Syria’s Many Militias: Inside the Chaos of the Anti-Assad Rebellion
By <
http://world.time.com/author/raniaabouzeid/> Rania Abouzeid / Antakya,
Turkey
March 06, 2013
<
http://world.time.com/2013/03/05/syrias-many-militias-inside-the-chaos-of-t
he-anti-assad-rebellion/#comments> 10 Comments
<
http://topics.time.com/syria/> Syria‘s rebels have been locked in a bloody
uprising against the regime of President
<
http://topics.time.com/bashar-assad/> Bashar Assad for nearly two years.
But for 27 days after it was formed last December, the Free Syrian Army’s
Military Command—elected by some 550 rebel delegates and tasked with
commanding and controlling the myriad groups on the ground—did not receive
so much as a bullet from its Arab and Western supporters. That lack of aid
threatened to crush the nascent Military Command’s credibility with the
fighting men inside Syria.
The body, headed by chief of staff Brigadier General Salim Idris, replaced
the Joint Command of the Revolutionary Military Councils (which was formed
less than three months prior), and shunted aside the dueling, Turkey-based
so-called leaders of the Free Syrian Army, Colonel Riad al-As’aad and
General Mustafa al-Sheikh, who were never more than figureheads.
After 27 days of pleading, the “valve was opened,” Idris told TIME in an
interview at a hotel in Antakya, southern <
http://topics.time.com/turkey/>
Turkey. (The command is based inside Syria, albeit close to the Turkish
border.) He remains at the mercy of suppliers he declined to name but who
are widely known — mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with the blessing of
Turkey and Western states. “Our brothers in the field make demands as if I
have any influence over our suppliers,” Idris said. “I can’t force them to
give us ammunition. If they say ‘I don’t want to give you anything,’ what
can I do?”
(MORE:
<
http://world.time.com/2013/02/27/portrait-of-a-lady-a-female-syrian-rebel-s
peaks-to-time/#ixzz2McL0CAJM> Portrait of a Lady: A Female Syrian Rebel
Speaks to TIME)
The men on the ground aren’t necessarily waiting for Idris’s supplies — they
have become adept at scrounging for weapons and ammunition, buying them from
the regional black market or from corrupt regime soldiers, capturing war
booty and making their own armaments, rockets and improvised explosives
devices. Almost two years of a grinding civil war have necessitated such
skills.
But if the Military Command is to successfully stitch together the patchwork
of factions and militias that make up the rebellion, it needs some form of
leverage — and the funneling of weapons and ammunition into Syria is
supposed to be its modus operandi. Although there are reports of new batches
of armaments being shuttled mainly via Syria’s southern border with Jordan,
as well as its northern one with Turkey, Idris says it’s all not enough: “We
need between 500-600 tons of ammunition a week. We get between 30-40 tons.
So you do the calculations.”
The Syrian political opposition didn’t even want to attend an international
conference on Syria in Rome last week, a reflection of the anger many of
Assad’s opponents feel at the lack of robust foreign support. In the end,
the head of the opposition coalition, Moaz al-Khatib, went but was
unimpressed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s pledge of $60m
non-lethal aid offered directly to select armed rebel groups. So how will
the Military Command succeed in imposing its authority when all of its
various predecessors largely failed, and Islamist groups outside the Free
Syrian Army (which itself is just a loose umbrella term) are growing in
stature and influence?
It’s not just about providing material support—the promise of prestige plays
a part too. Although there are Islamist Jihadi units of various shades
within the Free Syrian Army, other large independent groups like the Salafi
Ahrar al-Sham brigades and Jabhat al-Nusra offer the strongest Islamist
units within rebel ranks. The U.S considers Jabhat a terrorist organization
with links to al-Qaeda although the group denies this and is widely
respected by other rebels for its fighting prowess. Some FSA units are
joining the Ahrar and Jabhat, not just because their networks of support
seem to be more consistent, but because it has come to be perceived as a
kind of graduation or a promotion, an acknowledgement that a particular FSA
unit or an individual fighter is good enough to become a part of the most
respected, most disciplined rank of fighters. It doesn’t hurt that the Ahrar
and Jabhat turn fighters away, often because they aren’t considered pious
enough, making acceptance into the groups a form of achievement.
(PHOTOS:
<
http://lightbox.time.com/2012/11/12/matilde-gattoni-the-swallows-of-syria/#
1> The Swallows of Syria)
In several recent battles in Idlib province, for example, the two Salafi
groups took the organizational lead, and the participation of other groups
was by invitation only. Jabhat, in particular, has an authority the FSA
lacks because it fights fiercely—often at the very front of the
frontlines—is considered “clean” and not corrupt and because its religious
clerics can invoke the power of a Sharia court. Which group, once it has
pledged obedience or allegiance to a religious court, would dare fall
outside of its authority?
At the same time, a number of Islamist groups — including Ahrar al-Sham but
not Jabhat al-Nusra — have also coalesced into a bloc called the Syrian
Islamic Front, a coalition that says it’s fighting a “two-front war” — to
topple Assad and to build “a civilized Islamic society in Syria.”
Some members of the Islamic Front, like Ali Alloush, leader of the Martyr
Hamze battalion in the city of Maaret al-Numan in southern Idlib province,
say the lack of support drove him to join the Islamist coalition. “We were
not Islamists or extremists,” Alloush says. “Our Islamic philosophies and
understanding were not like the ones that the Syrian people now have, but
with the progression of time, our faith in God, and our belief that He was
the only one who could end this for us, that we have nobody but Him, grew.
