Why Have The Arab Monarchies Survived? - Analysis
By: <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/admin/> Eurasia Review
February 5, 2013
By Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero
To date, only presidents have fallen from power during the Arab Awakening -
no king has fallen from his throne. Arab monarchies are of course not immune
to the forces that brought down some of their republican counterparts, so
why have they all thus far survived? It is a commonly held belief that the
Arab world's monarchs are more legitimate than presidents because of their
claim to be direct descendents of the Prophet Mohammed. Some Muslims are
therefore more accepting of monarchs than presidents, and many Arab citizens
ruled by monarchs are emotionally connected to their rulers and admire them
profoundly, even though basic freedoms are restricted in all Arab
monarchies.
One year before the Awakening began, Freedom House ranked one monarchy
(Saudi Arabia) and two republics (Libya and Syria) as the three most
repressive Arab states. One monarchy (Kuwait) and one republic (Lebanon)
were ranked the most free (in the "partly free" category), while five
monarchies (Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar and UAE) and four republics
(Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Yemen) were ranked equally "not free."
The 2013 Freedom House report noted that during 2012, political freedom and
civil liberties improved in only three Arab countries - Egypt, Libya and
Tunisia - all republics. At the same time, the level of freedom in four
monarchies (Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and UAE) and three republics (Iraq, Lebanon
and Syria) declined. These rankings do not indicate that monarchies are less
authoritarian than republics in the Arab world, but they do appear to
indicate that rising aspirations for freedom in the region have generally
been met by a rise in repression.
Some analysts posit that Gulf Arabs are by nature tribal and apolitical,
lacking inherent interest in challenging their rulers' authority. Yet over
the past two years, political dissent has translated into mass mobilization
in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Large anti-government
demonstrations have been absent in only two Arab countries during the last
two years - Qatar and the U.A.E. Given the mass mobilization and vocal
political dissent that has taken place in the other four Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states, there is no reason to conclude that these two
countries have not experienced any uprising due to the nature of Arab
monarchism, or the region's political culture.
These two emirates' high GDPs per capita (the two highest in the entire Arab
world) do more to explain the absence of any mass mobilization of dissenting
voices over the past two years. Doha and Abu Dhabi's ability to effectively
distribute petro-wealth among their citizens has more likely successfully
purchased political acquiescence over the last two years. The same may
certainly be said of Saudi Arabia.
Apart from Libya, no Arab state with substantial hydrocarbon wealth has
fallen during the last two years. In the case of Libya, it was the
intervention by NATO that tipped the balance against Gaddafi. In the absence
of that, Gaddafi may well have survived. As for Jordan and Morocco, we
attribute their resilience to the introduction of political reforms early on
in the process. While most observers concur that reforms took little to no
power away from the regimes, the implementation of these reforms created a
perception within both countries that it was best to achieve reform by
working within the system. The billions of dollars in aid that the GCC
provided to the Hashemite Kingdom also made a difference in terms of giving
King Abdullah more room to maneuver.
That said, the events of the last three months in Jordan provide ample
reason to believe that King Abdullah may be the first Arab monarch to be
dethroned as a result of the Awakening. The unprecedented size of
anti-regime protests and the direct calls for the king's resignation
indicate that political dissent in the Hashemite Kingdom may be completely
beyond Abdullah's ability to control. Only time will tell for certain, but
it does indeed appear that the king's rule is at risk.
Although far fewer than 20 percent of Egyptians or Tunisians took their
grievances to the streets in January 2011, their presidents fell, while
Bahrain's King Khalifa retains power two years later - even though at least
20 percent of Bahrain's population participated in anti-regime
demonstrations. No one can argue that the Bahraini regime's survival is
attributable to the benevolence of its monarchical system or widespread
belief in its legitimacy. Instead, Bahrain's petro-wealth was used to
increase its support among the nation's Sunni-minority, while the security
forces of neighboring Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the U.A.E. were used to
oppress Shi'ite demonstrations. If 'King' Khalifa were instead 'President'
Khalifa, it is reasonable to conclude that Bahrain's ownership of
hydrocarbon resources, and its geographic proximity and political alliance
with Saudi Arabia, would have ensured the regime's survival just as easily.
