Analysis of internal workings of Congo’s Kabila regime wins African Argument
of the year
December 20, 2012
Guenther von Billerbeck’s piece ‘Congo: crisis in East deflects attention
from need for reforms from Kinshasa’ was voted (in a publicly accessible
online poll), the best piece to appear on African Arguments in 2012.
You can read Guenther’s piece in full below. Second was Abdi Aynte’s ‘
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/07/03/somali-presidential-elections-six-wa
ys-to-win-power-by-abdi-aynte/> Somali Presidential Elections: six ways to
win power’ and third was Michael Deibert’s ‘
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/29/north-kivu%E2%80%99s-false-peace-by-
michael-deibert/> North Kivu’s False Peace.’
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/29/north-kivu%E2%80%99s-false-peace-by-
michael-deibert/>
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/12/20/analysis-of-internal-workings-of-con
gos-kabila-regime-wins-african-argument-of-the-year/kabila_fils-3/>
http://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Kabila_fils.jpg
Congolese Presidente Joseph Kabila has retreeted from many policy decisions
since the death of key advisor Katumba Mwanke.
Congo: crisis in East deflects attention from need for reforms from Kinshasa
The current crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North and
South Kivu provinces is yet another episode in the epic conflict that has
engulfed the region since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Kivu crisis has
not only dominated analysis and news reporting on the country since the
early months of 2012; it has also absorbed the attention of the President,
Joseph Kabila, and proves a distraction from policy matters that are equally
important to the country’s future. Kabila and his entourage have not
provided effective leadership on a number of essential issues, namely, the
revision of the electoral commission, the revision of the mining code, the
holding of provincial elections and the implementation of long-awaited
projects to improve electricity supply in the country.
The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) – a Tutsi-led rebel group, allegedly
supported by Congo’s neighbour Rwanda – has started where Laurent Nkunda’s
Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple left off in January 2009. It has
successfully engaged the ineffective Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in North Kivu’s Rutshuru and Masisi
Territories – defections, notoriously bad leadership and military assaults
by the M23 having weakened the national army considerably. The crisis has
also caused massive displacement of the local population and sparked debates
about Rwanda’s purported role in rebellions in Eastern Congo.
This crisis shares many similarities with that which I witnessed when in the
Congo between 2006 and 2009. In this regard, it has raised the usual
questions and doubts about the international community’s strategy for the
vast Central African country. Such questions include:
Is the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) fit and willing to
protect the local population?
Has the international community done enough to foster security sector reform
and thereby bolster the FARDC and state authority in the unstable East?
Should the international community support a regime in Kinshasa that lost
legitimacy after the 2011 elections, which were widely regarded as
fraudulent?
Should the international community turn a blind eye to Kigali’s alleged
support of an armed rebellion in a neighbouring country?
However, these questions, whilst important, are not the only ones which
require answers as the Congolese leadership attempts to steer the country
away from its generally ascribed role as a failed state.
Some 2000 kilometers further west, in the capital Kinshasa, the crisis seems
far away and appears to play only a small role in the daily lives of the
people. Kinshasa is currently bustling with preparations for the conference
of Francophone countries – scheduled to take place from 12th to 14th
October. The government has cleaned up a city often described as Kin La
Poubelle. Now, Congolese and other Francophone flags are flying all over the
Boulevard du 30 Juin, hotels have been refurbished, and parts of the road to
N’Djili airport have been rehabilitated.
Besides engagement with other members of La Francophonie, there are other
issues that could change the country significantly, but which have been
sidelined by the crisis in the east. The revision of the electoral
commission could ensure that future elections are not mismanaged. The
revision of the mining code from 2002, if managed properly, could make the
county’s mining industry a catalyst of modernisation and renewal. The
holding of the long delayed provincial and local elections would improve
democratic governance and strengthen Kabila’s legitimacy.
Yet along the corridors of the presidential residence and in the backrooms
of the houses of Kabila’s closest advisors these issues are not given
priority. Around the presidency, the military crisis and the souring of
relations with Rwanda are the most important, if not the only, issues that
are being discussed. Ironically, the almost exclusive focus on security
matters may be just as threatening to the DRC’s stability as the
ever-recurring Kivu crisis.
It’s well known that for Kabila, and many of his advisors, the crisis is a
personal matter. It is said that the president feels betrayed by the
Rwandans and mourns the deterioration of relations with Kigali that had been
on the mend since a backdoor agreement in January 2009. He believes that he
should have known better, and now feels that he is being left out in the
rain by people he once thought his friends, such as the Rwandan Defence
Minister James Kabarebe.
