Mali-
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4746/Taking_the_fight_to_the_
desert> Taking the fight to the desert
18th January 2013
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/search_results_store.aspx?action=findiss
ue&ddlVolume=54&ddlIssue=2> Vol 54 N0 2
For now, the region is cheering France’s launching of a war on many fronts
against the jihadists although it is likely to drag on for many more months
As France pours men and money into the battle against jihadists, the
contours of Mali’s crisis are rapidly changing. Bombing raids may have ended
the militants’ hegemony over the people of Timbuktu and Gao, but their
campaign is far from over. Restoring some security across the Sahara will be
a slow and painful business, with many reverses. Pounded by French air
strikes near Leré, fighters led by Al Qaida’s Algerian commander Abdel Hamid
Abou Zeid quickly hit back, attacking Diabali. Then, half a desert away, on
16 January Moulathmine Islamist militants took 41 foreign oil workers
hostage at In Amenas, south-east Algeria.
The timetable for the West African military intervention approved by the
United Nations Security Council in December has been accelerated (AC Vol 54
No 1). Yet the effectiveness of this new force remains to be tested.
Governments have quickly promised deployments but are slower to deliver
them. So has the European mission to retrain Mali’s army, whose fragility is
evident. Will contributing countries still want their experts to work
alongside Malian troops if they are hurried into combat?
Direct French intervention on 11 January was sparked by the discovery that
the jihadist advance into Konna, a town just 56 kilometres north of the key
Sévaré military base, the lock on the gateway to Mali’s populous south, was
not just a negotiating ploy to gain new concessions. Ansar Eddine, led by
the Malian Tuareg Iyad ag Ghali, had recently pulled out of talks with the
government and the secular Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad
(MNLA), brokered by Burkina Faso. French surveillance revealed that Ag
Ghali’s men had been joined by fighters from Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’ouest
(MUJAO) in a two-pronged push to seize Sévaré and the nearby key town of
Mopti. Some 200 vehicles, carrying thousands of fighters, were converging on
this critical area from Léré and Douentza.
Victory would have left them free to seize Sévaré, whose runway is the only
one besides Bamako able to receive large aircraft. Victory would have opened
the route to Bamako and critically undermined the international intervention
planned for later this year.
France flies to war
That is why, as Malian forces were being overrun, French President François
Hollande responded to the request for help from Malian President Dioncounda
Traoré. He dispatched Burkina-based Special Forces and attack helicopters on
12 January, following up with Mirage and Rafale bombing strikes on Islamist
camps and supply bases across the north. A French helicopter pilot and at
least ten Malian soldiers were killed. Jihadist casualties were much higher.
Since then, as the militants fought back, the Malian army has shown little
capacity to mount counter-attacks, even with air support. So France
ratcheted up its engagement, from a few hundred troops to an expected 2,500.
Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pledged
over 5,000 soldiers, with the first arriving on 17 January. France is
following air attacks by deploying ground troops and armoured vehicles to
supplement the small commando teams around Sévaré, Diabali (170 km. north of
Ségou) and the key Niger River bridge at Markala.
Following France’s long-range air strikes, most militants have pulled out of
Douentza, Timbuktu and Gao. However, they are far from defeated. During
months of control, they have hidden weapons and fuel in remote places. They
are comfortable operating in desert terrain. Those fighting in the west are,
says French Defence Minister Jean-Yves le Drian, determined, well-trained
and heavily armed.
The future campaign
President Hollande has said that he will keep French forces in action, not
only until ECOWAS troops are ready but until Mali is in a position to
restore constitutional democracy and the jihadists have been expelled,
killed or captured. It is possible that the intervention forces together
with the army could restore control over the main towns relatively quickly
but would then face a long campaign to re-establish security at local level.
Already, villagers living around Sévaré report that the militants are hiding
in the countryside, sometimes posing as civilians. In Konna, they took the
town by infiltrating discreetly and then killing local forces. Even five
days after the first French assault had forced them to disperse, they still
slipped back into town to buy fresh food.
Inter-communal suspicion could also increase as Malians of Bambara, Peul or
Songhai ‘black’ ethnicity accuse their ‘white’ Arab and Tuareg compatriots
of sympathising with the militants. For months, light-skinned Malians
travelling to Bamako from the north have preferred to go through Burkina
rather than take their chances at trigger-happy army checkpoints around
Sévaré. Songhai villagers have been re-forming the Ganda Isso and Ganda Koy
militias; in the past these had poor human rights records.
Power games
Mystery still surrounds Ansar Eddine’s decision to pull out of the
Ouagadougou talks and join a major new offensive. There were rumblings that
AQIM and MUJAO had put pressure on Ag Ghali to end the negotiations or that
Ansar Eddine fighters were defecting to those groups, rich with cash from
drug trafficking and hostage ransoms. One senior Ansar Eddine commander is
reported to have been killed near Konna. Some reports suggest Ag Ghali fled
to his Ifoghas tribe’s heartland around Kidal. There were reports of other
conflicts among the jihadists late last year. One commander, Mokhtar
Belmokhtar, who is widely linked to the In Amenas attack, is reported to
have differed with AQIM chiefs Abou Zeid and Yahya Abou el Hamame, and
developed ties to MUJAO (AC Vol 53 No 15). Meanwhile Omar Ould Hamaha, a
Malian Arab (Bérabiche) who had been involved with both Ansar Eddine and
MUJAO, has founded a new group, Ansar el Charia, drawn from his own people
(AC Vol 53 No 8).
The MNLA has offered to support the French campaign, although the group’s
strength is much reduced. The Tuareg former Deputy Chief of Staff, Major
General Al Haji ag Gamou, commander of semi-regular forces attached to the
army but defeated last year, is reported to be planning a pro-government
assault on Ménaka, in the far east, from their refuge in Niger (AC Vol 53 No
4). He may have up to 600 men, largely drawn from his Imghad clan.
Bamako fallout
In Bamako, recent events have undercut the putschist leader Captain Amadou
Sanogo and rendered irrelevant his long opposition to military intervention.
His rhetoric about the determination and capacity of the Malian army now
looks ridiculous. His sympathisers in the vocal nationalist and anti-ECOWAS
camp, such as Oumar Mariko, are also weakened and the target of bitter
attacks in the Bamako press, much of it politically sponsored.
Many in the traditional political class may see the current situation as an
opportunity to fight back. Political rivals have been attacking ex-Premier
and presidential hopeful Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and hinting he sympathised
with the rebels. So he has hit back with a campaign to raise money for the
troops.
For now, France enjoys a warm welcome and ECOWAS may do, too. A lasting
trend may be the gradual rebuilding of the presidency’s authority.
Transitional head of state Traoré will still need to launch a credible
national consultation on the political future. His respected new Premier,
Diango Sissoko, has a consensual, unbombastic style that helps improve
government credibility. Ousmane Sy, made Presidency Secretary General in
September, has restored some coherence to the presidential office (AC Vol 48
No 20).
Mali map
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Received on Fri Jan 18 2013 - 16:00:52 EST