Given that six of the eight Arab monarch states are endowed with massive
natural resource wealth, their ability to distribute patronage to their
citizenry has surely impacted their longevity. But with a youthful
population, largely educated abroad and linked into the rest of the world
via social media, the Gulf monarchs must enact bold reforms if they are to
survive. Moreover, certain Arab states' oil reserves are being quickly
depleted, limiting their future ability to 'buy off' their citizens.
Time is clearly not on the side of any regime in the Arab world that chooses
to ignore such long-term dilemmas. By keeping domestic problems from
reaching a tipping point, certain Arab regimes have managed to contain their
citizens' rage effectively. However, youth unemployment and skyrocketing
living costs can only go so high before the monarchs' legitimacy is lost.
Conditions in several kingdoms suggest that the tipping point may not be too
far away.
Morocco's declining GDP growth - due in part to decreased tourism and
overseas remittances - does not bode well for Rabat. The fact that 49
percent of Moroccan youth are unemployed and not enrolled in school is a
troubling reality for this highly illiterate country. Last November, the
Jordanian government announced a reduction in fuel subsidies, which was met
with widespread protests, several of which turned violent. Although the
Saudi regime has increased spending on social programs by several hundred
billion dollars, and nearly 200,000 of its youths have studied abroad in the
last decade (mostly in the United States), few believe they will find jobs
upon return to the Kingdom. Many analysts contend that the unrest among the
Shi'ite minority in eastern Saudi Arabia is merely a time bomb waiting to
explode, and certainly one with immense geopolitical implications given the
proportion of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves existing in the east.
These three kingdoms' foreign policies have also played a unique role in
their Arab Awakening experiences. After France lost its Tunisian ally and
the U.S. lost its Egyptian ally, Moroccan King Mohammed VI knew that he
would face minimal pressure from Western governments to democratize or
improve human rights. Jordan's King Abdullah has also benefited from his
kingdom's alliances and proximity to foreign conflicts. Some pro-democracy
activists in Jordan have been undermined, given that many Jordanians remain
loyal to the regime, due to its capacity to shield Jordanians from the
turmoil on its borders. As Jordan plays an integral role in the
U.S./Israel/Saudi axis, King Abdullah is surely counting on the West and
Gulf monarchies to help keep his regime alive.
Likewise, as Saudi Arabia attempts to contain Iranian influence in the
region, its approach to foreign policy has also contributed to the
monarchy's longevity. By linking the Shi'ite protests in Qatif (in the
Kingdom's Eastern province) with Iran's hegemonic aspirations, the monarchy
has effectively used the ancient Arab-Persian rivalry to undermine Saudi
Shi'ites' demands for equality under the law. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is
carefully balancing it allegiances between the U.S. and China, so as to keep
its options for future maneuverability open.
Looking ahead, a gloomy outlook seems justified. The countries where rulers
have either lost or are in the process of losing power have experienced
militant tribalism, sectarian strife, declining economic conditions and the
rise of Islamists whose commitment to democracy is at best questionable. In
Arab countries where the regimes have survived the Awakening, human rights
conditions have worsened. In Morocco, where the King's "democratic reforms"
have earned him much adulation from Western governments, a rise in reported
cases of torture has been documented by the United Nations.
In the near term, we forecast that the Arab Awakening stands a better than
50/50 chance of slowly spinning out of control, characterized by a
combination of a widening gap between citizens' expectations and
governments' ability to deliver basic societal needs, deteriorating economic
conditions, rising social tension, increasing political violence, and
regional turmoil driven by the spillover effects of Syria's insurgency, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the looming possibility of war between
Israel/the U.S. and Iran. If the region's monarchies fail to address the
high rates of unemployment and increasing costs of living, there is every
reason to expect a tipping point to be reached. Once that occurs, all bets
are off for a continuation of the Arab monarchies.
Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions, a cross-border risk
management firm based in Connecticut, and author of the book "Managing
Country Risk". Giorgio Cafiero is a research analyst with CRS based in
Washington.
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Received on Tue Feb 05 2013 - 13:14:16 EST
