China's Sudan Challenge - Analysis
Written by <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/fpif/> FPIF
February 8, 2013
By Giorgio Cafiero
Sudan and China have enjoyed cordial relations for decades, developing a
fruitful economic and political partnership dating back to their mutual
estrangement from the West in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But Sudan's
2011 partition has presented China with a new set of challenges.
The ongoing failure of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve tense standoffs over
oil ownership, border demarcation, and the status of the disputed Abyei
region constitutes a delicate dilemma for China. Namely, Beijing will be
challenged to advance its interests in the Sudans while upholding its
foreign policy principle of non-intervention in other states' affairs.
Since the 2011 partition of the country, China's dual objective has been to
maintain its alliance with Sudan while establishing a cooperative
partnership with South Sudan, which controls
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/201315105759540808.html>
75 percent of all Sudanese oil. The crisis along the Sudanese border is
forcing China to at least consider adopting a policy of shuttle diplomacy
that it has not previously embraced, threatening China's historically
non-interventionist bent.
Historical Context
In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square crackdown in China and the Bashir-Turabi
coup in Sudan increasingly alienated both Beijing and Khartoum from Western
powers, Sudan began to look east. This dynamic paved the way for a strong
China-Sudan partnership. Beijing provided the National Islamic Front-run
regime, led by current president Omar al-Bashir, with low-interest loans and
weapons transfers, while Sudan opened its vast oil reserves to China. By
1996, the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), along with
Malaysian and Indian oil companies, had taken control of most of Sudan's
oil. In the past two decades, China has invested over
<
http://worlddefensereview.com/pham013108.shtml> $10 billion in Sudan.
Today, China is Sudan's top trading partner, purchasing
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/201315105759540808.html>
70 percent of Sudanese oil exports in 2010. When Sudanese oil exports
reached their peak,
<
http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-deft-sudan-diplomacy/> 6 percent
of China's total crude oil consumption came from Sudan. In addition to
maintaining the flow of money to Khartoum while Western companies have
withdrawn from the country, China's veto power has provided the Sudanese
regime with impunity at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Beijing's threat to veto all resolutions targeting Sudan has empowered
Bashir's regime to pursue its aggressive policies in Darfur without the
threat of economic sanctions being imposed by the UNSC.
The financial, diplomatic, and military support that Beijing has lent the
Sudanese regime during its conflicts with periphery factions predictably
infuriated the South Sudanese. Nonetheless, following the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) that concluded Sudan's second civil war, China
accepted southern independence as an inevitable outcome.
China's leaders understood that securing a partnership with the southerners
would be essential for ensuring access to the majority of Sudanese oil.
Indeed, when
<
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/24/136606335/new-republic-sudan-may-be-slipping-
into-civil-war> 98.5 percent of South Sudan's voters favored independence
during the January 2011 referendum, and South Sudan gained official
independence in July, Beijing immediately engaged the southerners
diplomatically. China was one of the first states to
<
http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-deft-sudan-diplomacy/> establish
a general consulate in Juba, and South Sudanese politicians-including
current South Sudanese president Salva Kiir Mayardit-were invited to China,
where they were promised robust Chinese investment.
But it became clear almost immediately following South Sudan's independence
that the sensitive issues relating to oil ownership, border demarcation, and
the status of Abyei-all left unresolved under the CPA-would prove highly
problematic for the North-South bilateral relationship. The majority of
Sudanese oil fell under Juba's control, yet the means to refine and export
it remained under Khartoum's, meaning cooperation would be necessary.
However, the two sides have failed to reach an agreement on these sensitive
matters. In January 2012, South Sudan shut down its oil production after it
accused Sudan of stealing its oil exports en route to Port Sudan on the Red
Sea.
In April, hostilities reached their peak when the Sudans engaged in a
military confrontation over disputed oil reserves along the border of
Southern Kordofan state in the North and Unity state in the South. Together,
these reserves account for about 60 percent of all known Sudanese oil
deposits. On April 10, South Sudan
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17674992> launched an offensive to
seize control of the oil hub in Heglig, Sudan-a target of vast geostrategic
importance, given the
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/sudan-clashes-oil-idAFL6E8ES29H20
120328?sp=true> 60,000 barrels a day of oil that it exports. South Sudan
maintained its control over this border town for 10 days until Sudan's
warplanes bombed the area and dislodged South Sudanese troops and their
Sudanese proxies.
