U.N. Secretary-General Report Recommends Coordination over Integration in
Somalia
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/marcgorrie/> Marc Gorrie | on
February 14th, 2013 |
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/10/u-n-secretary-general-report-recom
mends-coordination-over-integration-in-somalia/#comments> 0 comments
As the U.N. Security Council is
<
http://www.voanews.com/content/security-council-assess-somalia-mission/1600
608.html> determining what future role it should play in Somalia based on
the <
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/69> recent
report of the Secretary-General, the major developments of the political
track of the United Nations approach are overshadowed by the security and
humanitarian developments during the previous four months. These conditions
support the report's conclusion that further U.N. involvement in Somalia
under the Security Council's Resolution 2010 (2011) should take the form of
a U.N. assistance mission as opposed to a joint African Union and U.N. peace
support operation, a fully integrated U.N. peacebuilding mission, or a U.N.
peacebuilding mission separate from the U.N. Support Office for the African
Union Mission in Somalia ( <
http://amisom-au.org/> AMISOM).
Though Somalia has witnessed a successful eight-year political transition
where a new federal parliament and political agenda were established, the
instability of the security and humanitarian situations in the country have
dictated against the U.N.'s adoption of a plan of action that includes more
direct U.N. involvement. The reporting period covers the four months
immediately following the adoption of the provisional constitution, the
fundamental document of the new government containing a host of more
progressive rights and protections than in the past.
The Secretary-General's report recommends the Security Council opt for a
U.N. assistance mission that "would deliver political and peacebuilding
support with a presence across Somalia." Logistical support for AMISOM would
certainly continue, because the major advantage to this approach are the
relative lack of constraints the African Union forces operate under as
compared to U.N. peacekeeping missions. As eliminating the functional
capacity Al-Shabaab and its unpredictable yet consistent attacks, the
inherently defensive posture of U.N. ground forces precludes the possibility
of offensive operations. Such a strategic position would merely perpetuate
the nascent governments'
<
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-somalia-trialbre9141ci-2013020
5,0,6593784.story> tendency to violate individual rights in an effort to
contain the larger problems. This status quo where the new constitution is
overridden or construed to violate principles of human rights protections
will only serve to deligitimate the Somali government internally should it
persist. The U.N.'s continued involvement serves to
<
http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9705&ctl=Details&mid=12667&I
temID=19579&language=en-US> monitor and encourage the redress of practices
and occurrences out of step with human rights and the rule of law.
Though Al-Shabaab is recognized as the most persistent violator of human
rights in Somalia, the Somali National Security Forces and allied groups are
frequently implicated in cases of sexual violence. Successful combat
operations of the African Union in stabilizing the situation in Somalia are
thus seen as preconditions necessary to greater U.N. involvement as desired
by the international community and by the President of Somalia. If
international efforts take the form of a joint African Union and U.N. peace
support operation or a fully integrated U.N. peacebuilding mission without a
more stable security and humanitarian backdrop, U.N. procedures and rules of
engagement will hinder the peace process. Keeping the U.N. informed and
involved through a mission primarily serving to assist to AMISOM would both
increase the effectiveness of AMISOM operations and ease the transition to
greater U.N. involvement. This role is consistent with that envisaged by the
original Security Council
<
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,,SOM,,497839f92,0.html>
Resolution 1863 (2009), and supported by the successes of African Union
operations, which have brought
<
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650> al-Shabaab to perhaps its
weakest state in years.
The report acknowledges the need to keep the option of offensive operations
on the table and as such would set a supporting U.N presence that would
enable AMISOM to do so where it is not possible for the U.N. To do so
requires maintaining a structural separation between African Union and U.N.
operations. This recommendation makes the best use of the respective roles
of the African Union and the U.N. and suggests a course of action that
avoids the limitations of U.N. mechanisms in relation to the current
situation in Somalia through the flexibility of a regional, African Union
response. As President Mohamud of Somalia has requested African Union and
U.N. efforts be fully integrated, the structural separation is envisioned to
last only as long as is needed to stabilize the security and humanitarian
situations.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Thu Feb 14 2013 - 14:32:36 EST
