Briefing: M23, one year on
NAIROBI, 3 April 2013 (IRIN) - The M23 rebellion, the latest of a string of
armed insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) North Kivu
Province, has been active for one year now, during which hundreds of
thousands have fled their homes and many have lost their lives.
The Mouvement du 23-Mars, or
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/DRC-Understanding-armed-group-M23>
March 23 Movement, came into existence in April 2012, when hundreds of
mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers of FARDC, the national army, mutinied over poor
living conditions and poor pay. Most of the mutineers had been members of
the National Congress for the Defence of the People (
<
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/76275/DRC-Nkunda-s-rebel-group-spells-out-de
mands> CNDP), another armed group that in 2009 signed a deal with the
government, which the dissidents felt Kinshasa had not fully implemented.
M23 is named after the date the agreement was signed.
In November 2012, M23 captured Goma, the provincial capital, but withdrew
and subsequently entered into peace talks with the government. Neighbouring
Rwanda and Uganda were
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-congo-democratic-rwanda-uganda
-idUSBRE89F1RQ20121017> accused of backing M23 by a UN Security Council
Group of Experts report, charges both countries strongly deny.
In this briefing, IRIN outlines the group's impact on the province over the
past year, its current position and avenues for peace in eastern DRC.
What is the humanitarian situation in North Kivu?
Although clashes between M23 and FARDC have subsided, "North Kivu remains
highly insecure due to the proliferation of weapons, sporadic fighting
between armed groups and the army, and inter-community tensions," according
to the
<
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20PRESS%20REL
EASE%20-%20GOMA%20RESPONSE%20PLAN%20%28ENGLISH%29.pdf> UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
OCHA notes that since the beginning of the M23 rebellion, more than half a
million people have been driven from their homes in North Kivu. The figure
accounts for more than half of the 914,000 displaced people in the province.
Tens of thousands more fled to
<
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97742/Congolese-refugee-camps-in-Rwanda-full
> refugee camps in Rwanda and Uganda.
According to
<
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/drc-bosco-ntaganda-must-be-surrendered-icc-2
013-03-19> Amnesty International, M23 has been responsible for human rights
abuses "including violations of the duty to care for the civilian population
when launching attacks, forced recruitment of children who were either
trained to take part in hostilities or forced to work to build military
positions, unlawful killings, and acts of sexual violence". The organization
also blamed FARDC for widespread abuses against civilians.
Where are M23's leaders?
The movement's leadership now looks significantly different than it did in
April 2012.
In February 2013, a rift was reported in M23's leadership, with one of the
founders, Bosco Ntaganda, and M23's political leader, Jean-Marie Runiga, on
one side and M23's military chief,
<
http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/RVI%20Briefing%20-%20Usalama%20-%20Makenga
%20Profile%20%E2%80%93%203%20December%202012.pdf> Sultani Makenga, on the
other. The two factions clashed in North Kivu, and Makenga sacked Runiga,
who was the group's representative at the peace talks taking place with the
DRC government in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Following more fighting in
March, Ntaganda's faction surrendered. Both he and Runiga, along with
several senior commanders and close to 700 fighters, fled to Rwanda.
On 18 March, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in the Rwandan
capital, Kigali, and asked to be transferred to the International Criminal
Court for trial over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. He made
his first appearance in court on 26 March. According to a paper by the
<
http://riftvalley.net/resources/file/RVI%20Usalama%20Project%20-%20Briefing
%20-%20Ntaganda%20Profile.pdf> Rift Valley Institute, Ntaganda had fallen
out with fellow commanders early in the rebellion and had been effectively
relegated to the sidelines.
Experts have lauded Ntaganda's arrest as a positive step in the fight
against impunity in DRC, but warn that it does not mean an end to violence
in the region.
Runiga has been placed
<
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/congo-m23-faction-leader-arrested-rwanda>
under house arrest in Rwanda; the Rwandan government has
<
http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-rebels-rwand
a-moved-away-border?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%
3A+ReliefwebUpdates+%28ReliefWeb+-+Latest+Updates%29> disarmed the M23
troops who surrendered and moved them to a refugee camp more than 50km from
the DRC-Rwanda border.
Various reports indicate that Makenga is now
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/27/democratic-republic-congo-sulta
ni-makenga> consolidating his fighters, thought to number about 1,500, and
M23-held territory in North Kivu, but he may also be preparing for further
negotiations with President Joseph Kabila's government. According to Congo
expert <
http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2013/03/m23-split-and-join.html>
Jason Stearns, "The internal M23 split may have provided the break they [DRC
representatives] needed to make the deal acceptable for the rebels."
Any deal is likely to involve the integration of Makenga's fighters into
FARDC, with lower cadre fighters automatically integrated and higher ranking
officers considered for integration on a case-by-case basis. However,
analysts say the re-integration method has not worked in the past and must
be rethought.