As these tensions came to a head, South Sudanese President Kiir was on a
diplomatic trip to China. Kiir reportedly
<
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0424/On-trip-to-China-South-Suda
n-s-leader-warns-of-war-with-Sudan-video> complained to Chinese officials
that their close ally in Khartoum had "declared war" against South Sudan by
bombing Heglig several days earlier. Finding its own oil interests caught in
the crosshairs of a tense North-South standoff, China echoed the United
States, urging both sides to resolve their territorial disputes through
dialogue and to avoid military force. Kiir
<
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBVp94ELDiY> left China some three days
before he was scheduled to depart, suggesting that he had found China's
response inadequate.
While Sudanese leaders have met with their southern counterparts on numerous
occasions following the episode last April, both sides have failed to
implement the terms of a peace agreement signed in September meant to
resolve the conflict. In January of this year, Sudanese and South Sudanese
officials met in the Ethiopian capital to
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45320> negotiate a 14-mile
demilitarized zone. Yet the scope of this zone and Sudan's accusations that
Juba sponsors armed rebels in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states-a
charge denied by South Sudanese officials, who claimed that these rebels
were a domestic issue for Sudan-undermined the prospects for conflict
resolution.
War and Peace Cost-Benefit Analysis
Most analysts concur that although neither side wants war, both capitals
seem to believe that by delaying the signing of a diplomatic resolution,
they have room to advance their long-term interests. The weakened positions
of both Sudans drive their mutual interest in avoiding any full-scale war.
Sudan is militarily superior, yet Khartoum's capacity to score a military
victory is jeopardized by pro-Juba proxies in its southern regions.
Moreover, as the partition of Sudan has dramatically decreased the oil
supply under Khartoum's control, the state has much less revenue and a war
would only worsen the country's dire economic conditions.
Similarly, South Sudan is one of the world's least developed countries. Over
half of its citizens live below the poverty line. Its infant mortality and
maternal mortality rates rank near the top of the world, while its
<
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html>
27-percent literacy rate ranks near the bottom. War would only exacerbate
these conditions, and with oil sales constituting
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-southsudan-chinese-oil-idUSBRE
8AD0B520121114> 98 percent of Juba's budget, southern leaders know that they
must begin exporting oil to meet their people's needs. This cannot be
accomplished with Sudan bombing their oil fields.
Still, both sides rightly consider the demarcation of oil fields to be a
vital national interest. Some analysts also contend that Juba is benefiting
from the tense standoff, with the threat from Khartoum uniting a South Sudan
still grappling with the challenges of state-building and simmering ethnic
conflicts.
But as the political risks associated with greater investment in the
oil-rich region grow higher, the one party that has nothing to gain from the
status quo is China. The question is what cards China has to play.
South Sudan's leaders understand that Chinese firms are well placed to serve
the country's dire need for hospitals, telecommunications, schools, and
infrastructure, Thus, China is well positioned to attach strings to
development projects to push South Sudan toward concessions. As Khartoum
depends on China for oil exports, loans, infrastructure projects, arms for
the Darfur conflict, and its veto powers in the UN Security Council, Beijing
is in a strong position to pressure the Bashir regime toward concessions.
However, the Chinese may calculate that diplomatic efforts are likely to
prove futile as certain factors driving the Sudans' standoff remain outside
Beijing's sphere of influence. The recent kidnapping of several Chinese
workers in Darfur and the rise of militant Islamic extremism throughout the
region highlight additional political risks. If Beijing concludes that the
costs of doing business in the region outweigh the potential benefits, China
may back off and focus on longer-term interests in the Sudans. If this
scenario unfolds, China may turn its attention to other states, such as Iraq
and Venezuela, for oil until the Sudans resolve their standoff on their own.
Regardless, the tense crisis between the Sudans is compelling China to at
least question how well "non-interference" advances Beijing's geostrategic
interests. If Beijing does successfully engage in shuttle diplomacy between
Khartoum and Juba, it may be indicative of a new China that views its
responsibilities as a rising super power differently.
Independent foreign policy analyst Giorgio Cafiero is a contributor to
Foreign Policy In Focus.
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Received on Sat Feb 09 2013 - 07:55:01 EST
