Somalia trapped in servile or abusive international relations
15/01/2013
_____
Mareeg.com-Consistent with his unfailing mission to speak for the best
interest of the failed, fragmented and powerless Somalia, Professor Michael
Weinstein of Perdue University, Indiana, USA has tried one more time to
reason with the Somali Elite and the International Community (donor/powers)
about the main problem hobbling the Provisional Federal Government (PFG) of
Somalia as its predecessors through his analysis published by
<
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Analysis/Somalia_The_Structural
_Weakness_of_the_Provisional_Government.shtml> GaroweOnline on December 29,
2012. He eloquently explained the structural weaknesses-pull from without
and pull from within-, responsible for the PFG’s slow performance.
By adding the adjective “provisional” to the Federal Government’s name, the
professor reminds the Somalis that despite all rhetoric, in the eyes of the
international community, the present government isn’t different from the
previous transitional governments in legal, diplomatic and political terms.
In short, without defending the competence and integrity of PFG leaders, he
underscored that the donor-powers’ decision to starve the PFG, considered as
a pull from without, unless PFG leaders accept a kind of Trusteeship
Administration for the next 20 years, is more ominous for the revival of
Somalia than the pull from within (from dissatisfied Somali factions).”
Nevertheless, he restated that both forces are destructive.
The truth is that Somalia is trapped in servile or abusive international
relations in terms of foreign policy and diplomacy. Today’s role of
Somalia’s government is to rubber stamp the international decisions on
Somalia to make foreign domination palatable. The international photo-ops
and red carpets granted to the Somali leaders and the frequent three hour
visits of foreign dignitaries to Mogadishu mask the unequal power and
foreign driven policies imposed on Somalia. It’s hard to miss the
contradictions between the public statement and the official policy actions
of donors and neighboring countries in dealing with the new government.
During his visit to Ethiopia in November 2012, President Hassan has been
informed to honor all deals concluded between Ethiopia and previous
transitional federal governments since Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia is
not sanctioned by United Nations and African Union (AU) as part of AMISOM
forces. But in subsequent developments, Ethiopia, annoyed by the open door
policy of the new government, as usual, seems to have undertaken political,
diplomatic and military campaign to tarnish the credibility of the new
government and dispel the perception of political independence of Somalia.
Ethiopia wants to be the strategic gateway for Somalia.
Next, despite earlier confirmation of the
<
http://somalilandpress.com/somali-foreign-minister-meets-kenyan-officials-i
n-nairobi-37961> visit of President Hassan , the Kenyan government declined
to welcome him hours before his departure from Addis Ababa as gesture of
pressure. The Kenyan government, whose forces control large area of Somalia,
could not believe that the president of Somalia ignored Kenya’s wishes like
its candidate for the Prime Minister’s position or Jubbaland political
dispensation.
As a result, western diplomats in Nairobi and European capitals rushed
immediately to Mogadishu to admonish the new government to listen and work
with Ethiopia and Kenya. The new government declared its determination to
cooperate with neighboring countries, AU and United Nations for furthering
the mutual interests of all.
After diplomatic shuttles, the Somali president received an invitation for a
one day official visit from President Muwai Kibaki of Kenya with the
expectation of endorsing the nine-point
<
http://english.alshahid.net/archives/34032> Draft Communiqué published
before the meeting of the two leaders. But, the foreign minister of Kenya
read out an eleven-point
<
http://soomaalidamaanta.com/presidents-somalia-and-kenya-joint-communique/>
Official Communiqué. I transcribe below some points of the two communiqués
for analysis.
Draft Communiqué
Official Communiqué
5. Underscored the need to coordinate and cooperate both at the bilateral,
regional and international levels efforts geared towards consolidation of
peace and security in Somalia as well as reconstruction of the country and
building of new institutions of governance.
5. Same.
7. Commended the role of the Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD) in the
Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia and other liberated areas
and stressed the need to support this process which has been endorsed by the
IGAD Heads of State and Government, the African Union and the UN Security
Council
7. Commended the role of the Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD) and the
support to IGAD by the African Union and the UN Security Council.
8. Noted with appreciation the role of AMISOM in liberating large parts of
Somalia from Al Shabab militants and called on the United National Security
Council (UNSC) to consider favourably the extension of the mandate of AMISOM
when it expires on 7th March, 2013, so that AMISOM can continue helping in
the process of consolidation of peace and security in Somalia.
8. Same.
9. Recalled the negative impact on the sub-region of the breakdown of law
and order in Somalia over the years and acknowledged as legitimate the
consensus and interest of the sub-region in ensuring peace, security and
stability in Somalia
9. Agreed to relaunch and revitalize the Joint Commission as the principal
framework for cooperation in the security, cross border issues, Economic
Cooperation, Trade, Immigration, Education as well as cultural exchanges
10. Underscored the vital importance of cooperating in the fight against Al
Shabab and other militant elements who are a threat to the national security
of both countries.
