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[Dehai-WN] Opendemocracy.net: The great Ethiopian land-grab: feudalism, leninism, neo-liberalism ... plus ça change

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 19:58:47 +0100

The great Ethiopian land-grab: feudalism, leninism, neo-liberalism ... plus
ça change


 <http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/ren%C3%A9-lefort> René Lefort, 03
January, December 2012


Land in Ethiopia is being leased to agro-industry investors on very long
terms and below market rates. The beneficiaries have good political
connections. But then land has been the play-thing of centralising
authoritarians throughout Ethiopia's recent history.


About the author

René Lefort has been writing about sub-saharan Africa since the 1970s and
has reported on the region for Le Monde, Le Monde diplomatique, Libération,
Le Nouvel Observateur.

He is the author of
95-6183037> "Ethiopia. An heretical revolution?" (1982, Zed books).

His email is <mailto:renelefort_at_wanadoo.fr> renelefort_at_wanadoo.fr

Ethiopia is the world champion of “land grabbing” – the practice of renting
out vast expanses of farmland to local and, in particular, foreign
investors. In 2011, 3.5 million hectares were allocated, while the projected
figure for 2015 is 7 million hectares, an area twice the size of Belgium.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn1> [i] By way of
comparison, 12 million hectares are farmed by the same number of
smallholders, who make up four-fifths of the Ethiopian workforce. It is not
hard, then, to imagine the anticipated leap forward in agricultural output,
especially given that the productivity of these new mechanised farms should
be much greater than that of traditional peasant farmers. As a first
approximation, medium sized yields and export of just half of their
production should, in the medium term, bring in about US$ 10 billion in
foreign currencies, at a time when the deficit in the balance of payments is
the Achilles heel of the Ethiopian economy and its GDP currently stands at
US$ 30 billion.

“They gave the land to us and we took it… This is green gold!” exclaimed one
of the largest investors.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn2> [ii] The rents are
“ridiculously low by any standard” (theoretically starting at US$ 8 dollars
per hectare per year), the leases are for up to 99 years, finance facilities
and tax breaks are increasingly generous as the share of exported produce
goes up. Some are calling it “the deal of the century”.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn3> [iii] The
authorities, who are solely responsible for this operation, because land is
public property,
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn4> [iv] challenge the
term “land grabbing” and retort that these are “win win arrangements.” They
say that only “abandoned” or “unutilized” land is open to the investors “on
the basis of clearly set out lease arrangements… to make sure everybody will
benefit from this exercise.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn5> [v]

But the indictment of journalists and researchers, who have only recently
been able to peek beneath the of this operation shrouded in secrecy, seems

“The government of one of the most vulnerable countries in the world is
handing over vast land and water resources to foreign investors to help the
food security efforts of their home countries, or to gain profits for their
companies, without making adequate safeguards and without taking into
account the food security needs of its own people.” The mechanism that they
set up can be summarised as follows: Ethiopia rents out land to investors so
that they can export their produce, and then import the same produce, grown
somewhere else, to feed its own people. In the end, “the damage done…
outweighs the benefits gained.”

The Ethiopian regime is anything but impulsive. It has obviously weighed up
the pros and cons of land grabbing, especially since, for the large part,
these were known in beforehand.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn6> [vi] So why did
they throw themselves headlong into it?

The rush of investors for farmland is a global phenomenon, on a scale never
seen before.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn7> [vii] But why has
Ethiopia responded to this demand with such a staggering offer? There are
two main factors – the influence of Ethiopia’s long heritage and the radical
change of direction taken by the new “post revolutionary” ruling class over
the past decade.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn8> [viii]

“Land was the sign, the source, the stake, the object of wealth and power;
conversely, wealth and power gave access to the land.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn9> [ix] Haile
Selassie, officially the sole and unique landowner, gave land to those whose
support he wanted or to reward services rendered. They derived most of their
income from a “feudal” exploitation of this land, on condition that they
also handed over a substantial portion to the Crown. The Kings of Kings used
this deduction as his economic weapon to attain the supreme goal of
centralising power, at the expense of local “feudal” lords.