So, naturally our thoughts developed, just as they have in other Islamic
states facing this, toward extremism, and the West drove us to this.”
MORE:
<
http://world.time.com/2013/02/14/syrias-proxy-wars-in-lebanons-bekaa-valley
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Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, the Specter of Conflict Looms
In the midst of all this, the latest American initiative is to provide
direct non-lethal assistance to rebels, including body armor. But some
U.S.-donated body armor is already in Syria, and it’s not what the men on
the ground want. “You know how many of Assad’s men we killed who were
wearing those?” one fighter in Idlib province said, dismissing the vests and
helmets. “The U.S can keep them. We are seeking martyrdom anyway. We need
heavy weapons.”
While some rebels have embraced a fervent religiosity, others have opted for
criminal activity. Some groups have resorted to kidnapping, sometimes for
revenge, but most often to secure money for weapons like anti-aircraft guns.
(The 14.5mm is common; the larger caliber 23mm is widely considered more of
a status symbol because of its size, while the humble 12.7mm is now almost a
little passé.) Kidnap victims are also sold from one group to another. On a
recent day, TIME overheard a commander say that another group offered to
sell him three civilians for 1 million Syrian pounds (about $14,150) and
that they’d toss in a fourth civilian for free.
The Free Syrian Army’s various hierarchical structures, including the 14
provincial military councils, were supposed to be the main taps for weapons
and ammunition, and thereby a form of leverage with fighting groups. But the
military councils were never the main tap, and certainly aren’t now. Colonel
Afif Suleiman, head of the Idlib Military Council, says he makes it clear
that he has very little to offer the battalions that are part of the
council. “They know that the councils are just a way to organize their
activities, they don’t expect anything else from them,” he says. “If
somebody says they fought in this battle, if there is no proof, if he was
not registered, who will believe him? The council is a means to organize and
to prove the participation of people and groups.” In other words, a record
keeper that occasionally distributes arms and ammunition.
(MORE:
<
http://world.time.com/2013/03/01/u-s-steps-up-aid-but-syrias-rebels-want-ar
ms/#ixzz2McLWBfGb> U.S. Steps Up Aid, but Syria’s Rebels Want Arms)
Alloush’s friend and colleague in Maaret al-Numan, Radad Khalouf, leader of
Dara’ Maaret which is part of the Islamist Suqoor al-Sham brigade, says that
the military councils do more than they take responsibility for—he contends
that they fomented the splits within rebel ranks by trying to micro-manage
units on the ground, down to handpicking a group’s leader, for example, at
the threat of withholding ammunition. “In the beginning, we just had sticks
and pump action shotguns,” Khalouf said. “We will go back to the stick and
pump action rather than have somebody enforce their views on us.” He has the
same opinion about the rebels’ international backers, and their perceived
agendas.
Still, both Alloush and Khalouf like many of their ilk say they welcome the
formation of the Military Command, but as Khalouf says, “we are reserving
judgment until we see what it has to offer.” It’s a widely held view that
makes Idris, the chief of staff, bristle. “Do they ask themselves where am I
supposed to get the money from? Am I a government?” Idris says. “Everybody
is an analyst, from a fighter to a commander to somebody who has nothing to
do with anything, to the refugee.”
Nonetheless, Idris says that the Military Command is withholding support
from groups it considers ineffective, and reserving supplies for those it
deems worthy, based on their battlefield results. He denies that it is akin
to the patronage networks senior defectors instituted in the past, where
favoritism was shown to certain units often based on little more than a
pledge of personal loyalty to the senior defector. Idris also doesn’t think
it will foment the rivalry that already exists within rebel ranks for
funding and armaments; rather, he thinks he’ll be better able to weed out
ineffective groups.
(MORE:
<
http://world.time.com/2013/02/26/assads-big-ally-how-deeply-entrenched-is-i
ran-in-syria/#ixzz2McLgjaiZ> Assad’s Big Ally: How Deeply Entrenched Is Iran
in Syria?)
There is an operations center, which sends monitors to the battlefield to
watch and report on who fought where and how, who abandoned their posts, who
responded to advice, who worked well with others, and who sat back, watched
and waited to move in and grab the war booty. Take Commander X, Idris says,
who in the past to impress his overseas or local patrons “goes and fires a
few rockets, creates a bit of dust, films it and puts it on YouTube so that
he can say ‘see, I worked.’ Now, it’s no longer like that.” Commander X
won’t be supplied by the Military Command or included in future battles,
Idris says. If his patrons are overseas, or private donors, Idris says he
will inform them too, something he says he has already done although he
refused to divulge which groups had been reprimanded. “Syrians don’t have
time to stage these plays,” he says.
Idris says if he can organize and coordinate a little over half of the
groups on the ground he’ll consider it a success “because 70-80% of the
fighting men are civilians (i.e. not defectors), with civilian leaders. They
are not used to being told ‘no, you can’t participate in this fight.’ He’s
fighting in his town, he bought his own gun, his brother may have been
killed, his son wounded. How can I impose anything on him? I can’t.”
Soldiers are used to taking orders, Idris says. Armed civilians are not.
“Bashar is not better than us at organizing his men, but he has the power of
a state,” Idris says. “He can bring that to bear and punish a man who won’t
follow orders. It’s not easy [for us]. It’s very difficult to command this.”
MORE:
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http://world.time.com/2013/02/19/on-patrol-in-syria-with-assads-most-discip
lined-enemies/#ixzz2McLKbtrW> On Patrol in Syria with Assad’s Most Diligent
Enemies
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Received on Wed Mar 06 2013 - 18:40:04 EST