11. Agreed to establish a Joint Permanent Border Commission to deal with
Security and Cross border issues along the common border.
Point 5 requires the new government of Somalia to coordinate with the Kenyan
Government at bilateral, regional and international levels on all efforts
geared towards consolidation of peace, reconstruction and building of new
institutions of governance in Somalia. Implicitly point 5 covers the
objectives of the Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia deleted
from point 7 of the official communiqué.
Point 8 of both communiqués supports the extension of the presence of AMISOM
forces in Somalia while it does not mention the urgently needed support for
funding the Somali security forces and the lifting of the arms embargo. The
official communiqué contains new points 9, 10, and 11 concerning a Joint
Commission for Cooperation (JCC) stipulated in 2005, cooperation in the
fight against Al-Shabab and other militant elements, and a Joint Permanent
Border Commission. There is no sufficient information about the 2005
agreement, the other militants and border commission mentioned in these
additional points.
The Foreign Ministry of Ethiopia’s
<
http://www.mfa.gov.et/weekHornAfrica/morewha.php?wi=766#766> comment on the
visit of President Hassan S. Mohamud to Kenya made extensive reference to
the draft communiqué instead of to the official communiqué, particularly
highlighting the Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia. This
deliberate misrepresentation indicates the kind of diplomatic ambushes the
new government faces in dealing with neighboring countries.
Sanaullah Baloch, UN Constitutional Advisor on Somalia, perhaps sensing
grudges from the neighboring countries suggests in his piece
<
http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2013/jan/27624/somalia_peace_prospects.aspx>
Somalia: peace prospects of January 9, 2013 the following:
“The Somali leadership needs a visionary diplomatic approach to avoid any
sort of confrontation and competition with neighboring countries such as
Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, which have played a crucial role in the peace
process and peacekeeping.”
The British Government invited the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister
of Somalia Fawzia Yusuf Haji Aden and the Foreign Minister of Somaliland Dr.
Mohamed A. Omar. In his one paragraph statement, the UK Foreign Secretary
William Hague who met with Foreign Minister of Somalia said, “The foreign
minister outlined the Somali government’s plan to tackle the challenges
ahead including improving security, increasing access to justice,
transparent financial management, political reconciliation and economic
development.”
The question is how the Somali government will implement that plan without
substantial financial assistance from donors? Mogadishu port revenue is not
sufficient to cover half of Mogadishu Local Government budget needs. All
international funds are channeled to UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) of
$1.3 billion for 2013, to AU/AMISOM forces, to private security companies,
and to Ethiopian forces.
The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (CFO) website details information
about the two below mentioned policy initiatives (Assistance) dedicated to
Somalia/Somaliland. These initiatives are components of the UK National
Security Strategy (NSS) and Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).
(1) Policy preventing conflict in fragile states
(2) Policy preventing and reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia
The British Government leads a working group of the Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia focused on regional capacity development for the
prosecution of the captured pirates and military engagement against piracy.
Most of the funds allocated for the implementation of these policy
initiatives are transferred to UN and Non-Governmental organizations.
The UK Minister for Africa, Hon Mark Simmonds held talks with the foreign
Minister of Somaliland. Both parties agreed cooperation on terrorism,
piracy, economic development and continuation of the dialogue between
Somalia and Somaliland.
The new government of Somalia has severe limitations to deal systematically,
proactively and skillfully with the complex foreign policy issues and the
myriads of actors. It doesn’t have necessary institutional capacity,
integrity and independence to carry out foreign policy that supports
domestic policy goals. Some of the causes are:
* Absence of basic institutional capacity at national level for
carrying out policy and administrative functions.
* Somali diplomatic missions are either self-employed or guests
(agents) paid by the host governments.
* Lack of institutional memory and reliable documentation of
international bilateral and multilateral agreements.
The new government of Somalia gains no benefits by working with countless
personalities and entities. The continuation of present chaotic and
manipulative interactions with the international community will inevitably
result the defenestration of the new government.
Donor-powers have predetermined their non-negotiable policy actions towards
Somalia. So to avoid haphazard diplomatic engagements which could jeopardize
Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, credibility and long term
stability, it is necessary a deep analysis of the core foreign policy issues
and diplomacy options that would help peacebuilding and statebuilding in
Somalia. It would be politically more sensible to adopt a streamlined
framework of cooperation with the international community.
Professor Michael Weinstein said loudly that “the political outcomes in
“Somalia” are not under the PFG’s control, but are the resultants of the
play between external actors, PFG and domestic factions.” It is the
responsibility of the Somali Government and Elite- particularly public
intellectuals- to speak and fight for the best outcomes which would promote
first and foremost the common interests of Somalia. Only patriots bequeath
lasting positive legacy to their people and country.
Mr. Mohamud M Uluso
mohamuduluso_at_gmail.com
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Received on Wed Jan 16 2013 - 20:46:58 EST