"M23 integration in FARDC is feasible but is not suitable. The policy of
repeated integration of armed groups in FARDC is [contributing] to the
fragmentation and militarization of FARDC," Marc-Andre Lagrange, DRC senior
analyst for the International Crisis Group, told IRIN via email. "Since that
approach has proven, with M23, to be a failure, the DRC government with
MONUSCO and UNSC should look for another option."
According to a recent article in the newsletter Africa Confidential:
"Experts broadly agree that some kind of agreement between Kinshasa and M23
is in the offing and will be signed soon, but reliable sources in North Kivu
diverge on what the outcome will be. Some feel that Makenga will reintegrate
his troops into the FARDC, while others suggest that Makenga and [new] M23
political leader Bertrand Bisimwa can stay independent of the army while not
being seen as a 'negative force'."
What is the fate of the peace talks?
The
<
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97075/Analysis-Seeking-civilian-and-military
-solutions-in-the-DRC> Kampala peace talks between M23 and the DRC
government began in December 2012, under the auspices of the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The talks have made little
progress and have been put on hold due to the rebel group's internal
problems. Bisimwa has urged Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
<
http://allafrica.com/stories/201304021191.html> to revive the talks.
On 24 February, a
<
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/scanned-on-24022013-125543.pdf> UN-brokered
peace agreement aimed at ending conflict in eastern DRC was signed in the
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, by 11 African countries - Angola, Burundi,
the Central African Republic, DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South
Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Dubbed the Peace, Security
and Cooperation Framework for the DRC, the deal's goals include the
reformation of the DRC's army and an end to regional interference in the
country. Among the decisions reached was the formation of a neutral
intervention force aimed at fighting "negative forces" in eastern DRC -
referring not only to M23 but other armed groups as well.
While the deal was lauded as a breakthrough by African countries, analysts
are more sceptical, criticizing the agreement as being long on rhetoric and
short on detail and solid action plans. A
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/28/regional-peace-to-settle-violence-
in-the-drc-shows-progress-not-so-fast/> Foreign Policy Association blog post
noted that since the 1990s, a number of similar regional agreements had
failed to bring peace to DRC. It pointed out that the some key players were
not mentioned or involved - including
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96899/DRC-Civilian-population-in-Masisi-at-r
isk> armed groups like Raia Mutomboki (Swahili for "angry citizens"), Mai
Mai Cheka and the Hutu-dominated FDLR, whose presence in eastern DRC is
perceived as a threat by Rwanda.
"The primary aggressors present in the country for the last 10 years, the
militia groups that patrol the eastern provinces, were not even included in
the discussion," said the author, Daniel Donovan. "By excluding these
groups, they hold no commitment to such an agreement, which begs the
question: How does this move signify a guarantee for peace?"
What is next for the region?
On 28 March, the
<
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44523&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo>
UN Security Council authorized an offensive "intervention brigade" to
"address imminent threats to peace and security" as part of the UN
Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).
The risk of violence remains
"The objectives of the new force - which will be based in North Kivu
Province in eastern DRC and total 3,069 peacekeepers - are to neutralize
armed groups, reduce the threat they posed to State authority and civilian
security, and make space for stabilization activities," according to the UN
News Centre. It also aims to support the Addis accord.
Following the announcement, the DRC government said it supported the
intervention brigade and warned M23 rebels to disband. M23's Bisimwa
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21993655> has rejected the UN's
decision to send the force, <
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YAzl8128kE>
but said the group would neither fight nor flee the UN forces.
The
<
http://www.fidh.org/DRC-An-intervention-brigade-within-MONUSCO-would-requir
e-further-human-13106> International Federation of Human Rights has warned
of a potential "escalation in military confrontations and increased risk of
retaliatory attacks by armed groups against civilians" as a result of the
force's entry into the fray, and urged MONUSCO to "mitigate against the
increased risks that communities will face".
Experts say reforms in eastern DRC must go beyond military solutions. "The
intervention brigade. should not be seen as the only solution but one
element of a comprehensive solution," said ICG's Lagrange.
"After last year's fall of Goma and rise of the Mai Mai [rebel] threat,
there is a serious need for a new approach against the armed groups. Such an
approach should include the use of military force; a targeted policy of
arrest on armed groups' leaders; a DDR [disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration] offer focusing on civilian reintegration; the investigation
and neutralization of the logistical networks of the armed groups; and
development work in the communities that generate armed groups," he told
IRIN.
"Groups like M23 are not a cause but a symptom of what's going wrong in the
DRC," he added. "The Congolese government must commit to implement the
security sector reforms, especially the reforms concerning the FARDC. It
must also abandon its policy of peace prevailing over justice."
kr/rz
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Received on Wed Apr 03 2013 - 14:15:20 EDT
