further by the economic decay that follows
breakdowns of political process and effective governance, providing still
more opportunities for non-state actors to strengthen. The inability of
Islamist governments to deliver on popular expectations particularly
economic relief and an assumed inclination of Western powers towards secular
rivals will not however cap the resurgence of political Islam. The uprisings
of the Arab Spring were not driven by any religious calling so any
characterization of them as Islamic is misleading – nevertheless, the
emerging and future political landscape will continue to favor political
Islam for reasons discussed, and the secular narrative of Arab nationalism
will subside as an Islamist one takes its place.
Had they not occurred near-simultaneously and contagiously across such large
populations, each individual crisis would have been more easily absorbed
into the geopolitical status quo. For now, the regional status quo has
survived but political instability and deepening crises with political
process, legitimacy and state authority suggests the greatest challenges to
political and regional security lie ahead. In hedging their bets, states
will increasingly supplement traditional diplomacy with political engagement
at sub-state levels– further weakening traditional state structures, but
also creating unprecedented levels of influence for state actors among
non-state actors and vice versa. Ideology will be decisive particularly for
non-state actors whose survival is tied strongly to political narratives at
the grassroots, but a multi-polar region will ensure a competitive
marketplace for tactical political bargaining and deal making. This growing
transnational interplay of political forces at state and sub-state levels
has already begun to concretize a new multi-layered paradigm of influence,
power, and even authority.
Sabahat Khan, Senior Analyst, INEGMA
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Received on Mon Apr 08 2013 - 15:58:09 EDT
