Libya in the African Context: a history waiting to be written
¨C By Bridget Conley, World Peace Foundation
January 10, 2013
In the flurry of assessments and debates about the 2011 war in Libya that
overthrew the country¡¯s longtime ruler, Muammar Gaddafi, there has been
little scholarly or policy attention to Libya¡¯s relationship with
sub-Saharan Africa during and after the conflict.
The World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School (institutional partner of
the RAS on African Arguments) recently convened a seminar to examine aspects
of this relationship after the conflict as well to bring to light untold or
under-appreciated components of African engagement during the war that
overthrew Gaddafi. Below is a summary of the seminar with links to short
essays that several of the participants contributed afterwards.
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/10/libya-in-the-african-con
text/> A full seminar briefing paper is available here.
Turning Away from Africa
As
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/13/libya-in-the-african-con
text-2/> Faraj Najem argues, over modern history, the relationship between
Libya and sub-Saharan Africa has been checkered. There are important
historic links across the Sahara, especially associated with the Sanussiya
of Cyrenaica. Also, nomadic groups in the Fezzan, including the Toubou and
Tuareg, range into the neighboring countries. In modern times, Libyan-©\
African relations were closely identified with the person of Muammar
Gaddafi. Rebuffed by Arab leaders, Gaddafi turned towards Africa and tried
to buy influence, while also promoting grandiose visions of himself as the
leader of the continent. His military adventurism in the continent included
support both for legitimate liberation movements (such as the South Africa¡¯
s ANC) and for insurgents.
Today, in post-Gaddafi Libya, there is a popular perception that as a result
of this largesse sub-Saharan Africans in general, and the African Union (AU)
in particular, supported Gaddafi. As a cause or perhaps a consequence of
this perception, during the conflict that overthrew Gaddafi many black
Libyans fighting on behalf of the former leader were stigmatized as
¡°African mercenaries.¡± This may have been because Libyans did not want to
acknowledge that their compatriots were committing violations of human
rights. The sum effect is that Libyans in the post-Gaddafi context are
leaning away from Africa, albeit with important exceptions such as those
countries that actively supported the NTC.
Nonetheless, geography cannot be overcome. For a host of reasons, including
regional and international security concerns, Libya cannot ignore
sub-Saharan Africa. It shares concerns with its regional neighbors over the
proliferation of weapons, trafficking of people across the Sahara, and use
of smuggling routes for illicit commodities such as drugs. Libya will also
need cooperation on issues such as the presence of exiled members of the
former regime in African countries and Libya¡¯s commercial investments
across Africa. However, given the new Libyan leadership¡¯s deep distrust, we
should not expect to see a rapid improvement in the relationship.
Stories from the fall
The African Union Mediation Effort
United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011, in
paragraph 1, demanded an immediate ceasefire, and in paragraph 2, stressed
the need to find a solution to the crisis, making specific mention of the
AU¡¯s effort at ¡°facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms
necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution.¡± Nonetheless, by the
time this resolution was passed, the P3 (France, Britain and the United
States) had already made their decision that military action would continue
until regime change had been achieved. The UN was of the opinion that there
was no opportunity for negotiations until the killing of civilians had
ceased. The AU¡¯s position was that there was always time for negotiation,
and that an attempted military solution would have high costs for Libya and
unknowable repercussions for the region.
The AU initiative suffered from many flaws, including internal divisions
within the continent, poor public relations, and the failure to counteract
negative perceptions of the African intention and role among Libyans and
internationally. The Libyan opposition was deeply skeptical of the AU¡¯s
endeavor. Nonetheless the AU roadmap and framework were the only full
package on offer for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and it failed
primarily due to opposition from the P3. From an early date, members of the
AU¡¯s ad hoc High Level Committee were clear in private that Gaddafi needed
to step down, and managed to wring a tacit concession from him on this.
South African President Jacob Zuma, who chaired the committee, put
considerable effort into the initiative and coordinated with the Russians.
However, by the time that talks reached the stage at which Gaddafi was
actively contemplating leaving power, the NTC was gearing up for its final
offensive on Tripoli.