This mode of feudal extrication was even more brutal in areas on the edge of
the Abyssinian plateau that had been conquered and subjugated at the end of
the 19th century. The State handed out two thirds of these lands to its
supporters, with outrageous favouritism shown to the Amharas of Shoa, which
was the epicentre of imperial power. This particular form of what
researchers have dubbed “internal colonialism”, which included settlers from
the plateau, was justified either on racial grounds – the light-skinned
“Northerners” from the plateau, versus the “black” people, the chankilla
(slaves) of the South –or on social grounds – the “Northern” farmers versus
the agro-pastoralists or pastoralists of the South– and on the basis of a
myth, whereby these vast lands were an almost deserted Eldorado, a natural
outlet for the insatiable hunger for land arising from the extreme density
of the Abyssinian plateau. All of this also fuelled a spontaneous emigration
of “Northerners”.

For the imperial regime, agriculture was the engine for development. But as
the regime came to an end, it oscillated between two strategies. For the
first, which remained marginal, “small farmers are efficient and are capable
of being the engine of growth and economic development” on condition that
they receive help to increase their remarkably low productivity. Whence the
timid appearance from the 1960s onwards of “package programmes.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn10> [x] In the second
strategy, which dominated and received the support of international
organisations, these “subsistence farmers” are incapable of “productivity
growth”. Salvation could only come from the development of “large and
mechanized farm enterprises.” Hence the emergence of “agrarian capitalism”
or “mechanised feudalism”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn11> [xi] through land
concessions given to private Ethiopian, and sometimes foreign, investors.
This was ultimately the case for about 2% of cultivated land.

When the Derg took power in 1974, with its Marxist-Leninist ideology backed
by the student movement, its priorities was to eradicate this “feudal” class
of “landlords” by one of the most radical agricultural reforms ever
undertaken: “land to the tiller.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn12> [xii] It became
public property. But the State maintained a sort of crown right over its
administration, beginning with granting use rights to peasants over a parcel
of land roughly proportional to the size of their family.

In a break with the imperial regime, its economic strategy was aimed first
at the mass of smallholders. It made widespread use of the ‘packages’. But
it very quickly adopted the “socialist” dogma of agricultural development
with the emphasis on large mechanised farms. Once nationalised, the large
private farms became rather like sovkhozes, and failed in much the same way.
Migration from the plateau to the lowlands increased dramatically through
forced “resettlement” drives.

When the current regime came to power in 1991, it did not touch the 1974
agrarian reform. The thread running through history remained unbroken – land
rights continued “to define relations of power between the state… and
smallholders and their communities.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn13> [xiii] But unlike
its predecessors, the current regime put subsistence farmers at the centre
not only of agricultural development but development in general, with a
level of public support unequalled in Africa and probably in the world. The
aim was to lift the peasant masses out of their abyssal poverty, to achieve
nationwide food security, and to stimulate the foundations of an industry
encouraged by the demand for basic commodities by the fringe of the newly
“rich” peasants.

Ten years on, the failure of this strategy has become patent, not for want
of public funding, but mainly because the authorities applied it using the
same top-down approach as its predecessors. The authoritarian recruitment of
small farmers deprived the strategy of a key element – their empowerment. In
fact, the authorities refused to let this happen. As the evidently
“enlightened” avant-garde, they alone could decide what the peasants had to
do and to impose this on them. And this empowerment could above all have
undermined their hegemony.

Agricultural productivity languished (and is still at a standstill). Food
security stayed (and remains) a mirage. Emergency food aid and, since 2005,
a vast programme of cash for work and food for work programmes (the
Productive Safety Net Programme) continue to be needed for one out of six
Ethiopians, on average. Industry stagnated too.

This economic failure was coupled with a major political setback. The regime
was convinced that its efforts to help the peasant masses would guarantee
their unswerving support. It was confident that there would be no risk in
opening the political arena more than ever for the 2005 elections, in order
to gain national and international legitimacy. But the rise of the
opposition shook the regime. The millions of small farmers mostly followed
the rural elite, spearhead of the opposition movement.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn14> [xiv]

In the early 2000s the convergence of these two factors and the elimination
of the ruling party’s “left wing” after its worst internal crisis led to a
Copernican revolution, dubbed “Renewal”. It had two inextricably intertwined
strands. Since 1991, development had primarily been “indigenous” - or
introverted. It needed to mobilise the relatively homogeneous mass of small
farmers as a whole, with the aid of massive but undifferentiated state
support. Development was to become primarily “exogenous” – or extravert.
Following a “structural change”, Ethiopia now had to follow a new dogma – to
become part of “the mainstream of the global market economy”. What is at
stake? Nothing less than “to ensure national survival as a country.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn15> [xv] But becoming
part of this mainstream now requires expansion of the tiniest and most
capitalist sectors, led by the “new entrepreneurs”. To this end they are
being promised the (much-demanded) freedom to do business and an almost
complete monopoly on public support – in other words, the fast track to
becoming rich. In political terms the ruling power expects, in return, that
they will guarantee their support, using their position as opinion leaders
for the peasant masses and even the urban population – i.e. that these new
entrepreneurs become the regime’s new constituency.

