Great Decisions 2013: The Intervention Calculation
Foreign Policy
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/jasonanderson/> Jason Anderson |
on February 21th, 2013 |
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/20/great-decisions-2013-the-intervent
ion-calculation/#comments> 0 comments
The U.S. conducted airstrikes against Serbian forces in 1994 and 1999, and
against Libyan troops in 2011, to reduce threats of genocide and
humanitarian disaster. But the sole superpower sat idle in 1994 while
hundreds of thousands were slaughtered across Rwanda and bodies floated down
river past horrified neighbors. Just what criteria the U.S. has used - and
what it should or could use - to intervene militarily is discussed in "The
Intervention Calculation."
As a cast of former generals, diplomats, and think-tank luminaries discuss
the role of U.S. intervention after World War II, generally two reasons come
to the fore, humanitarian and strategic. Strategic interests remain loosely
defined, several experts note, and can usually be traced to economic or
political motives. Whatever the reason, interventions come at a cost, and
just off-camera lurks the question, as narrator David Strathairn starkly
intones, "Can we still afford to flex our military might in conflicts that
aren't ours?"
Historically among these U.S. interests, none were greater than curbing
communist influence. For armed interventions such as Korea and Vietnam (and
later proxy conflicts worldwide) there was always a defense budget and
popular will. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and a new world stage, the
criteria for U.S. intervention became less clear.
One chapter, "Economic Interests," shows how stated interests may have
ulterior motives. Desert Storm in 1991 pushed Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait -
the purported right thing to do - but also restored a neutralized oil
source, removed the threat to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and straitjacketed a
dictator. Airstrikes in Libya, though conducted more by NATO partners, did
offer the chance (although now, it seems, equally distant) for Western
multinational companies to access an oil giant. As Jonathan Tepperman,
Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, observes, "If you look closely,
strategic and economic interests have been closely intertwined."
Similar charges come from several contributors in another chapter,
"Humanitarian Concerns." Perhaps intervention is never more justified than
when under a threat of mass casualties or genocide. Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya
in this case figure prominently, yet detractors remained. Russia (and China,
in the case of Libya) charged that NATO had used a humanitarian excuse to
intervene when the real motive (they say) was regime change.
Whatever the finger-pointing, racial and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold
War power vacuum continued to fester. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
intent on establishing white-hat recourse to pre-empt carnage, helped bring
a majority of countries together under the banner of "Responsibility to
Protect." This initiative, agreed by members at the 2005 U.N. World Summit,
states that all nations have the responsibility to protect their own from
genocide and humanitarian crimes. Danielle Pletka, of the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI), comments that "R2P, as it's known in the foreign
policy community" has been a powerful message to autocrats that they can no
longer rule through marginalizing or eliminating opposing groups. And NATO
stands by, the narrator reminds us, ready to use U.N. security resolutions
as a license to intervene.
The last chapter, "Policy Decisions," starts by noting that historically
there has been no unifying policy thread across U.S. presidential
administrations defining conditions for intervention. Going forward, is this
any different? Do any criteria apply? In a twenty-first century world, in
which brawn is drawn economically and majority Islamist nations experiment
with democracy, the role of U.S. interests and goals of possible
intervention have become obscured.
President Obama is shown proclaiming, "When our values and interests are at
stake, we have a responsibility to act." Yet this is juxtaposed with the
civil war in Syria, whose regional neighborhood, Russian military base, and
substantial arsenal complicate a case for U.S. intervention. Former
Congressman Barney Frank is shown shrugging, "The likelihood of success is
also a factor." Such is the calculus for planning intervention, as the
documentary title suggests.
Without predetermined criteria of when to step in, Max Boot, a senior fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations, simply recommends preparation. "History
keeps dealing us cards we don't expect," he says, and "we simply have to
have a military that can be ready for a wide spectrum of scenarios and can
effectively intervene."
Yet great decisions, like sound arguments and noble acts, should be made by
informed leaders. As detectives look for the whole story, so should
policymakers, and especially a global policeman. Beltway pundits who are
former U.S. government managers and work for U.S.-based organizations, and
often U.S.-funded initiatives, suffer from a limited viewpoint, which could
also be said of "The Intervention Calculation."
The video does mention how interventions can evolve into uncertainty, such
as in Afghanistan; it should explore further, however, whether calculations
consider political climate and stakeholders. A recurring frustration among
allies and enemies alike is that American policymakers, with all their
resources, usually fail to understand cultural and regional dynamics that,
if addressed, can lead to quicker solutions and reduce the impetus for
intervention (and, worse, extended stays).
Cases in point have occurred in every region, be it military intervention or
simply funding projects that exacerbate tensions. The U.S. bolstered border
guards and security transit regulations along an African border, which
actually increased instability, since regional traders depended on the
porous border for access to local markets. U.S. rule of law programs push
court systems in rural Afghanistan, where most prefer traditional judgments
by council. The Arab world is traditionally distrustful of American programs
since the U.S. has supported dictators (in direct contravention of its own
representative system) and assisted in Israeli theft of Arab land. And in
former communist bloc nations, a gradual NATO drift eastward, installation
of missile systems, and training/equipping militaries cannot help but raise
the eyebrows of a transitional Russia. Humanitarian motivations for
intervention are all well and good, but the calculation needs to factor in
perception of regional states, and local realities, to be most effective.
Another factor not explored in the video is an alternative enforcer, namely,
forces from Europe. In the wake of World War II, a debilitated Europe relied
on the U.S. to counter any Soviet military threat. Europe has since suffered
smaller militaries, partly a result of domestic defense decisions, but with
instability in the Middle East and North Africa arguably affecting Europe
more than the U.S., Germany and France and/or an EU force are more
appropriate policemen. Airstrikes on Libya, as Damon Wilson of the Atlantic
Council tells us in the video, were carried out predominantly by non-U.S.
NATO forces.
In the wake of heavy U.S. involvement abroad, the bar for military
intervention in 2013 is set much higher than 10 years ago. A stagnant U.S.
economy overdue for jobs, and expected defense cutbacks, has whet few
appetites for further intervention. When humanitarian disaster looms,
however, the most able should not shy from duty. With U.N. backing as moral
justification and the ability to project power across the globe, it seems
that if the U.S. has the ability to act, with a likelihood of success, not
only should it act - if recent history is any guide, it probably will.
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Received on Thu Feb 21 2013 - 20:32:14 EST