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-th
e-libya-conflict-of-2011/> Alex de Waal argues that, ¡°The AU¡¯s principal
diplomatic advantage was that only African leaders could make the case to
Gaddafi that he should both stop his assault on civilian populations and
step down, with any credibility. A combination of African access to Gaddafi
and NATO leverage over the TNC could have provided the basis for a
negotiated settlement. However, this possibility was never pursued.¡±
Neighbors¡¯ Involvements
The role of Sudan was critical in the overthrow of Gaddafi. Sudanese support
to the Libyan opposition was immediate and generous, based on Sudan¡¯s
interest in ending Gaddafi¡¯s patterns of interference in its internal
affairs, by, for instance, supporting rebel groups like the Justice and
Equality Movement in Darfur. Sudanese support stretched far beyond engaging
in supporting the anti-Gaddafi elements in the local politics of south east
Libya.
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/17/the-sudanese-role-in-lib
ya-2011/> As examined in depth by Asim Fath-Elrahman Ahmed Elhag, The NTC
leadership sought out Sudanese support and were provided wit weaponry,
logistics and expertise that were enormously helpful in the war effort, up
to the western mountains, Misrata and Tripoli itself. The extent of this
support has never been fully documented but it is openly acknowledged by
both the NTC and Sudan, though not yet by NATO. It is not clear whether
there was actual battlefield coordination between Sudanese intelligence
officers and NATO in terms of target selection by aircraft. Sudan¡¯s role
has continued beyond the conflict in terms of monitoring the southern
borders of Libya, tracking Gaddafi loyalists, and helping with contacts
between the NTC and some sub-Saharan countries (e.g. Niger).
Chad leaned towards supporting Gaddafi during 2011. Chadian policies towards
Libya must be seen in the light of the history of wars between the two
countries, including the territorial dispute over the Aouzou strip, the
Libyan annexation of Chad, and Libyan sponsorship of particular leaders in
the Chadian civil wars. The north-south conflict in Chad is itself in large
part a product of Libya intervention.
Chadian President Idriss D¨¦by feared the NTC, which he saw as rigidly
Islamist and ready to expel Africans from Libya. He was also aware of the
potential for Libya to destabilize its neighbor. After the conflict, D¨¦by
is looking to normalize relations with the NTC, but he also has a strong
commitment to the Toubou who live both in northern Chad and southern Libya
and will, if necessary, intervene to back them up in their local conflicts
inside Libya.
Libyans see Chad as their backyard. Cyrenaica has historic links to Chad
through the Sanussi order. Tripolitania¡¯s links to Chad are much weaker.
Current international policies towards southern Libya, northern Chad and the
neighboring areas of the Sahara, tend to be framed by the international
political boundaries, which are arbitrary. While counterterrorism policy is
integrated across the region, political engagement is not.
Algeria is a powerful influence throughout the Maghreb and the Sahara.
Algerian politics present an enigma: it gives the appearance of continual
crisis but the regime displays a remarkable resilience. It is an oligarchic
state in which each faction of the elite also has a reach into the
opposition, creating a structure that is remarkably resistant to systemic
change, despite day-to-day signs of crisis such as numerous local riots. The
regime also has a memory of the 1988 October demonstrations that led to the
Algeria¡¯s failed democratization and subsequent civil war, and is
determined not to repeat the same mistakes. The government has learned to
manage expressions of popular discontent, using the pattern of numerous
local demonstrations to identify the most pressing issues needing its
attention, without being threatened.
Algeria took a strong non-interventionist position in the 2011 conflict and
Libyans see it as representing the old order. The Algerian security services
enjoy a reputation for penetrating all armed groups and political formations
both inside and across their borders, making them a formidable presence in
the region.
The role of Qatar in Libya and more widely in the Middle East and Africa has
not been subject to much critical scrutiny by scholars, perhaps because of
Qatar¡¯s role as a prominent sponsor of higher education, research and
mediation. However,
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/01/07/qatars-involvement-in-li
bya-a-delicate-balance/> as Lina Khatib has written, the rapid emergence of
this small but rich state as an important player in the wider region
deserves attention. Initially Qatar carved out the niche of mediator,
serving as friend to all, but during 2011 played a more assertive role in
intervening in Libya. Qatar¡¯s extensive engagements throughout the region
can be characterized as ¡°promiscuous,¡± pursued to further its interests of
competing with Saudi Arabia, countering Iran, gaining favor in the West, and
protecting its own security. Within the Arab countries, Qatar has filled a
vacuum of state mediator, but in its efforts to expand into Africa, it has
moved into a more crowded field and run up against the AU. There are
important unanswered questions about the professionalism, effectiveness and
sustainability of Qatar¡¯s foreign policy roles.