This explains the appearance of the “model farmers” within traditional
agriculture. They are chosen on the basis of their ability to grow
“marketable farm products”. They attract the bulk of State agricultural
support and are automatically – and if necessary forcefully - enrolled as
members of the ruling party. Rural society is becoming socially and
economically polarised. At the top is the emergence of a slender class of
“kulaks”, while the mass of small farmers is left to fend for itself. “Those
who take advantage will prosper, and the rest will lose mercilessly”.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn16> [xvi]

But “the key actor in this agricultural development will be relatively
large-scale private investors.” The regime is returning to the old
philosophy, whereby “the growth of large and mechanized farm enterprises” is
the engine for growth in the agricultural sector. Once again, the “tractor
ideology”, with its endless fields, farmed by an armada of machines, is
definitely the only prospect for the future.

Ethiopia was unable to reach its goal of rapidly increasing its share of
global commerce by relying solely on its traditional exports (coffee, oil
seeds, etc.) from small producers. It hopes to use its very low labour costs
to become an exporter of basic manufactured goods, but this will take time
and success is by no means certain. The ruling power had no choice but to
seize the golden opportunity presented by this global “land rush”. A
combination of factors – the dogma of Ethiopia entering “into the mainstream
of the global market economy,” the decision that “the agriculture sector
will continue to be the engine of growth” and that it could only be fuelled
by “relatively large-scale private investors,” the observation that Ethiopia
is unable to raise the investments needed on its own –led unavoidably to its
only immediately available asset of any value, its land, being put on the
market, and to offer it to the only economic forces able to exploit it
quickly: foreign investors. From the Ethiopian government’s perspective on
the economy, land grabbing is far from being a foolish whim or a bit-part
player. It has the starring role.

But there also has to be a healthy supply of investors. Given the
competition in Africa, the Ethiopian authorities need to align themselves
with the prevailing conditions and accept that they cannot control the
process, at least in the short term.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn17> [xvii] Nothing
must get in the way of this unbridled “Go West” spirit.

This economic logic fits completely with the prevailing political logic. The
radical Marxist “revolutionary elite” made a complete U-turn when it came to
power in 1991, promising democratisation and a free market economy. In fact,
using the same mechanisms of “communist engineering” based on “democratic
centralism” that had been so useful for sizing power, this elite continued
to consolidate their control to the point of achieving a monopoly. Today,
due to ‘the effective “fusion” of party and state’,
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn18> [xviii] Ethiopia
is de facto ruled by a ‘monolithic party-state,’
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn19> [xix] dominated by
a handful of leaders where Tigreans – 6% of the population – are

This achievement of political monopoly cannot be divorced from what the
researcher Jean François Bayart calls a “Thermidorian situation”,
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn20> [xx] characterised
by the “revolution of interests”. The new “revolutionary elite… is turning
into a dominant class via the primitive accumulation of capital that comes
with holding power, according to the classical procedure of straddling
institutional, family and business interests.” It uses this political
hegemony “to accumulate wealth or the means of production under the cover of
“free trade”” and “joining the global market.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn21> [xxi]

The first phase of this metamorphosis started as soon as the new government
took office. The promised liberalisation of the economy led to a wave of
privatisation but it was modest in reality. It left out the main public
asset, land, as well as the banks, insurance companies, telecommunications
and electricity utilities. The rest was just an illusion. “Privatisation
became monopolisation.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn22> [xxii] Through
endowments supposedly created to stimulate rehabilitation, mainly of the
Tigray State, the leadership plundered the “privatised” enterprises.
Operating with a total lack of transparency, and enjoying a great many
privileges, “State-owned enterprises and ruling party-owned entities
dominate the major sectors of the economy.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn23> [xxiii] Their
profits “are not being rolled over… but diverted elsewhere.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn24> [xxiv] Most of
what was left over has been pocketed by a few oligarchs under the protection
of top leaders of the party State. Lower down the scale, it is essential for
any private entrepreneur to be able to count on the support of a powerful
official to run his business.

