Exploited and misused: the impossible discourse of the 'Arab Spring'
By Ramzy Baroud
Friday, 25 January 2013
A reductionist discourse is one that selectively tailors its reading of
subject matters in such a way as to only yield desired outcomes, leaving
little or no room for other inquiries, no matter how appropriate or
relevant. The so-called Arab Spring, although now far removed from its
initial meanings and aspirations, has become just that: a breeding ground
for choosy narratives solely aimed at advancing political agendas which are
deeply entrenched with regional and international involvement.
When a despairing Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on
fire on Dec.17, 2010, he had ignited more than a mere revolution in his
country. His excruciating death had given birth to a notion that the
psychological expanses between despair and hope, death and rebirth and
between submissiveness and revolutions are ultimately connected. His act,
regardless of what adjective one may use to describe it, was the very key
that Tunisians used to unlock their ample reserve of collective power.
Then-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's decision to step down on January
14, 2011, was in a sense a rational assessment on his part if one is to
consider the impossibility of confronting a nation that had in its grasp a
true popular revolution.
Egypt also revolted less than two weeks later. And it was then that
Tunisia's near-ideal revolutionary model became prey for numerous, often
selective readings and ultimately for utter exploitation. The Egyptian
January 25 revolution was the first Arab link between Tunisia and the
upheavals that travelled throughout Arab nations. Some were quick to ascribe
the phenomenon with all sorts of historical, ideological and even religious
factors thereby making links whenever convenient and overlooking others
however apt. The Aljazeera Arabic website still has a map of all Arab
countries, with ones experiencing revolutionary influx marked in red.
Many problems have arisen. What tools, aside from the interests of the
Qatari government, for example, does Aljazeera use to determine how the
so-called Arab Spring manifests itself? And shouldn't there be clear
demarcations between non-violent revolutions, foreign interventions,
sectarian tension and civil wars?
Not only do the roots and the expressions of these 'revolutions' vastly
differ, but the evolvement of each experience was almost always unique to
each Arab country. In the cases of Libya and Syria, foreign involvement (an
all-out NATO war in the case of Libya and a multifarious regional and
international power play in Syria) has produced wholly different scenarios
than the ones witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt, thus requiring an urgently
different course of analysis.
Yet despite the repeated failure of the unitary 'Arab Spring' discourse,
many politicians, intellectuals and journalists continue to borrow from its
very early logic. Books have already been written with reductionist titles,
knitting linear stories, bridging the distance between Tunis and Sanaa into
one sentence and one line of reasoning.
The 'Arab Spring' reductionism isn't always sinister, motivated by political
convenience or summoned by neo-imperialist designs. Existing pan-Arab or
pan-Islamic narratives however well-intended they may be, have also done
their fair share of misrepresenting whichever discourse their intellectuals
may find fitting and consistent with their overall ideas. Some denote the
rise of a new pan-Arab nation, while others see the 'spring' as a harbinger
of the return of Islam as a source of power and empowerment for Arab
societies. The fact is, while discourses are growing more rigid between
competing political and intellectual camps, Arab countries marked by
Aljazeera's editorial logic seem to head in their own separate paths, some
grudgingly towards a form of democracy or another, while others descend into
a Hobbesian 'state of nature' - a war of all against all.
But reductionist discourses persist, despite their numerous limitations.
They endure because some are specifically designed to serve the interests of
certain governments - some with clear ambitions and others are simply trying
to ride the storm. In the case of Syria, not a single country that is
somehow a party in the conflict can claim innocence in a gory game of
regional politics, where the price tag is the blood of tens of thousands of
Syrians.
Media framing
Western media continue to lead the way in language-manipulation, all with
the aim of avoiding obvious facts and when necessary it misconstrues reality
altogether.
Ramzy Baroud
Western media continue to lead the way in language-manipulation, all with
the aim of avoiding obvious facts and when necessary it misconstrues reality
altogether. U.S. media in particular remain oblivious to how the fallout of
the NATO war in Libya had contributed to the conflict in Mali - which
progressed from a military coup early last year, to a civil war and as of
present time an all-out French-led war against Islamic and other militant
groups in the northern parts of the country.