The Conflict in Mali
The seminar paid special attention to the conflict in Mali. While this
crisis was triggered by the Libyan conflict, specifically the return of
several thousand Malian Tuareg who had served in the Libyan armed forces,
the roots of the crisis are internal to Mali. In fact, the problem should be
seen not as a crisis in the north, but,
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/11/20/military-intervention-in
-mali-would-be-a-disaster/> as Jeremy Swift states, as one intrinsic to the
Malian state itself, which has since independence failed to come to a
workable political arrangement with the Tuareg and other populations of the
northern regions, as well as failing to address the needs of citizens in the
south.
The current situation, with several insurgent groups (separatist and
Islamist) operating in northern Mali, and a decrepit political system and
army in the southern part of the country, is unsustainable. The objective of
the government and the international community should not be to restore
Malian state pride and territorial integrity, but to reform and restructure
the Malian state. The military option, currently being pursued, suggests
three main scenarios, none of them promising. Under scenario one, the
Government of Mali and ECOWAS launch an offensive to recapture the north,
and ¡°win.¡± This would provoke a humanitarian crisis and would further
embitter the Tuareg and radicalize the inhabitants of the north. Under
scenario two, the rebels win, with a similar outcome. The third scenario is
a stalemate.
A national political settlement is needed. The best options are those based
on the 1992 National Charter, including maximum devolution of powers to the
northern regions and a national process of reconciliation. However, the
necessary internal political forces to push for such a solution are not
currently present and international discussions are largely focused on
military intervention.
The internal dynamics within the north also require attention. The Tuareg,
themselves a diverse group, are only one ethnic group among several in the
north, matched in numbers by Arabs and Songhai. Conventional distinctions
between Sufis and Salafis in the north do not hold: the dynamics of Islamism
are changing. The different insurgent groups have divergent agendas and may
find it difficult to maintain a coalition.
Several commentators pointed out that beginning under US President George W.
Bush, that the US provided significant support to the Malian army, which,
nonetheless, crumbled at the first sign of insurgency. Its next move was to
stage a coup. Before they can be expected to play an effective, let alone
positive, role in resolving Mali¡¯s armed insurgencies, the Malian military
and security sector needs reform.
There was strong consensus amongst the Mali experts that the proposed
military intervention is unworkable, but it has nonetheless generated a
sense of inevitability. However,
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/11/putting-mali-together-ag
ain/> as Alex de Waal argued in a recent New York Times op-ed, there is room
for maneuver. UN Security Council resolution 2071 on Mali demands that rebel
groups cut ties with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, but urges that
negotiations take place between all other major players ¨C including rebel
groups, transitional authorities, and local leaders. Algeria is strongly
opposed to a military intervention and is a key player. France is aware of
the problems of an intervention and appears to be backtracking.
Conclusions
The following principal conclusions can be derived from the seminar.
* The full account of the 2011 uprising, conflict and revolution
remains to be written. There are important details of the AU mediation
effort, and the roles of neighboring countries that have yet to see the
light of day.
* Libya and its sub-Saharan neighbours need to engage with one
another, and the AU and Libya need to develop common understanding.
* The central Sahara, consisting of southern Libya and the adjoining
areas of the neighboring countries, should be studied as an integrated
whole, in pursuit of integrated national and international policies.
Bridget Conley is Research Director at the World Peace Foundation.
<
http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/10/libya-in-the-african-context-by-brid
get-conley-world-peace-foundation/gadaffi/>
http://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Gadaffi.jpg
The fall of Mouammar Gadaffi was an event of major significance to the Sahel
and north Africa regions.
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Received on Thu Jan 10 2013 - 14:04:05 EST