For a long time, the land – especially rural but also urban – and as a
result agriculture, was left out of this grabbing process, remaining
effectively public property. But an – unfortunately very poorly documented –
process of “rampant privatisation” started at the end of the 1990s, mainly
in urban areas. The first to benefit were senior officers during the war
with Eritrea (1998-2000), who were rewarded with land that they then built
on, mainly as a means of speculation. This privilege gradually extended to
high-ups in the nomenklatura, then to those lower down. There is a return to
a major feature of the pre-revolutionary period. Those in power started to
reward their most devoted servants with land. And, inversely, owning land
became the main gateway to wealth. For anyone visiting Addis Ababa, the
construction boom will be the first thing that strikes them.

Mutatis mutandis, the same process has percolated into the rural areas. Its
most glaring manifestation is the recent eruption of floriculture, mainly
run by foreign companies. But the amount of land involved is still small,
about 1 600 hectares. In contrast, land grabbing started as early as 1996
with a total lack of transparency, but almost exclusively for the benefit of
Ethiopian nationals, at least up until the mid-2000s. The first regions to
be targeted were the irrigated lands of the Awash, Afar, bordering the
Tigray region, and Kaffa, the main coffee-producing region. Even today, 95%
of the investors are Ethiopians. Their farms are generally much smaller, a
few hundred hectares at most. For want of skills and resources, fewer than
20% of these farms would have started to be developed. Essentially, then,
these Ethiopians have made an investment, with what they themselves called
“easy” access to loans and facilities for acquiring the land, if they had
not been given it “for free.” This “preferential treatment” applied
especially to Tigreans.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn25> [xxv] Once again,
the central authorities used the allocation, and even gifts, of rural land
to reward or consolidate what they considered to be their most loyal
supporters, again with an ethnic bias. Once again, the age-old push toward
the lowlands resumed, still presented as a deserted Eldorado.

“Land leases are tantamount to near ownership”, declared one of the largest
foreign investors.
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn26> [xxvi] With land
grabbing, this process of land privatisation took on a new dimension. “What
is being grabbed or transferred are rights belonging to individuals and
communities”. Who is doing the grabbing? “The dominant classes, especially
landed groups, capitalists, corporate entities, state bureaucrats and
village chiefs… at the expense of citizens and grassroots communities.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn27> [xxvii] And at the
top of the list, in Ethiopia, the nucleus of the party State. It seized the
monopoly on land grabbing for any land over 5 000 hectares. Previously, any
real estate transaction, no matter what the size of the land, was handled by
each of the nine States in the federation. It is this nucleus that laid its
hands on the land rights by disappropriating the local communities, and then
according itself the right – and the power that goes with it – to
reallocate them to investors, all at its total discretion. Moreover, so long
as the land was farmed by locals, there was hardly any surplus and this
tended to remain within small local commercial and financial circuits. With
land grabbing, output worth billions of dollars entered commercial and above
all financial circuits controlled by the central power.

So, after industry and services, a new wave of centralisation of economic
resources has been added to the already extreme centralisation of political
power. They offer each other mutual support. Once again, land is playing a
major role in rejuvenating the superimposition of wealth and power, public
and private elites. A “revolutionary” interlude is coming to an end. And
this has at least two major consequences.

Land grabbing is leading to the ““South Africanisation (of the agricultural
structures)… meaning structures dominated by large, settler-type estates
existing side by side with a host of impoverished small farms struggling to
survive in the shadow of these estates.”
dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_edn28> [xxviii] It
“marginalises” the rural population. It reinforces the “disempowerment” of
traditional peasants, when the opposite is needed for them to become an
“active agent in all matters affecting their lives.” In this way it is
shattering the relative egalitarianism of the rural world that has been in
place since 1974, by polarising society, and nurturing class division,
another aspect of which is the ongoing “kulakisation” of the small farmers.

The present regime has instituted a federal system. It considers that the
hypercentralisation, even Jacobinism of its predecessors had exacerbated the
centrifugal forces, mainly ethnically driven, to the point of threatening
the unity of Ethiopia. The perpetuation of this unity requires a genuine
balance of power between all of the “nations, nationalities and peoples of
Ethiopia”. But land grabbing is part of a process of re-concentration, which
renders the federal system even more artificial.

