Implications Of Political Change In The Central African Republic – Analysis
By: <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/admin/> Eurasia Review
January 9, 2013
By Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero
As was the case in Mali, recent events in the Central African Republic (CAR)
have the potential to profoundly impact the dynamics of political change in
Africa, where the plethora of failed or failing states provides a ripe
breeding ground for extremists to assume power. The CAR’s location, being
landlocked and surrounded by the failed states of Chad, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Sudan, make it vulnerable and beholden to its
neighbors. Being mineral rich makes it ripe for political change and a
natural target for extremists.
A rebel coalition (Séléka) has taken over a dozen towns in the CAR over the
past month — including four regional capitals. The country’s military, along
with its regional allies in the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), have secured a buffer zone north of the capital city, Bangui. As a
result, the rebels decided not to assault Bangui and agree to negotiate with
the government, being led by President Bozizé, in Gabon this week.
Regardless of the outcome, democratic reforms are unlikely to be part of the
CAR’s political landscape in the near future.
Four militant factions compromise Séléka — the Union of Democratic Forces
for Unity (UFDR), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP),
the Democratic Front of Central African People (FDPC) and the Wa Kodro
Salute Patriotic Convention (CPSK). Their success, in such a short period of
time, highlights the government’s inability to control the majority of its
territory. Séléka is unlikely to compromise much, given its momentum and the
country’s wealth of natural resources (gold, minerals, diamonds, uranium and
timber). Bozizé has accused the Sudanese regime of sponsoring Séléka — which
Khartoum denies. The CAR also claims that Sudanese, Nigerian and Chadian
mercenaries have joined Séléka.
Séléka justifies its use of violence on the grounds that Bozizé has failed
to live up to the terms of a 2007 peace agreement — which includes providing
ex-rebels with employment and money. From their perspective, his presidency
lacks legitimacy. The majority of the rebels come from the country’s
northeast. Séléka accuses the central government of neglecting the northeast
while showering Bozizé’s cronies with natural resource wealth as a means of
securing loyalty. Séléka
<
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2
012/12/2012123065143225231.html> claims that its actions are driven by a
“thirst for justice, peace, security and economic development of the people
of Central African Republic.” Bozizé and many of his supporters believe that
the rebels are manipulated by foreign powers (primarily Sudan), which are
determined to deprive the CAR of its natural resource wealth.
Despite the international community’s support for a brokered political
solution, the prospects for peaceful settlement are undermined by the two
sides’ incompatible stances on Bozizé’s role in resolving the conflict. A
spokesman for Bozizé’s ruling party
<
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-03/news/sns-rt-us-car-rebelsbre9
010k5-20130102_1_bakouma-uranium-deposit-president-bozize-rebel-assault>
stated that any proposition that the president step down would be “rejected
systematically.” In 2011, the president was reelected to a second term
(ending in 2016) in an election that many Central Africans and human rights
organizations label as fraudulent. Although Bozizé promises not to seek a
third term, he has said he must remain in power for the next three years. A
representative of the CPSK stated that a peace deal is only possible if
Bozizé exits the presidency. Whether either side will compromise remains to
be seen, however, it is unlikely that much progress will be made at the
bargaining table.
Sadly, violence and instability is nothing new for the CAR. Since achieving
independence from France in 1960, the country has experienced numerous armed
rebellions, bloody coups d’état, military revolts and oppressive leadership.
Rebels from among its neighboring states have exploited the CAR’s weak
geostrategic position for many years. Foreign governments — including
France, Libya, Sudan and Chad — have historically allied themselves with
various governments or rebel factions in the CAR to advance their own
national interests. As a result, large flows of weapons are constantly
moving across the country’s borders and outside the control of the
government.
The political change that has been so prominent in the Middle East and North
Africa over the past two years has been largely absent throughout
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The key socioeconomic and political factors that
have driven citizens of MENA into the streets — high unemployment,
corruption and authoritarianism — are in some cases even worse in SSA. In
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Senegal, Kenya, Swaziland and South Africa the
unemployment rates range from 25 to 95 percent. Last year Transparency
International ranked many countries in SSA among the worst in the world in
terms of corruption. Few sub-Saharan leaders came to power through elections
deemed free and fair by international observers, and six of the region’s
leaders have ruled for more than a quarter century.
So why have sub-Saharan Africans not followed their MENA counterparts and
launched an “African Spring”? We identify five primary reasons:
1. A fear of greater instability has likely led citizens of SSA to act more
cautiously and refrain from public demands for democratization. Within the
last two decades, SSA has been far more prone to produce failed states than
MENA. Such a legacy has undoubtedly shaped perceptions about political
reform.
2. The profound ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions in SSA tend to be
stronger than a sense of national unity. This contrasts with Egypt, Libya
and Tunisia, where deep tribal and ideological divisions exist, but more
than 90 percent of citizens are Arab/Berber, speak Arabic, and practice
Sunni Islam.
3. Whereas the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries maintained a sense of
independence from the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes, the militaries put
pressure on their leaders to relinquish power in response to the
unprecedented protests that erupted two years ago. In many sub-Saharan
African states, the militaries are less prone to challenging their leaders.
4. Given the important role social media and the internet played in unifying
citizens of MENA against authoritarian regimes, technological constraints,
lower income levels and lower literacy rates in SSA have prevented citizens
from utilizing social media for political mobilization.
5. The MENA movements were largely driven by increased levels of
urbanization, while the majority of sub-Saharan Africans live outside urban
areas and are less connected to urban dwellers than their North African
counterparts.
All five of these factors bode poorly for Central Africans, who are deeply
divided along ethnic and religions lines. The Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara,
Mboum, M’Baka, and Yakoma ethnic groups each constitute between 4 percent
and 33 percent of the population. Half of Central Africans practice
Christianity, 35 percent hold indigenous religious beliefs and 15 percent
are Muslim. Social media cannot be an influential force for political reform
in the CAR — out of a population of approximately five million, fewer than
23,000 are Internet users, and the adult literacy rate is less than 60
percent. The nation’s urbanization rate is just 39 percent — only two
percent higher than the SSA average — yet significantly lower than the North
African average. Finally, since Bozizé came to power following a coup in
2003, his forces have fought mercilessly to keep him in power, which is not
conducive to an uprising.
It is within this context — with the CAR being a weak state, divided by
tribal, ethnic and religious divisions, with a historical legacy of
authoritarianism, and with low levels of trust between the government and
its opposition — that the latest rebellion has taken hold. Prospects for
peace are not good. Given its momentum, and the nature of political change
occurring elsewhere in Africa, it is likelier that Séléka will be victorious
than not. But what is unlikely to change is the basic political composition
of the country.
If we consider what has happened in countries such as Mali and Sudan, and
what is now happening in the CAR, it appears that radical political change
in the failed or failing states of SSA is the new normal. Given that the
conflict in the CAR is reaching a crescendo at the same time that the UN
intends to send a military force to attempt to wrest control from al-Qaeda
affiliates in Mali, the CAR may unwittingly find itself in the middle of a
higher stakes game of chess, as the West attempts to battle extremist forces
and influence the nature of political change in Africa. Depending on the
outcome, the CAR may come to serve as a spark for what may yet become the
‘African Spring.’
Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions, a cross-border risk
management firm based in Connecticut (USA), and author of the book “Managing
Country Risk”. Giorgio Cafiero is a research analyst with CRS.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Wed Jan 09 2013 - 19:07:20 EST
