After Mali Comes Niger
West Africa's Problems Migrate East
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/sebastian-elischer> Sebastian
Elischer
February 14, 2013
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138931/sebastian-elischer/after-mali
-comes-niger?page=show> Article Summary and Author Biography
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/136046>
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/printmail/136046>
Snapshot
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138767/susanna-wing/making-sense-of-
mali> Making Sense of Mali
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/susanna-wing> Susanna Wing
Recent reports have oversimplified the conflict in Mali, hinting that the
country hosts a coherent Tuareg separatist bloc and a popular radical
Islamist movement. In fact, mainstream Malians love neither. Most of them
just want a return to democracy with broader participation and more freedoms
-- the precise opposite of what they fear the separatists and Islamists
would bring. As long as French assistance helps hold those groups off, it
will be welcome.
Last month, the French army's rapid advance into northern Mali and the
timely deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) seemed to result in a swift victory over Islamist and Tuareg
militants there. Equally important, however, was the Islamist and Tuareg
militants' hasty withdrawal into northeastern Mali. With France planning to
pull its troops out of the country as soon as March, Mali will almost
certainly be turned into an ECOWAS trusteeship. The most likely upshot is
not a neat end to the conflict but, rather, a migration of the problem into
neighboring Niger.
Parts of the Tuareg leadership, which signed a power-sharing agreement in
March 2012 with three jihadist militias -- al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
Ansar Dine, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa -- have
already fled across the unguarded Nigerien border, where they will try to
regroup. Given Niger's weak government structures, they also pose a serious
security threat to the country as a whole.
Niger presents an appealingly easy target. For one, despite several attempts
at reform by President Mahamadou Issoufou, who was elected in April 2011,
Niger's secular political elite lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its largely
illiterate, rural, and deeply religious population. Numerous failed attempts
at democratization and rampant corruption by previous governments have
plagued the country for over two decades. Among the population, this
troubled legacy has fostered a general sense of alienation from the capital.
Large parts of the Nigerien army, meanwhile, are opposed to the notion of
civilian rule. Ever since it was pushed out of power in 1991, the army
leadership has cultivated a deep mistrust of the civilian elite among all
military ranks. Consumed with hatred for the Tuareg following two major
military campaigns against them (1990-1995 and 2007-2009, respectively), the
Nigerien army has overthrown three civilian governments since 1993. Although
recent coup attempts in 2011 and 2012 proved amateurish and lacked
sufficient support among both the armed forces and the population, they
indicate long-standing tensions between parts of the military and the
civilian elites.
Despite a 2009 peace accord with the government, Niger's Tuareg clans remain
marginalized economically and disenfranchised politically. Although in 2009
the central government agreed to channel more resources to the Tuareg, this
promise has clearly not been kept. The Tuareg thus have remained poorer than
the rest of the population. The current prime minister's Tuareg ancestry
should not distract from the fact that the community lacks genuine political
representation in the capital.
Given that the Tuareg are a nomadic people, no one knows exactly how many
there are -- but the best estimates suggest that there are roughly 1.2
million Tuareg in total, with most of them living in Mali and Niger.
Issoufou, for one, has explicitly warned about the threat of a new Tuareg
rebellion in the north. The government's announcement of a $2.5 billion aid
package for the Tuareg-populated areas at the height of the French
intervention was likely an attempt to head off such an insurgency.
Meanwhile, in southern Niger, unguarded checkpoints along the border with
Nigeria have allowed for an influx of radical Islamic preachers, who have
sought to win over the population by promising to provide public goods that
the state has not. Boko Haram, a jihadist militant organization based in
Nigeria, and homegrown radical Islamic sects, such as the Izala movement,
operate well-known outposts in Niger's southern cities of Diffa, Maradi, and
Zinder. Their operatives clash regularly with Nigerien security forces.
In short, Niger's domestic political scene remains highly volatile. And the
fuse that ignites it could well be the inflow of rebels from Mali. These
rebels could try to foment an uprising of either Islamists or Tuareg -- or
both. The socioeconomic predicament of the Tuareg in northern Niger and the
growing influence of Islamist groups in the south provide fertile ground for
such an attempt.
The outbreak of wider unrest in Niger could drag the West into a long-term
military engagement in the Sahel region. France gets roughly three-quarters
of its energy from uranium mined in northern Niger, near the city of Arlit.
Unsurprisingly, France has already deployed soldiers to protect those
resources, and China is said to have done the same at its uranium mine near
Azalik. Niger is also an oil exporter, and production is expected to grow
significantly in coming months. Rebel movements and Islamic militants are
within reach of Niger's mines and oil fields, which they could use to fund
their rebellion. Further attacks on Nigerian and Algerian territory remain a
distinct possibility.
The West should not trust the Nigerien army to manage such a conflict on its
own. Its upper ranks were appointed by the previous civilian government --
based on political loyalty, not merit. As a result, the army lacks
professionalism and adequate training. And the country's already weak forces
will soon be further depleted: Niger has offered ECOWAS 20 percent of its
military to either join in the operation in Mali or go on standby.
ECOWAS' ability to police the region is also highly questionable. First,
previous ECOWAS missions -- in Sierra Leone and Liberia -- have proved touch
and go. In both cases, mistrust and disunity plagued relationships among the
military leadership. These ECOWAS operations also suffered from inadequate
resources, including a lack of weapons. Ultimately, the only reason they
were effective was a strong British military presence. But with France's
withdrawal from Mali imminent, such a force will be lacking in the Sahel.
Moreover, the various African countries that have pledged support for the
military engagement in Mali lack the necessary finances for even that war.
They have already asked Western donors for $1 billion in aid, and thus far
the West has provided only half that amount. It will be no easy task for
them to open another front.
Furthermore, roughly a third of all African soldiers committed to the Mali
mission come from Chad, which is not an ECOWAS member. Although the United
Nations' mandate for Mali refers to "an African-led International Support
Mission" and therefore permits any African nation to join the fray, a
longer-term, multilateral mission would ultimately raise the question of
whether ECOWAS or Chad is in charge.
Unfortunately, however, outside help does not appear to be on its way. The
United Kingdom and Germany do not seem to grasp the importance of the Sahel
to European energy security. Germany has dedicated only three aircraft to
the Mali campaign and the United Kingdom has sent 240 "not for combat"
soldiers. In the United States, meanwhile, President Barack Obama lacks a
comprehensive African strategy, let alone a plan for the Sahel. Drone
policing -- the Obama administration's preferred tactic -- provides little
more than a short-term fix. If the West wants to prevent the Sahel from
falling hostage to Tuareg and Islamist militants, longer-term military and
financial engagement is urgently required.
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Received on Thu Feb 14 2013 - 08:55:49 EST