Many in Kinshasa also say that Kabila’s close supervision of security
matters has raised eyebrows among senior generals. It has left him
vulnerable to accusations of weak leadership and mismanagement should the
situation not improve or should the M23 hand a decisive military defeat to
the FARDC. In such a situation, it is possible that powerful people in the
country’s security machinery and military hierarchy push responsibility on
to Kabila. The President’s almost exclusive focus on these issues would make
it easy for him to become a scapegoat, should a scapegoat be required.
Equally serious is the dangerous mixture of trust and disconnect between the
presidency and the government of Prime Minister Matata Ponyo Mapon caused by
Kabila’s preoccupation with security matters. The President trusts his Prime
Minister with the day-to-day management of politics and leaves issues that
are not related to security, mining and oil entirely to Matata. Reportedly,
Kabila does not want to hear about macroeconomics, decentralisation or
budgetary issues; matters unrelated to security are perceived to be an
unnecessary burden.
Kabila trusts and supports Matata – much more than he trusted the Prime
Minister’s predecessors Adolphe Muzito or Antoine Gizenga. This may be due
to Matata’s friendship with Augustin Katumba Mwanke, the eminence grise of
Congolese politics and business, and Kabila’s closest confidant prior to his
death in a plane crash this February. The Prime Minister was on the plane
with Katumba when it crashed, but survived with nothing more than a few
bruises.
Matata has used the President’s confidence in him to go ahead with reform
processes that are again threatening the vested interests of people around
Kabila. For the first time in the country’s history, civil servants and
members of the FARDC will be paid electronically, directly into bank
accounts. While movements away from the cash-based economy will curb
corruption, senior civil servants and officers, who were previously in
charge of handing out cash to their subordinates, will lose out.
Matata’s concentration on macroeconomic reforms and his efforts to
streamline government and instill more discipline into his cabinet has made
him popular with the international community. At the same time, he has
stepped on the toes of many, especially the advisors surrounding the
presidency. His appointment to the position of Prime Minister caught many by
surprise. Evariste Boshab, president of the ruling People’s Party for
Reconstruction and Development (PPRD), and Pierre Lumbi, president of the
Social Movement for Renewal (MSR) and Kabila’s chief advisor on security
matters, had eyed the position for themselves. Matata is relatively new to
Kinshasa’s political intrigues, and as a native of Maniema Province is not
part of the powerful Katangan clique dominating the presidency. His reform
efforts, which may undermine the privileges of the old political elite, may
come back to haunt him.
Matata has little political backing in Kinshasa besides that of Kabila.
While he is ambitious and without doubt would like remain part of the
country’s political leadership, he seems isolated from those who matter in
the country, like Boshab and Lumbi as well as those in control of the
intelligence and security machinery. It is well known that they are just
waiting for a political mistake in order to attack Matata. Even a small
error may cause him to lose Kabila’s support and spell the end of his
political rise
On the face of it, Kabila remains politically strong. However, his position
has been weakened by his poor showing in the last elections and by the death
of Katumba Mwanke. Katumba was many things: Kabila’s financial advisor, a
commercial heavyweight with control over many industries, and a political
powerbroker who managed to win majorities for the president. But most
importantly for Kabila, he was a friend and a shock absorber who mastered
the complex politics around the president, where divergent interests
permanently fight for influence and access.
Without Katumba Mwanke, Kabila is more exposed to these political games, and
he is not equipped with Katumba’s political acumen to manage them. The
President also appears to be sickened by the constant bickering within his
family and his political entourage, withdrawing from these issues as much as
possible. He now spends the majority of his time on his farm outside
Kinshasa. The crisis in the east and the death of Katumba weigh on him
heavily and Kabila has hardly been seen in public between Katumba’s death in
February and the UN General Assembly in September. He has also not issued
public statements on the state of affairs for months. The 2011 elections
cast a shadow on Kabila’s legitimacy at home and abroad, but not talking to
his people seems a strange way to rebuild it.
The Kivu crisis matters, but neither the president nor the international
community should mistake its resolution as being the only issue in building
a better future for the Congolese people. Reforms that ensure employment and
provide basic services to the population, attract international investment
and ultimately create jobs for the masses are badly needed. A prime minister
without political backing may not be enough to bring change, and the
international community should not make the mistake of placing its hopes
solely on Matata. Kabila needs to step up, wherever he may be.
Günther v. Billerbeck is a Director in G3’s Africa Practice and a former
Political Affairs Officer with the peacekeeping mission in DRC.
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Received on Fri Jan 04 2013 - 17:29:49 EST
