Congo-Kinshasa: Will the Mounting Evidence of Rwandan Meddling in Eastern
Congo Lead Donors to Change Their Response?
By Courtney Meyer, 9 January 2013
Analysis
In late November, two Congolese rebel fighters who chose to abandon the
group revealed to the BBC the extent of Rwanda's meddling and financial
backing.
Captain Rudahirwa and Colonel Bestfriend Ndozi - former members of the
Congolese army turned students and activists in the Congolese Movement for
Change - alleged that the Rwandan government sent between $15,000 and
$20,000 every month, allowing the rebel movement to buy food, uniforms, and
medicines.
These testimonies were followed by evidence in early December that both
Rwanda and Uganda - the latter first being accused of providing support in a
leaked draft of the United Nations Group of Experts report in late October -
supported the M23's capture of Goma on 20th November.
The UN Group of Experts report is what most governments use to demonstrate
Rwanda's backing, but the neutrality of the group and the credibility of
their work has come into question.
While it is clear Rwanda has motives for meddling -particularly while it
denounced the FDLR in late November for attacking across the border - proof
other than the Group of Experts' reports has been hard to come by. Will this
more recent evidence have any bearing on donor opinions?
Actions and accusations
Rwandan authorities have long been accused (most recently by Human Rights
Watch) of using the Congrès National pour la Défense du People (CNDP) as a
proxy army to fight against the regrouped génocidaires (known as the Forces
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), and of maintaining military
influence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to benefit from
mineral resources.
Partially integrated into the Congolese national army in 2009 under a peace
deal, in April 2012, some of the rebels formed the M23, which has since
become alternatively known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army.
Although the initial post-genocide meddling occurred overtly (when the RPF
spearheaded a regional effort to overthrow Mobutu), Rwanda has never
admitted to any of the more recent allegations. In 2008, accusations flew
about Kigali backing the 2004-2009 uprising of the CNDP, causing some donors
to suspend official development assistance.
At first glance, it may not be clear as to why donors have expressed concern
about Rwanda's foreign policy decisions. However, many of the countries
suspending aid to Rwanda in 2012, including the United Kingdom but excluding
the United States, are providing general budget support, allowing emphasis
on national priorities. Using aid to indirectly maintain political
intolerance of the FDLR is a political consideration aimed at ensuring the
regime's hold on power.
Development objectives and development objections
While donors may not be pleased that their contributions are indirectly
supporting the regime's regional security objectives, the confusing rhetoric
donors are giving Rwanda indicates a level of recognition on their part that
the regime's security objectives are not being entirely juxtaposed with
development.
By measures both economic and developmental Rwanda is developing, growing
and excelling. Last decade, it was the tenth fastest growing economy in the
world, with an annual GDP that - excepting 2009 - has exceeded 7 percent
since 2004.
Rwanda's actions resemble what Thai political scientist Chai-anan
Samudavanija's called the 'three-dimensional state' which retains legitimacy
by tackling three objectives: security, development, and participation, with
the first being made paramount at specific points in time.
Donors also prioritize these objectives, and in some circumstances this
leads to donor complacency about politics and aid misuse - seemingly a
willingness to pick battles - even when the compromise means ignoring the
governance strategies that the current neoliberal paradigm aims to counter.
An old era in new clothing?
Following a suspension of U.S. military aid and a threat of charges for
aiding war crimes in late July, many proclaimed the end of an era of
exceptional Western-Rwandan relations after countries including the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany suspended small portions of their
development assistance.
Yet since then, Rwanda has been held up as an example of development success
with advice to give about post-conflict stabilization as a new non-permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council.
Perhaps some are beginning to recognize the conflicting message. US
legislators recently urged the Obama administration to reprimand the Kagame
administration's continued connections to the M23, urging the president to
overcome what many considered a relationship defined by lenience and guilt
over a failed response to the 1994 genocide.
In the week preceding Christmas, Obama stressed to his Rwandan counterpart
that any support for the Congolese rebels was "inconsistent with Rwanda's
desire for stability and peace".
The US isn't the only country wrestling with the nature of its rapport with
the African country. In November, former UK International Development
Secretary Andrew Mitchell was accused of acting as a "rogue minister" by
controversially authorizing a payment of £16 million after previously
suspending all funds. The remainder of the annual £37 million was later
revoked by Secretary Justine Greening.
Asked about the inconsistent message, Prime Minister David Cameron argued,
"...we should be very frank and very firm with President Kagame and the
Rwandan regime that we do not accept that they should be supporting militias
in Congo or elsewhere
"I will raise this issue presently with the president, but I continue to
believe that investing in Rwanda's success as one of those countries in
Africa that's showing you can break the cycle of poverty, you can improve
conditions for people, is something that we are right to do."
Will the new evidence of Rwanda's M23 involvement or the changing nature of
the US and UK leadership's opinion make for an altered relationship between
the countries? Contrary to what many US Congressmen and women believe, I
suspect donors largely comprehend the difference between recognizing
Rwanda's outstanding commitment to development and overcoming their own
guilt over the country's ethnic violence.
Greater policy space was necessary under the initial post-conflict
circumstances, and political repression and violence - though not
appreciated yet at times respected by donors - is an inevitable product of
regaining control.
Whether such control needs to be maintained by commanding additional
violence is a question that these donors have yet to respond to in a more
than politically rhetorical way.
Courtney Meyer is a freelance writer with an interest in central and east
Africa.
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Received on Wed Jan 09 2013 - 18:51:47 EST