Mali is not an Arab country, thus doesn't fit into the carefully molded
discourse. Algeria is however. Thus when militants took dozens of Algerian
and foreign workers hostage in the Ain Amenas natural gas plant in
retaliation to Algeria's opening of its airspace to French warplanes in
their war on Mali, some labored to link the violence in Algeria to the Arab
Spring. "Taken together, the attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya,
the Islamist attacks on Mali, and now this Algerian offense, all point to
North Africa as the geopolitical hotspot of 2013 - where the Arab Spring has
morphed into the War On Terror," wrote Christopher Helman, in Forbes, on Jan
18.
How convenient such an analysis is, especially when "taken together." The
'Arab Spring' logic is constantly stretched in such ways to suit the
preconceived understanding, interests or even designs of western powers. For
example, it is now conventional media wisdom that the U.S. is wary of full
involvement in Syria because of the deadly attack on the U.S. embassy in
Benghazi. When seen from Washington, the Arab region appears less compound
and is largely understood through keywords and phrases, allocated between
allies and enemies, Islamists and liberals and by knee jerk reactions to
anything involving Israel or Iran.
One only needs to compare media texts produced two years ago, with more
recent ones. Whereas the first few months of 2011 were mostly concerned with
individuals and collectives that had much in common with Mohamed Bouazizi -
poor, despairing, disenfranchised, and eventually rebellious - much of the
present text is concerned with a different type of discussion. Additionally
there are almost entirely new players. The Bouazizis of Tunis, Egypt and
Yemen remain unemployed, but they occupy much less space in our newspapers
and TV screens. Now we speak of Washington and London-based revolutionaries.
We juxtapose U.S. and Russian interests and we wrangle with foreign
interventions and barefacedly demarcate conflicts based on sectarian
divisions.
"Arab awakening is only just beginning", was the title of a Financial Times
editorial of Dec 23. Its logic and subtext speak of a sinister
interpretation of what were once collective retorts to oppression and
dictatorships. "The fall of the Assads will be a strategic setback to Iran
and its regional allies such as Hezbollah, the Shia Islamist state within
the fragile Lebanese state," the editorial read. "But that could quickly be
reversed if Israel were to carry out its threats to attack Iran's nuclear
installations, enabling Tehran's theocrats to rally disaffected Muslims
across the region and strengthen their grip at home. It is easy to imagine
how such a conflict would drag in the US, disrupt the Gulf and its oil
traffic, and set fire to Lebanon."
Note how in the new reading of the 'Arab Spring', people are mere pawns that
are defined by their sectarian leanings and their usefulness is in their
willingness to be rallied by one regional power or another. While the
language itself is consistent with western agendas in Arab and Muslim
countries, what is truly bizarre is the fact that many still insist on
contextualizing the ever-confrontational U.S., Israel and western policies
in general with an 'Arab Spring' involving a poor grocer setting himself on
fire and angry multitudes in Egypt, Yemen and Syria who seek dignity and
freedom.
Shortly after the Tunisian uprising, some of us warned of the fallout, if
unchecked and generalized discourses that lump all Arabs together and
exploit peoples' desire for freedom, equality and democracy were to persist.
Alas, not only did the reductionist discourse define the last two-years of
upheaval, the 'Arab Spring' has become an Arab springboard for regional
meddling and foreign intervention. To advance our understanding of what is
transpiring in Arab and other countries in the region, we must let go of old
definitions. A new reality is now taking hold and it is neither concerned
with Bouazizi nor with the many millions of unemployed and disaffected
Arabs.
Palestinian-American journalist, author, editor, Ramzy Baroud
(www.ramzybaroud.net) taught Mass Communication at Australia's Curtin
University of Technology, and is Editor-in-Chief of the Palestine Chronicle.
Baroud's work has been published in hundreds of newspapers and journals
worldwide and his books "His books "Searching Jenin: Eyewitness Accounts of
the Israeli Invasion" and "The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a
People's Struggle" have received international recognition. Baroud's third
book, "My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story" narrates the
story of the life of his family, used as a representation of millions of
Palestinians in Diaspora, starting in the early 1940's until the present
time.
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Received on Fri Jan 25 2013 - 15:56:11 EST