The issues involved in land grabbing go beyond the economy. On top of the
tensions born of the government’s rejection of all forms of democratisation,
on top of the mounting ethnic tensions, it helps to sharpen the divide
between the classes. It is going to turn the entire political landscape
upside down, deepening the divisions within Ethiopian society.







dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref1> [i] Dessalegn
Rahmato, 2011, Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia,
Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa. The other reference study is The
Oakland Institute 2011, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa –
Country Report Ethiopia. Unless otherwise stated, all the following
quotations are taken from these documents.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref2> [ii] In Zenawi
says: No land grab in Ethiopia, not today, not tomorrow, Keffyalew
Gebremedhin, 9 August 2011.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref3> [iii]Ethiopia at
centre of global farmland rush, The Guardian, 21 March 2011.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref4> [iv] The
Constitution stipulates that “Land (rural as urban) is a common property of
the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject
to sale or to other means of exchange… Ethiopian peasants have right to
obtain… the protection against eviction from their possession”.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref5> [v] Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, ITMN Television, 26 June 2011.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref6> [vi] In an
interview for the Financial Times (7 August 2008), Meles Zenawi himself
predicted that “large-scale farming” could bring “some employment”, but “not
much”. It would not solve the problem of food insecurity because “it is not
about production, it’s about income distribution… (which) is not going to be
improved by concentrating on large farms.”

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref7> [vii] These
figures give a range from 50 to 80 million hectares rented globally to to
foreign investors in the past few years, mainly in Africa.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref8> [viii] The last
emperor, Haile Selassie, was overthrown by a socialist military junta, the
Derg, in 1974. This in turn was overthrown in 1991 by a coalition of armed
movements, led by a radically Marxist regional autonomist movement, the
Trigray People’s Liberation Front. It remains the cornerstone of the ethnic
coalition currently in power.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref9> [ix] Ethiopia –
An Heretical Revolution, René Lefort, 1983, Zed Press

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref10> [x] Fertilizer
and selected seeds plus loans plus training.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref11> [xi] Lefort,

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref12> [xii] Land
reform of 4 March1974.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref13> [xiii] The
peasant and the State – Studies in Agrarian Changes in Ethiopia 1950s-2000s,
Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009, Addis Ababa University Press.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref14> [xiv] Powers –
mengist - and peasants in rural Ethiopia: the May 2005 elections, Lefort
René, Journal of Modern African Studies, 45/2, 2007.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref15> [xv] Meles
Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends And New Beginnings, 9 August 2006.
This quotation, as well as those that follow, are taken from this document
and The EPRDF's Rural Development Vision : An Overview, Special Issue N°3 of
Renewal (Tehadso), April 2002; Development, democracy and revolutionary
democracy, August 2006 (internal document of the EPRDF).

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref16> [xvi]
Development, democracy and revolutionary democracy, internal document of the
ruling party, August 2006.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref17> [xvii] Or to
take over later, when the balance of power is more favourable, because
investors have to wait at least until the sizeable investments needed to
kick-start their farms have started to pay off: “Prime Minister Meles and
the Government of Ethiopia have historically proven to be crafty
negotiators… Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the GoE … has a
reasonable overall plan” to renegotiate the contracts later (Ethiopia
seeks dramatic changes in agricultural land use, 10 December 2009,

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref18> Aalen L. &
Tronvoll K. 2009. The End of Democracy? Curtailing political and civil
rights in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy, 36/4.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref19> [xix] Clapham
C. 2009. Post-War Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis, Review of African
Political Economy, 36, 120.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref20> [xx] In
reference to the Thermidorian reaction (1794) which ended the Terror era of
the French revolution

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref21> [xxi] Jean
François Bayart, Le concept de situation thermidorienne : régimes
néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique, Questions de
Recherche/Research in Question N°24 – March2008, Centre d’études et de
recherches internationales, Ecole des sciences politiques, Paris.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref22> Idem.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref23> Idem.

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref24> [xxiv]
Party-statals : How the ruling parties “endowments” operate, 19 March 2009,

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref25> Oakland

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref26> Idem

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref27> Dessalegn

dalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%C3%A7-change#_ednref28> [xxviii] Ruth
Hall, The Many Faces of the Investor Rush in Southern Africa: Towards a
Typology of Commercial Land Deals, 2010, unpublished paper, cited by
Dessalegn Rahmato.



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